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CHAPTER ONE 
 
1.0 Introduction.  
Inter-firm relations play a central role in today’s business, from outsourcing, joint 
ventures, to alliances. Contractual governance merits studying, because in global 
business, the final product involves different firms (Min & Zhuo, 2002). These firms are 
often from different countries.  Such a trend is likely to continue due to the intensified 
role of emerging markets in the global economy. Emerging markets have recently 
become an interesting and growing area of research due to their growth potential in 
global business. Recent statistics have indicated that 38.9% of world manufacturing 
goods are now coming from developing markets, 57.6% from developed markets and 
3.5% from transition markets, with both developing and transition markets constantly 
rising while developed markets continually falling (UNCTAD, 2012). Ernst & Young 
(2013) article on six global trends shaping the business world have also estimated that 
70% of world growth over the next few years will come from emerging markets.  
 
Changes in the research patterns have not gone along or at least in proportion to changes 
in the world business. Contracts are about ‘‘getting things done in the real world’’ 
(Macneil, 1980:5), and thus proper knowledge of the context and its linkage to 
contractual governance is essential. Most firms stuck in emerging markets because of 
applying ‘‘traditional thinking’’ (Khanna, Palepu, Sinha, 2005:63) that does not take into 
account contextual factors. Transactions do not function without institutions (Khanna & 
Palepu, 2010), nor does contracts function independent of society (Macneil, 1980). There 
is no good reason to assume that theoretical predictions are generalizable to every market 
if institutions and exchange cannot be separated. Applying institutional thinking into 
contracts does not go without challenges (Williamson, 1993).  
 
The focus of the thesis is to address four gaps within contractual governance literature. 
These gaps are content (completeness and the psychological aspect of a contract) and 
context (using emerging markets) by nature.     
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First is that most studies that have explored contractual completeness in both traditional 
economics (Masten & Crocker, 1985; Spier, 1992; Hart & Moore, 1999; Maskin & 
Tirole, 1999; Saussier, 2000) and outside economics (Luo, 2002, 2005; Poppo & Zenger, 
2002; Reuer & Arino, 2002; Anderson & Dekker, 2005; Aubert et al, 2006; Argyres & 
Mayer, 2007; Argyres, Bercovitz & Mayer, 2007) have not provided strong empirical 
examination on the institutional role on the concept. Most works used general models 
(especially those of economics), single economies or homogeneous institutions, but 
heterogeneous institutions are important for validity reasons (Oxley, 1999). Luo (2002) 
suggested the concept of contractual completeness is made up of two dimensions 
(contractual term specificity and contingent adaptability). According to Luo, 
‘‘contingency adaptability is the extent to which unanticipated contingencies are 
accounted for and relevant guidelines for handling these contingencies are delineated in a 
contract, while term specificity concerns with how specific and detailed the terms are’’ 
(2002: 905).  Some scholars consider ‘term specificity’ as an attribute for ‘complexity’ 
and has investigated on complexity (Poppo and Zenger, 2002; Reuer and Arin ᷈o, 2002, 
2003; Arin᷈o and Reuer, 2004).  
 
Both the first (Grossman & Hart, 1986; Hart & Moore, 1990) and second generation 
(Bolton & Faure-Grimaud, 2010; Hart & Moore, 2008; Tirole, 2009) views of incomplete 
contracts suggest that the variations in the structural aspects of a contract are exogenously 
and endogenously determined. Parkhe operationalization of the concept of degree of 
contractual safeguards motivated studies that were outside the domain of economics 
(Deeds and Hill, 1999; Reuer and Arin ᷈o, 2002, 2003; Arin ᷈o and Reuer, 2004).   
 
Contractual completeness makes sense when we look at the optimal version of contracts.  
‘‘An optimal contract trade off’’ the effects between rigidity and flexibility (Hart & 
Moore, 2008:4). In other words, optimal contractual choice, among other things is 
influenced by the costs and benefits analysis, which is endogenous to parties in the 
transaction (Crocker & Reynolds, 1993). According to the authors, the parties in the 
contractual arrangement can intentionally decide to choose low levels of contractual 
completeness. The optimal level of a contract, according to Crocker and Reynolds (1993) 
can be found when the marginal costs of increasing completeness are equal the marginal 
benefits of reducing incompleteness.    
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Second and closely similar to the first is that, in spite of dynamic approaches on the 
concept of completeness, the argument of two dimensions of contracts (Luo, 2002) has 
not been developed sufficiently to display the theoretical distinction (similarities or 
differences of the dimensions). We believe there is still work to be done in terms of 
consolidating the theoretical strength of these dimensions. It is also worth noting that 
most of contractual dimensions that emerge in empirical studies are based on factor 
analysis. Providing both empirical and theoretical strength on these dimensions is 
essential for broadening our understanding of contractual governance.  
The third is on the partners’ psychological responses in the contractual relations, i.e. 
satisfaction in contractual dealings. There is the argument that contracts are not optimal, 
but rather they are at satisficing level (Bolton & Faure-Grimaud, 2010).  If partners can 
reach contractual agreements that are at satisficing levels, the key question that has not 
been adequately addressed is on which drivers are responsible for this satisficing level. 
The concept of contractual satisfaction was mentioned by Grønhaug & Gilly (1991), but 
there was no empirical development of the concept. The concept of contractual fairness 
that was introduced by Klein (1980) and later developed in the study by Poppo & Zhou 
(2013) is closely linked to the concept of contractual satisfaction. Though we understand 
fairness is one of the attributes for satisfaction (see Huseman, Hatfield and Miles (1987) 
and Tse & Wilton (1988) on equity theory), it does not capture all facets of the concept.  
 
Fourth, is on international comparisons of contractual satisfaction in heterogeneous 
emerging markets. Looking at contractual satisfaction by comparing contextual 
environments will enhance our understanding on whether the drivers of contractual 
satisfaction are influenced by contextual surroundings.   
  
We use four empirical papers that cover each gap we have identified above. The data 
used was obtained from two heterogeneous emerging markets; Tanzania (advancing or 
less advanced emerging market) and Poland (advanced emerging market).  The rationale 
for selecting these economies is provided in the next section on the research context 
(section 1.1).  Each paper links upon the other. Paper one addresses the first gap (use of 
heterogeneous institutional data in studying contracts) where we focus on a single 
dimension of contractual completeness (ex-ante contractual term specificity) and 
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examines how it differs within the institutional setting of heterogeneous emerging 
markets of Tanzania and Poland. The findings indicate that relational dimensions 
(reputation and history) and ex-ante contractual costs (these include searching, 
negotiation and drafting costs that are incurred prior to contracts) have a complementary 
effect on contractual completeness (ex-ante term specificity). The effect was stronger in 
more advanced than in less advanced emerging markets.  This paper suggests the drivers 
of contractual completeness differ in terms of strength rather than the direction of effect 
across the heterogeneous emerging markets. 
 
The contribution of this paper is on the role of institutional context in shaping specific 
dimensions that influences the structural elements of contracts. Further, we incremented 
the debate on the complementary versus substitute roles of relational governance 
(Möllering, 2002; Lazzarini et al., 2004; Eriksson and Sharma, 2003) using the 
institutional perspective. The findings present the rationale behind divergence and 
convergence of results which were not well explained in the past literature.    
 
In paper two we address the second gap (on differences in the contractual dimensions) by 
adding the second dimension (contingent adaptability) of contractual governance and 
analyze how it differs with ex-ante term specification (from previous paper). Building 
upon Luo (2002) work on two dimensional view of contractual completeness, the paper 
finds that the key difference between the two contractual dimensions (contingent 
adaptability and term specification) is the level of assets and how they interact with 
volume uncertainty. This is one of the important advancements in the contractual 
governance theory, because there has not been a strong theoretical explanation on what 
shape the differences in these dimensions.   
 
Paper three addresses the third gap (on contractual satisfaction) by exploring the idea of 
contractual satisfaction and how it is influenced. The paper suggests that, while ex-ante 
term specificity, contingent adaptability, reputation and trust have a positive influence on 
contractual satisfaction, opportunism has a negative one. The findings make a 
contribution in terms of introducing the concept of contractual satisfaction in the study of 
contractual governance and deviates from the held assumption that the level of details can 
lead to negative outcomes (Macaulay, 1963) such as opportunism. This paper suggests 
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also that by allowing for both term specificity and contingent adaptability, the parties are 
relatively satisfied. A key note to take in this paper is that it is not how the terms are 
tightened that determined safeguard, but it is how contracts are designed in terms of 
balancing the terms and flexibility aspects. Such a balance will be the optimal choice that 
provides satisfaction to exchange parties.      
 
Paper four addresses the fourth gap (on international comparisons of contractual 
satisfaction) by acquiring the idea from paper 3 into an international level through the 
comparison of contractual governance using institutional context. The major findings 
suggest that ex ante efforts (costs) and ex post specifications have a significant positive 
effect on contractual satisfaction. This effect is stronger in advanced emerging market 
(Poland). 
 
The contribution of this report is that, contractual satisfaction (that is experienced at the 
optimal choice) can significantly differ from one transaction to the other as a result of ex 
ante efforts and ex post specifications (contingent adaptability). Another key take from 
this paper is that the level of contractual satisfaction can vary between institutions as a 
function of cost and level of adaptability that will be allowed.    
 
The rest of the introduction chapter is organized as follows; Section 1.1 provides the 
context for the study. Section 1.2 to 1.5 provides an overview of research objective and 
research questions. Section 1.6 provides an overview of the relevance of the study. This 
includes both theoretical and practical relevance. Section 1.7 provides the organization of 
the thesis.  
 
1.1 Research Context 
This study uses two countries from emerging markets; Tanzania and Poland. The regions 
that the countries have been selected are significant in today’s business economy. 
Whereas Eastern and Central Europe have been viewed as an attractive debt market after 
the Eurozone crisis (Oprita, 2012), Sub-Saharan Africa on the other hand, has been 
named as the region with the second highest economic prospects in the world for the 
years 2011-20 (Economist, 2011). 
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What distinguishes emerging markets themselves with well-developed markets is the 
intensity and nature of institutional dynamics (Hafsi &Farashi, 2005) together with 
”degree to which they have successfully adopted rule-based market governance systems’’ 
(Roth & Kostova, 2003:317). Institutions are ‘‘regulative, normative, and cognitive 
structures and activities that provide stability and meaning to social behavior’’ (Scott, 
1995: 33). The institutional spectrum ranges from formal (such as rules and regulations) 
to informal (such as trust and reputation). Albeit formal institutions are important, 
nevertheless this does not override the germaneness of informal ones (Hill, 1995). 
Institutions in our definition consist of culture, regulations and norms actions that shape 
the way people behave (See North, 1990). We define institutional context as the 
embedded (aggregated) cultural, regulatory and norms actions. 
 
Key institutional dimensions that are mostly used in literature are legal, normative and 
cognitive actions (North, 1990; Scott, 1995), thus it is important to compare the two 
economies using these dimensions. According to World Bank data (2004-2014), 
Tanzania and Poland have made radical legal reforms especially on contractual 
procedures. From 2012 to now, this dataset (World Bank, 2004-2014) indicates that 
Poland is doing relatively better in terms of reducing legal procedures than Tanzania. The 
same dataset indicated that Tanzania is doing better in terms of the length of time it takes 
to enforce contracts (less time to enforce contracts). From 2008 to date, the cost of 
enforcing contracts is relatively similar for Poland and Tanzania. Normative aspects deal 
with how firms or individuals abide by the rules. We use corruption perception index as a 
proxy for assessing the normative institutions. Poland is doing relatively better in terms 
of corruption index (low corruption in Poland) compared to Tanzania (Transparency 
International, 2001-2013), implying the high propensity for business firms in Poland to 
abide to normative standards.  Cognitive elements deal with cultural aspects of the 
society. Poland and Tanzania are relatively similar in terms of power distance and long-
term orientation, but differ in terms of individualism, masculinity and uncertainty 
avoidance (Hofstede Centre, 2014). Poland ranks higher in all three dimensions 
(individualism, masculinity and uncertainty avoidance).  
 
In addition to the above comparative institutional dimensions, economic and political 
histories are important features that shape nations. The two economies have relatively 
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comparable patterns that are deduced from historical and economic landscapes. These 
comparable features are important to justify for their comparisons. Tanzania moved from 
a failed African socialism (Ujamaa) that was followed by implementation of structural 
adjustment programs in mid1980’s.  On the other hand, Poland disintegrated from the 
communist regime toward a capitalism path (Prazmowska, 2010). In addition, since 
Poland joined the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (EOCD) in 
2004, it has experienced a significant economic growth (EOCD, 2006). The country was 
also ranked among key emerging markets of Europe (Dow Jones, 2012; S&P, 2010). 
Further, Poland was the only country in East and Central Europe to sustain economic 
growth during the 2009 recession (Oprita, 2012). On the other hand, Tanzania is marked 
as one of the fastest growing economies in Africa (Economist, 2011) and is among the 
top 15 countries in Africa in terms of foreign direct investments (FDI); these 15 countries 
have attracted 82% of new FDI projects in Africa since 2003 (Ernest & Young, 2012).  
 
In relatively speaking, Poland can be considered an advanced emerging market while 
Tanzania is an advancing, or less advanced emerging market due to critical differences in 
technological and institutional transformation. World Economic Forum (2010) indicates 
that while Tanzania is considered to be a factor driven economy, Poland is considered to 
be in transition from efficiency to innovation driven economy.   
 
1.2 General Objective of the Study 
To address some key gaps of contractual governance theory in the context of 
heterogeneous emerging markets 
 
1.3 Specific Objectives 
 Explain drivers of contractual completeness  and their roles in heterogeneous 
emerging markets 
 To address the two dimensional view of contractual completeness  
 Develop contractual satisfaction view  
 Address international comparison of contractual satisfaction in the context of 
heterogeneous emerging markets 
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1.4 General Research Question 
What are key theoretical drivers of contractual governance in heterogeneous 
emerging markets? 
 
1.5 Specific Research Questions 
 
Q1: What are the drivers of contractual completeness and their roles in 
heterogeneous emerging markets? 
The literature on contractual completeness has evolved in different models and 
perspectives. The international aspect, however, has been at a large extent limited. The 
early literature involved the data from relatively advanced institutions, a matter that has 
led to limitations on the generalizability of findings. The studies that took place in China 
and Eastern Europe (Xin & Pearce, 1996; Roth & Kostova, 2003; Peng & Zhou, 2005) 
have indicated the role of specific institutional layout in influencing the contractual 
governance. It is also worth mentioning that even this cluster of studies that extended the 
literature on contracting; either used a single country or a set of relatively homogeneous 
countries. In search for generalizing findings, it is important that studies compare 
relatively heterogeneous institutions (Oxley, 1999). Another aspect is on the parameters 
that influence the degree of contractual completeness within the context of emerging 
markets. Based on the previous literature, the relational aspects of contracts have shown a 
unique influence on contractual governance. Key arguments on this uniqueness have been 
linked with cultural differences. There is strong debate when it comes to the role of 
relational dimensions on contracting. Whereas some have supported for the 
complementary (Aubert et al, 2006; Blomqvist, Hurmelinna & Seppänen, 2005; Hart and 
Moore, 2008; Klein, 1996; Möllering, 2002; Seppänen, Blomqvist & Sundqvist, 2007), 
others have supported the substitutive role (Gulati, 1995; Oxley, 1997; Yu, Liao, Lin, 
2006). Though most studies are in favor of complementary role, we have not obtained 
strong evidence on these roles and their level of influence across heterogeneous 
economies. Further, the cost element of establishing contracts can extensively vary from 
one country to the other, so ex-ante contractual costs are of relevance to examine.  
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Q2: Are there predictive differences or similarities on the two dimensions 
(contingent adaptability and term specificity) of contractual completeness? 
 
Dimension(s) of contractual governance is another interesting and growing area of 
research. Key dimensions (term specificity and contingent adaptability) have been 
highlighted in the literature (Luo, 2002; Reuer & Arin ᷈o, 2007) but there is still a little 
understanding of their theoretical differences and determinants for their choice in the 
contracts. The evolution in this area of contractual governance research broadens the 
scope of how one can view a contractual structure. This development confirms the earlier 
literature on the endogenous choices of contractual completeness (Crocker & Reynolds, 
1993). Depending on the orientation of the parties and the structure of the contractual 
arrangement to be implemented, parties have a range of options to decide (in terms of 
dimensions), but we intend to study on what influence such choices.  
 
Q3 and 4: What are the key drivers of contractual satisfaction? 
This part combines two questions (question three and four). Question three will only 
address the drivers of contractual satisfaction in a single country and question four will 
expand this by using the institutional context of heterogeneous emerging markets. Before 
we explore the conceptual reasoning behind contractual satisfaction, it is better to look at 
the optimal contractual reasoning. At the optimal level of a contractual arrangement, 
parties maximize the benefits and the cost involved in a given contractual choice (Crocker 
& Reynolds, 1993).  Both costs and benefits are perceived by parties and sometimes 
cannot be computed in arithmetic terms. The fulfilled motive for why parties decide to 
govern their relationship by contracts will partly be reflected by their degree of 
satisfaction. For example, if parties decide to increase the degree of assets’ safeguard; a 
fulfillment of this motive will not only be a function of how the structure was managed, 
but also by how partners feel about it. The satisfaction element of contracts is thus a 
psychological side of the contractual exchange. It is possible for parties to feel satisfied 
with their contractual arrangement even if the level of completeness is low. The 
implication is that completeness does not necessarily mean contractual satisfaction. This 
is one of the important perspectives that need to be taken into account in the study of a 
contractual satisfaction. To get a better understanding on the contractual satisfaction, one 
can also take a look at the classical consumer satisfaction framework.  
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The most referred framework on consumer satisfaction is the disconfirmation paradigm 
(Hill, 1986). The expectation (on which the evaluation is based upon) is an important 
dimension in this paradigm. Hill (1986) identified the drivers of expectation to include, 
among other things; product, prior experience and information about the referents market 
activities. The important note one can draw from the disconfirmation paradigm is that the 
elements which form the bases for satisfaction evaluation are independent. The concept 
of relationship (Crosby and Stevens, 1987) and information (Spreng et al, 1996) 
satisfaction are closely related to contractual satisfaction but differ in terms of properties 
that are measured. In this study we intend to take the perspective of satisfaction in 
resolving some questions connected to the psychological side of the inter-firm exchange.  
 
1.6 Relevance of the Study 
1.6.1 Theoretical contribution 
Theoretical contribution of this study is addressed in terms of content and context 
aspects. 
 
Content: The study has contributed to the dimensions of contractual completeness and 
drivers of contractual satisfaction. There has been little theoretical research on how the 
two dimensions of contractual completeness differ. The current study has made a 
theoretical contribution on differences and similarities of the two dimensions and their 
theoretical implications. Further, the concept of contractual satisfaction which is relevant 
in business cooperation and continuity has been brought into the contracting literature.  
 
Context: In terms of context, the concept of contractual completeness has been revisited 
by applying the international context. Past studies have used single markets or closely 
similar emerging markets in examining contractual governance, but the current study 
used heterogeneous emerging markets. 
1.6.2 Practical contribution 
As the business platform moves toward emerging market, it is relevant to have a practical 
understanding on key issues surrounding inter-firm relations. There is just a theoretical 
convention that relations are necessary, but with little implication on how this is reflected 
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in a contractual setting. The study provides a practical tool on conditions which relational 
and non-relational components are to be given emphasis in an inter-firm contractual 
design.  In addition, the study provides a practical know how on the expected outcome of 
some of the relational /non-relational components within different contextual settings. 
Such know-how may empower firms with proper strategic decisions.   
 
1.7 Organization of Thesis  
This thesis is organized in terms of chapters. Each chapter covers a specific issue. 
Chapter two presents key concepts relating to the dependent variables. In this chapter, we 
present the concepts of contractual completeness and contractual satisfaction. Further, 
empirical reviews are also presented in this chapter. Chapter three presents the relevant 
theories that are applied. These include; transaction cost, relational governance, 
satisfaction frameworks and institutional perspectives.  
Chapter four addresses the methodological and descriptive statistics. In this chapter, we 
present the research approach, research design, data collection methods, and data 
analysis. Further, we present the quality assessment aspects. Key issues that are 
addressed in the quality assessment are; validity and reliability. Chapter five to eight 
present a series of papers that build up the thesis. Each paper increments the other. 
Chapter four covers paper1 which deals with contractual completeness by comparing the 
two countries (Tanzania and Poland).   
Chapter six covers, paper 2 that builds upon Luo (2002) work on two dimensional view 
of contractual completeness; Contingent adaptability and ongoing contractual term 
specificity. Chapter seven covers, paper 3 which brought into perspective the concept of 
contractual satisfaction using the Polish data set.  
Chapter eight covers, paper 4 that extended the idea from paper 3 by taking contractual 
satisfaction further in the international landscape. It was not a mere retesting of paper 3, 
but there were additional variables with theoretical improvement. Chapter nine provides a 
final remark by giving an overall picture of the contribution, the future research and the 
study limitation. Figure 1 below provides a general layout of the papers in the thesis and 
how they link each other. References for chapters one up to four will be presented at the 
end of chapter four, where those of chapter five up to nine will be presented at the end of 
each chapter.   
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Figure 1: Organization of papers and concepts 
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CHAPTER TWO                                                                        
KEY CONCEPTS 
       
2.0 Introduction 
This section covers the key concepts of the study; contractual completeness and 
contractual satisfaction. In each of the concepts, we present the theoretical argument 
followed by an empirical review. Section 2.1 starts with the concept of contractual 
completeness, while 2.1.1 provides the empirical review of the concept. Section 2.2 
provides the theoretical aspects of contractual satisfaction, followed by 2.2.1 which 
reviews the past studies on satisfaction within inter-firm relations.   
 
2.1 Contractual Completeness  
Relaxations on the assumptions for completeness led to increased research attention on 
the contractual completeness (Furlotti, 2007). Parkhe operationalization of the concept of 
the degree of contractual safeguards attracted later studies on contracts which were 
outside traditional economic models (Deeds and Hill, 1999; Reuer and Arin᷈o, 2002, 
2003; Reuer et al., 2003; Arin᷈o and Reuer, 2004). Luo (2002) suggested the concept of 
contractual completeness to be made up of two dimensions (contractual term specificity 
and contingent adaptability). Some scholars consider ‘term specificity’ as an attribute of 
‘complexity’ and investigated the complexity aspect of contractual governance (Poppo & 
Zenger, 2002; Reuer & Arin ᷈o, 2002, 2003; Arin ᷈o & Reuer, 2004). The content of ‘term 
specificity’ according to Furlotti has little to do with the ‘‘articulation and extensiveness 
of the contract’’ (2007:81). In spite of the move toward contractual complexity, the 
researches on completeness have not adequately addressed the call from Williamson 
(1996) who emphasized on the need to incorporate institutional context in studying 
contracts. An extensive review provided in table 1 below indicates this gap.  
 
Most definitions of contractual completeness focus on term specification (Brown, 
Potoski, & Van Slyke, 2007; Saussier, 2000). Based on the second-generation view of 
contracts, completeness can be viewed as the degree of detail used to describe activities 
and objectives, which may cover all possible situations and contingencies (Al-Najjar, 
1995; Brown et al., 2007; Hendrikse & Windsperger, 2011; Saussier, 2000). Hendrikse 
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and Windsperger define contractual completeness as the “ratio between specific rights 
and residual rights where specific rights refer to detailed specification of decision action 
in the ex-ante period and residual rights refer to the planning of decision procedures 
which enable decision making about specific actions in the ex post period” (2010:4).  
 
Albeit contractual completeness is hard to achieve (Bernheim & Whinston, 1998; 
Furlotti, 2007; Macaulay, 1963; Macneil, 1980; Neu, 1991; Nakhla, 2003), it is possible 
to study the degree of contractual completeness (Al-Najjar, 1995; Brown et al., 2007; 
Hendrikse & Windsperger, 2011; Saussier, 2000) which will likely vary in heterogeneous 
emerging markets.  The first generation of incomplete contracting theories (Grossman & 
Hart, 1986; Hart & Moore, 1990) explains incompleteness by high enforcement costs due 
to exogenous verifiability constraints in the contract execution period. The second 
generation of incomplete contracting theories (Bolton & Faure-Grimaud, 2010; Hart & 
Moore, 2008; Tirole, 2009) argued that the incompleteness of contracts results primarily 
from adaptation and endogenous verifiability problems under bounded rationality of 
contract partners. The incomplete contract theory gives some clue on the impact of 
contractual incompleteness, but does not provide sufficient knowledge in relation to the 
differences in contractual completeness levels nor does it explain the extent to which 
those levels emerge as an outcome of parties’ goodwill (Roxenhaull & Ghauri, 2004).    
 
Term specification and contingent adaptability (planning) are important dimensions of a 
contract, according to Luo (2002). ‘‘Contingency planning clauses can be defined as a 
part of a contract that is designed to support within-agreement adjustments by proscribing 
the ways in which the contractual partners will deal with changes that might arise during 
the execution of the contract’’(Argyres, Bercovitz and Mayer, 2007:5). These 
contingencies can increase the willingness of the vulnerable party to commit the 
exchange (Klein, 1993). Term specificity concerns with how ‘‘specific and detailed the 
terms are’’ (2002: 905). Spier pointed out that ‘‘in an intermediate range, some contracts 
will be complete and others will be incomplete; the exact pattern will depend on the 
information structure as well as the nature of the transactions costs’’ (1992:433). 
 
Aspects that hinder contractual completeness can occur before the contractual period (ex- 
ante) or after (ex post). While the latter is associated with adaptation problems (Grossman 
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& Hart, 1986; Hart & Moore, 1990), the former is associated with the bounded rationality 
of the contractual partners (Bolton & Faure-Grimaud, 2010; Hart & Moore, 2008; Tirole, 
2009). Both relational and non-relational factors are also important in addressing 
contractual completeness. If relational dimensions are in a continuum (Ferguson, Paulin, 
& Bergeron, 2005) from weak to strong, with the former having a high degree of formal 
contractual constraints and the later a low degree, then the degree of contractual 
completeness will be influenced by this continuum.  
 
Debate on the contractual governance has argued for both complementary (Aubert, 
Houde, Party & Rivard, 2006; Blomqvist, Hurmelinna & Seppänen, 2005; Hart and 
Moore, 2008; Klein 1996; Möllering, 2002; Seppänen, Blomqvist & Sundqvist, 2007) 
and substitutive (Gulati, 1995; Oxley, 1997; Yu, Liao, Lin, 2006) roles of relational 
governance on contracting. Whereas large part of literature has supported for the 
complementary roles, there are key issues that have not been clearly addressed in the 
literature (in relation to these perspectives). The first is whether there are differences (in 
these roles) across different institutional structures in emerging markets. The second is on 
the extent or the level of influence that these dimensions have across these markets. This 
second aspect has hardly been addressed in the literature. Further the cost component is 
an important aspect when it comes to optimal contractual designing (Crocker & 
Reynolds, 1993). The literature on institutions has already indicated the relevance of 
including the contextual surrounding in the study of contractual governance (Williamson, 
1996). It is important to provide a clue to these perspectives of contractual completeness 
so as to empower firms with better predictions that ensure proper strategic alignment 
when dealing with different emerging markets.  
 
 
2.1.1 Empirical review for contractual completeness 
 
An increase in asset specificity has been argued to increase the level of details 
(specifications) in contracts (Dyer, 1997; Poppo and Zenger, 2002), but the endogenous 
decision among exchange partners can influence such a specification level (Crocker and 
Reynolds, 1993; Saussier, 2000). Research on contractual completeness assumes that 
more elaborate and complete contracts limit opportunism (see Macher & Richman, 2008; 
Shelanski & Klein, 1995).  
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Collaborative relationships between firms have also been found to influence governance 
(Gulati, 1995), however Macher & Richman (2008) establish that such collaborative 
relationships have an influence only on the least stringent provisions that firms apply for 
coordination purpose. The relational governance research also associates complete 
contracts with performance (Gong et al., 2007; Poppo & Zenger, 2002; Ryall & 
Sampson, 2009), but Lusch and Brown (1996) found contrary observation; that normative 
contracts positively influence performance when increased trust between firms improves 
relationship quality.  
 
The study of writing contracts within the petroleum coke that was conducted by Goldberg 
and Erickson (1987) concluded that the increased numbers of contractual provisions are 
translated as an attempt of exchange parties to safeguard their specific assets. This 
finding was consistent with Crocker and Masten (1988) study in the natural gas industry 
that also found that the length of terms covered was positively related to specific assets.  
 
A range of studies conducted by Joskow (1985, 1987, 1988b, 1990) attempted to find the 
impact of asset specificity on contractual duration and price adjustments within the 
context of the coal industry (coal suppliers and coal-burning electric plants). The findings 
from these studies indicated that the greater the specific assets, the longer the contractual 
period. These findings were supported by Saussier (1999) study in the coal transportation 
in France. Aubert and colleagues (2006) did not find conclusive results on the impact of 
asset specificity on contractual completeness, but authors argued that these results were 
still premature to reject the null hypothesis on the net impact of specific assets on 
contractual completeness. Further, the authors suggested that, firms trade-off the costs of 
designing, negotiating and implementing more complete contracts with the benefits of 
doing so.   
 
Crocker & Reynolds (1993) studied the relationship between contractual incompleteness 
and opportunistic behavior using the context of Air force engine procurement with 
contracts from the 1970s and 1980s. Their findings suggested that the contract is more 
complete when there is a history of dispute among the parties and less complete when 
there is in temporal or technological uncertainty. An important element of their study was 
that contractual completeness was treated as endogenous concept. Crocker and Reynolds 
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(1993) view more ‘complete’ contracts as the simplest (fixed price), while Saussier 
(2000) view them as having the largest number of clauses.    
  
Zollo and colleagues (2002) study on strategic alliances suggested that prior relations 
between firms can lead to the development of inter-organizational routines; these routines 
can allow firms to avoid the need for detail mechanisms in monitoring and coordinating.  
In connection to volume uncertainty, Aubert and colleagues (2006) found that firms 
facing greater volume uncertainty seek less complete contracts, while firms dealing with 
easily measurable dimensions and standardized activities aim for more complete 
contracts. Acheson’s study (1985) was performed in the fish industry at Maine lobster 
market and findings indicated that the fisherman and pond operators structured their 
agreement in a way that reduced information cost and opportunism (that is linked with 
information asymmetry). Lyon (1994) study was within the context of engineering sub-
contractors and found out that formal contracts are less frequently applied for projects 
with high technological conflicts.  
 
Some studies looked at specific dimensions of contracts. For example Mayer and 
Bercovitz (2003) examined the concept of contingent adaptability and their findings 
suggest that there is a positive association between contracts and level of task 
interdependence. Further, they found a negative association between contracts and 
appropriability of technology. Argyres and colleagues (2007) applied the same database 
and found that prior relationships (history) have a positive relationship with contingency 
provision. Elfenbein and Lerner (2005) studied contingencies in the context of alliances 
in internet portals and their partners and found that the proxy for the anticipated conflict 
of interests and uncertainty has a positive impact on the use of contractual contingencies.  
 
The literature on contracting has indicated that the increased number of clauses in a 
contractual relationship can lead to contractual complexity (Reuer & Arin ᷈o, 2007; 
Barthélemy and Quélin, 2006). Findings on the contractual complexity have suggested 
that the concept is a multidimensional with its different dimensions having unique 
antecedents (Reuer & Arin ᷈o, 2007).  In the table 1 below, we provide a summarized view 
of past studies that have looked at the concept of contractual completeness and related 
concepts. The review indicates that even though the topic has moved into a different 
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angle (on complexity), the institutional influence (use of heterogeneous markets) on 
contractual completeness is something that has not been adequately addressed in the 
literature.   
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Table 1 Review of contractual completeness 
Author Predictors/Variables Outcomes/Dependent 
Variables 
Context Methodology Findings/Remarks 
Masten & 
Crocker 
(1985) 
Excess, demand, 
Depth (of the well), 
Number of buyers, 
Number of sellers, 
Concentration of 
pipes in the region 
Take or pay 
provisions (specified 
take percentage, 
applicable price 
ceiling, the actual 
price of gas) 
Natural gas in 
USA 
Empirical analysis. 
Data was obtained 
from a survey 
covering multiple 
sources.  
Take percentage is significantly 
lower for wells associated with 
a small number of sellers and 
large number of buyers, each of 
which raise the alternative 
value of the gas. Externalities 
do not result in a divergence of 
private and social valuations, 
take obligations contained in 
contracts written in unregulated 
environments provide for 
efficient adaptation to changing 
circumstances in long-term 
contractual relationships.  
Mulherin 
(1986) 
Specific assets, length 
of time, Number of 
pipelines in the field, 
Number of gas 
producers 
Contractual 
complexity (in terms 
of provisions) 
Gas industry in 
USA 
Empirical analysis. 
Data were based 
on producer-
pipeline gas 
contracts between 
1940-54 
Contractual provisions used in 
particular producer-pipeline 
agreements were systematically 
affected by the nature of the 
bilateral contracting hazards. 
Hart & 
Moore 
(1988) 
Specific investments, 
payoffs, risk 
assumptions 
Incomplete contracts 
and contingencies 
Conceptual 
models 
Game and 
Mathematical 
model 
Because parties can rescind the 
original contract and write a 
new one, severe limitations are 
placed on the form the revisions 
can take. Where parties are risk 
neutral and must undertake 
relationship specific 
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investments, they will not be 
able to sustain efficient 
investment levels even if the 
messages are verifiable.  
Chung, 
(1991) 
Exogenous 
uncertainty, buyer 
and seller's specific 
assets,  
Contractual 
incompleteness 
Conceptual 
models 
Mathematical 
model and 
Economic 
assumptions 
In the case where the parties are 
risk neutral and must make 
specific investments, it is 
possible to induce efficient 
investments and the first best 
regardless of the allocation of 
the ex post decision authority. 
In the case where the parties are 
risk averse, but where there are 
no specific investments, it has 
been shown that it is generally 
not possible to implement the 
first best.  
Spier (1992) Transaction cost, 
principal type, ex 
ante costs, ex post 
costs 
Incomplete contract Conceptual 
model 
Mathematical 
model, game, 
economic 
assumptions 
In the presence of transaction 
costs, incompleteness may act 
as a signal of the principal’s 
type. Two types of transaction 
costs are considered: those 
incurred ex ante (drafting costs) 
and those incurred ex post 
(enforcement or verification 
costs). The presence of either of 
these costs, asymmetric 
information leads to more 
contractual incompleteness than 
full information does.  
Crocker & Reputation, Contractual Air Force Empirical analysis Degree of contractual 
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Reynolds 
(1993) 
opportunism, 
environmental 
uncertainty 
incompleteness engine 
purchase from 
General 
Electric and 
Pratt and 
Whitney 
using contractual 
data 
incompleteness chosen in 
practice, reflects the relative 
magnitudes of these economic 
costs. Variables associated with 
higher levels of environmental 
complexity, such as 
technological uncertainty or 
remote dates for contract 
performance, increase the costs 
of drafting complete contracts.  
A record of past opportunistic 
behavior or the potential to 
hold-up in a sole-source 
environment, on the other hand, 
increases the likelihood of ex 
post redistributive efforts, and 
results in the use of more 
complete contracts 
Lyon (1994) Vulnerability, 
complexity, size, trust 
Formal contract UK 
engineering 
subcontractors 
Empirical analysis 
involving 91 firms. 
Data was collected 
through a survey.  
Vulnerability has a positive 
impact on the use of formal 
contracts while the complexity 
and trust had a negative impact. 
Size was not significant 
Bernheim & 
Whinston 
(1998) 
Static contracting 
problem, dynamic 
setting, structural 
inter-temporal 
linkages (current 
choice affects future), 
dynamic setting 
without structural 
Contractual 
incompleteness 
Conceptual 
models 
Game and 
mathematical 
models and 
economic 
assumptions 
Incompleteness is an essential 
feature of a well-designed 
contract. Once some aspects of 
performance are unverifiable, it 
is often optimal to leave other 
verifiable aspects of 
performance unspecified.  
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inter-temporal 
linkages.  
Hart & 
Moore 
(1999) 
Specific investments, 
payoffs, 
renegotiation, 
commitment 
Incompleteness Conceptual 
models 
Mathematical 
model, economic 
assumptions and 
conceptual cases 
The contract is incomplete if 
the parties would like to add 
contingent clauses, but are 
prevented from doing so by that 
fact that the state of nature 
cannot be verified. The way 
contract is completed is not 
optimal from an ex-ante 
perspective. Parties would like 
to ensure that price is 
independent of seller’s cost, but 
this may not be compatible with 
their ex-post incentive 
constrain. Optimal complete 
contracts subjects to 
commitment and incentive 
constraints.  
Maskin & 
Tirole 
(1999) 
Dynamic 
programming, 
Specific investments, 
partners’ behavior, 
prior beliefs 
Contractual 
incompleteness 
(optimal 
completeness) 
Conceptual 
model 
Mathematical 
model, game and 
economic 
assumptions 
Transaction costs need not 
interfere with optimal 
contracting (transaction costs 
need not be relevant), provided 
that agents can probabilistically 
forecast their possible future 
payoffs. Optimality results hold 
very generally provided that the 
parties can commit themselves 
not to renegotiate. 
Renegotiation may be hard to 
reconcile with a framework that 
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otherwise presumes perfect 
rationality 
Segal (1999) Seller costs, specific 
investments, 
uncertainty, ex ante 
and ex post surplus.  
Contractual 
complexity and 
renegotiation 
Conceptual 
models 
Mathematical 
models, game, 
economic 
assumptions 
As environment becomes more 
complex, the outcome under 
any message-contingent long-
term contract converges to that 
of the incomplete contract 
model where trade is 
contractible ex post, but not ex 
ante. When trades are costly to 
describe, both ex ante and ex 
post, the incomplete contracting 
result is extended to broader 
class of environment 
Chen (2000) Service quality cost 
of providing service, 
value of service to the 
buyer, social surplus, 
residual rights.  
Verification 
arrangements 
(contracts) 
Conceptual 
models 
Mathematical 
model and 
economic 
assumptions 
Once human behavior (self-
interested) is taken into 
account, an incomplete contract 
may become optimal even if 
complete contracts are 
available. Social surplus can 
increase contract cost. An 
incomplete contract is more 
likely to be adopted if people in 
a society are more willing to 
keep promises, and are 
relatively low should the 
promise be broken. Allocation 
of residual rights in incomplete 
contracts has important 
implication for resource 
allocation  
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Saussier 
(2000) 
Asset specificity, 
uncertainty 
Contractual 
incompleteness 
France electric  
power sector 
contracts of 
between 1977-
1997 
Empirical analysis. 
Dataset had about 
29 contracts for the 
transportation of 
coal to Électricité 
de France power 
plants.  
Contracting parties choose the 
level of completeness that will 
be most effective in minimizing 
transaction costs. Parties’ 
choice of contractual terms 
reflects a trade-off between the 
specification costs and rigidities 
associated with specifying 
detailed performance 
obligations in uncertain 
transactions and the greater 
flexibility expected cost of 
establishing the terms of ex 
post trade in less definite 
relational contracts.  
Arruñada, 
Garicano & 
Vazquez 
(2001) 
The number of 
dealerships in 
network, length of 
relationship, quality 
of products sold 
Manufacturer level of 
discretion 
(completion, 
monitoring and 
termination) 
Dealership in 
Spain 
Empirical analysis. 
Data was collected 
from a survey of 
dealership 
contracts of 
networks operating 
in Spain. Final 
sample used was 
23.  
Contracts substantially restrict 
the decision rights of dealers 
and grant manufacturers 
extensive rights to specify and 
enforce dealers’ duties. The 
allocation of decision rights and 
incentive intensity differs 
across brands, however. This 
variation is explained by 
incidence of moral hazard.  
Luo (2002) Contractual 
completeness, 
cooperation 
Performance International 
joint-ventures 
in China 
Empirical analysis 
of 293 
international joint 
ventures. The data 
involved survey 
and archive records 
When contracts are more 
complete, cooperation 
contributes more to 
performance. Contribution of 
contractual completeness 
(contingent adaptability and 
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term specificity) to 
performance declines as 
completeness increases, but the 
contribution of cooperation 
remains linear.  
Poppo & 
Zenger 
(2002) 
Asset specificity, 
longevity of 
relationship, Tenure 
and budget 
Performance, 
relational governance, 
contractual 
complexity 
Executives 
from 
information 
services 
exchange 
Empirical analysis 
using survey data 
from a sample of 
the information 
service exchange 
Formal contracts and relational 
governance function as 
complements. Contractual 
complexity indirectly increases 
exchange performance by 
increasing relational 
governance, which in turn 
increases exchange 
performance.  
Reuer & 
Ariño 
(2002) 
Governance misfit, 
specific assets, 
environmental 
uncertainty, firm’s 
strategy, contractual 
safeguards 
Contract 
renegotiations (can be 
a proxy for contingent 
adaptability) 
Spanish firms 
engaging in 
alliance 
relations 
between 1986-
1992 
Empirical analysis. 
Data was collected 
using a survey that 
focused on firms 
engaging in 
alliance in relations 
in Spain between 
the years 1986-
1992. A final 
sample was 91 
respondents 
Firms tend to change the 
governance alliances when a 
misalignment exists between 
the chosen governance structure 
and features of the transaction. 
Asset specificity affects 
alliance design as well as post-
formation governance 
decisions. Contractual 
alterations are also more likely 
when firms employ less 
extensive contractual 
safeguards in their alliances and 
when a parent firm’s strategy 
change. Cross-border alliances 
are any more or less likely to 
experience contractual 
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renegotiations than domestic 
alliances.  
Luo (2005) Institutional 
environment, 
environmental 
uncertainty, 
knowledge 
proprietariness, 
dependency, host 
country legal 
incompleteness, 
interference by host 
country, economic 
exposure 
Contractual 
completeness 
(contingent 
adaptability and term 
specificity and 
contractual 
obligatoriness) 
International 
joint ventures 
(IJV) in China.  
Empirical analysis. 
Data was collected 
from surveys 
involving senior 
executives in 
China during 1998-
1999. Final sample 
used was 110.  
Term specificity and 
contractual obligatoriness 
increase when the 
proprietariness of resources to 
be invested in the IJV or the 
incompleteness of the host 
country’s legal system increase. 
Contractual obligatoriness 
increase functions of economic 
exposure and environmental 
volatility, whereas contingency 
adaptability in a contract arises 
when interplay dependency, 
investment uncertainty and 
knowledge proprietariness 
intensify or when 
environmental hazards escalate. 
If IJV contract is structured 
multidimensionality as above, 
can curtail opportunism and 
guide venture evolution at the 
same time.  
Elfenbein & 
Lerner 
(2005) 
The efforts required 
by partners, Internet 
traffic, the financial 
position of partners, 
industry 
development,   
Technical 
performance and 
product market 
performance 
contingencies 
Contracts 
between 
internet portals 
providers and 
firms involving 
USA users 
only (between 
Empirical data 
analysis of 100 
internet portal 
alliance contracts 
Contracts involve fewer 
contingent control rights as 
industries have matured. Where 
incentive conflicts are 
potentially greater, more 
contingent control rights are 
used.  
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1995-1999) 
Anderson & 
Dekker 
(2005) 
Transaction 
characteristics 
(uncertainty, size, 
asset specificity, task 
specificity) 
Transaction partner 
characteristics 
(competitions and 
power) 
Contract 
extensiveness 
Small and 
medium IT 
firms in 
Netherlands 
Empirical study 
with 858 firms. 
Data was obtained 
by survey  
Size, asset specificity and task 
complexity have a positive 
impact on contract 
extensiveness. These 
transaction characteristics have 
different effects on different 
dimensions of contracts (right 
assignment, after-service, 
product and price, and legal 
recourse) 
Aubert et al 
(2006) 
Asset specificity, 
volume uncertainty, 
dependency 
measurability, 
standardization of 
transaction, 
organizational skills, 
technical skills 
Contractual 
completeness 
Information 
technology 
firms in 
Canada 
Empirical analysis 
(probit model). 
Data used was 
gathered from a 
survey of 
information 
technology firms in 
Canada. A final 
sample was 196 
firms.  
 
Firms arbitrage between the 
costs of writing complete 
contract and those associated 
with the level of risk exposure. 
They allow identification of 
critical factors that influence 
the level of contract 
completeness. These include 
uncertainty, measurability and 
standardization of transaction 
as well as organizational skills. 
Asset specificity did not have a 
significant impact 
Barthélemy 
and Quélin 
(2006) 
Core-related 
specificity, switching 
costs, adapting 
human assets and 
environmental 
uncertainty 
Contract complexity, 
Ex-post transaction 
costs 
Survey of 
European and 
American 
outsourcing 
contracts 
Empirical analysis. 
The data involved 
91 outsourcing 
contracts signed 
between 1992 and 
1997.  
High switching costs result in 
dense contracts. Core-related 
specificity has a positive impact 
on the complexity. The greater 
the uncertainty about the 
outsourcing client’s future 
needs, the more will elaborate 
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clauses have to be included in 
the contract in order to deal 
with unexpected contingencies 
Argyres & 
Mayer 
(2007) 
Complexity, 
appropriability 
Types of contract 
terms (extensiveness), 
primary loci of 
contract design 
capability 
Conceptual  Conceptual  Firm’s contract design 
capabilities evolves through 
learning trade-offs for different 
types of contractual provisions. 
Knowledge about the trade-offs 
reside differently in managers, 
engineers, and lawyers 
regarding different types of 
contractual provisions 
Argyres, 
Bercovitz & 
Mayer 
(2007) 
History (as a proxy 
for trust), controls 
(interdependency, 
innovation) 
Contingency planning 
and task description 
IT services and 
computer 
hardware 
between a firm 
(Compstar) and 
various buyers 
(mostly 
Fortune 500 
companies) 
Empirical analysis. 
386 contracts from 
computer firm that 
supply IT services 
and computer-
related hardware. 
The period covered 
by the dataset is 
from 1986-1998.  
Contingency planning and task 
description behave as 
complements in contractual 
design. Complementarity 
reflects patterns of learning to 
contract. A repeated exchange 
between two firms leads to 
greater effort in contingency 
planning in subsequent 
contract, a finding that is also 
consistent with learning effects, 
but not with frequently made 
claims that contracts and trust 
are substituted 
Reuer & 
Arin᷈o 
(2007) 
Asset specificity, 
prior ties (as proxy 
for trust), time-bound 
alliances, open-ended 
collaborative 
Contractual 
complexity 
Spanish firms 
that engaged in 
alliance 
relationships 
(years between 
Empirical analysis. 
Data was collected 
using a survey that 
focused on firms 
engaging in 
Two underlying dimensions of 
contractual complexity were 
identified; based upon 
enforcement and coordination 
functions of different 
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relationships 1986-1992) alliance in Spain 
between the years 
1986-1992. A final 
sample was 91 
respondents 
contractual provisions. Usage 
of particular contractual 
provisions is a function of asset 
specificity as well as whether 
the alliance’s duration is pre-
specified or open ended. Firms 
that have collaborated with 
each other in the past are not 
likely to negotiate enforcement 
provisions; rather, repeat 
collaborators are less likely to 
adopt contractual provisions 
that are informational in nature 
and are geared to the 
coordination of the alliance. 
Battigalli & 
Maggi 
(2008) 
Verifiable 
contingencies and 
actions, multitask, 
external environment, 
agent’s behavior, cost 
of writing contracts 
Optimal contracting 
(formal and informal 
contracting) 
Conceptual 
models 
Mathematical 
models and 
economic 
assumptions 
 
It might be optimal to regulate 
a task by rigid rules, that is, by 
writing a non-contingent clause 
once and for all, or to leave a 
task to the agent’s discretion 
with no informal agreement to 
take the efficient action. If we 
interpret a contract 
implementing the first-best 
outcome as ‘‘complete’’ 
contract, then the main 
implication of large writing 
costs is that they generate 
contractual incompleteness. 
Alternative mode of 
governance that could avoid the 
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costs of writing detailed 
contracts, namely giving 
authority to the principal. If the 
principal could instruct the 
agent on what actions to take in 
each period, there would be no 
need to specify contingencies 
or actions in a contract. 
Hendrikse & 
Hu (2009) 
Uncertainty (from 
market), reputation, 
quality of products 
Contractual 
completeness 
Fruit and 
vegetables 
market in 
China 
Empirical analysis. 
Data was obtained 
from multiple-case 
designed which 
included primary 
farmers and 
agribusiness 
(downstream 
marketing) 
Contractual completeness 
varies substantially across 
different supply chains in 
China. A contract is more 
complex when the firm 
designing the contract sells 
high quality product. It is not 
clear if market uncertainty 
determines the completeness of 
contract. Reputation has no 
effect on the completeness of a 
contract 
Zhou & 
Poppo 
(2010) 
Asset specificity, 
environmental 
uncertainty, 
behavioral 
uncertainty, 
perceived legal 
enforceability 
Explicit contracts, 
relational reliability 
Manufacturing 
firms in China 
Empirical analysis. 
Data was collected 
using a survey that 
involved 
manufacturing 
firms engaging in 
buyer-supplier 
exchange relations. 
Final sample used 
was 399.  
When managers perceive that 
the legal system can protect 
their firm’s interests, they tend 
to use explicit contracts rather 
than relational reliability to 
safeguard transactions 
involving risks. When 
managers do not perceive the 
legal system as credible, they 
are less likely to use contracts, 
and instead rely on the 
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relational reliability to 
safeguard transactions 
associated with specialized 
assets and environmental 
uncertainty, but not those 
involving behavioral 
uncertainty. Legal 
enforceability does not 
moderate the effect of relational 
reliability on contracts, but does 
not weaken the effect of 
contracts on relational 
reliability.  
Hendrikse & 
Windsperger 
(2011) 
Behavioral 
uncertainty, 
environmental 
uncertainty, trust, 
specific investments, 
the intangibility of 
system specific 
know-how, contract 
design capability 
Contractual 
completeness 
Franchising 
sector in 
Austria 
Empirical analysis. 
The data involved 
a survey on 
franchising firms 
(using managers as 
respondents). A 
final sample was 
52 firms. 
The degree of contractual 
completeness depends on 
behavioral uncertainty 
(negatively), trust (positively), 
franchise specific investment 
(negatively), environmental 
uncertainty (negatively), the 
intangibility of system know-
how (negatively) and contract 
design capabilities (positively) 
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2.2 Contractual Satisfaction  
Most models on relationship satisfaction tend to ignore contracts as an important 
dimension to be evaluated in inter-firm relations. Crosby (1987) three attributes model of 
overall relationship satisfaction (core service, contact person and the institution (firm)) 
did not indicate the position of contracts in evaluating the inter-firm relationship. Overall 
satisfaction provides an aggregated account of all attributes, thus it is difficult to 
represent an in-depth knowledge of satisfaction/dissatisfaction at a transaction specific 
(attribute) level. Though contractual satisfaction is a subset of overall satisfaction, it is a 
transaction specific evaluation. Relationship satisfaction is also an overall satisfaction 
evaluation because it provides an aggregated assessment (evaluation) of all attributes in a 
relationship. Contractual satisfaction is thus a subset of an inter-firm relationship 
satisfaction, but its evaluation is entirely based on aspects that pertain to a contractual 
relationship. Contractual structures have an important role in inter-firm relations. 
Macaulay (1963) pointed that rely on complex contracts or partial or complete equity 
ownership to manage an exchange relationship may signal a lack of trust to exchange 
partners. Ghoshal and Moran (1996) made the similar observation.  
 
It is relevant to study contractual satisfaction because by default contracts do not operate 
at an optimum level (Bolton & Faure-Grimaud, 2010). Understanding what lead parties to 
be satisfied at a particular contractual arrangement will provide us with a rich source of 
knowledge on drivers behind satisficing contractual arrangements.  In addition, 
satisfaction is important in business relations (Dwyer, Schurr, & Oh, 1987; Pfeffer & 
Salancik, 1978) because it increases cooperation (Lusch, 1976) and continuity (Anderson 
& Sullivan, 1993; Ganesan, 1994; Ping, 2003). In today’s business world the fairness (as 
one of the attribute for satisfaction) in the contractual dealings matters a lot. According to 
World Fair Trade Organization (WFTO) (2014), the EU public procurement directive 
voted for deliberate choice of fair trade products. This new law, according to WFTO 
confirms the direction set by the court of Justice of the European Union in the North 
Holland case ruling, which for the first time clarified that public contracts can award 
additional points to products ‘‘of fair trade origin’’. Similar trends are taking place in 
emerging markets. For example South Africa has established a consumer protection Act 
(Timothy & Posthumus, 2010) which aim at establishing a balance between the supplier 
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and buyer in situations where one party has more experience and knowledge that can 
result into unfair contracts. 
 
 Grønhaug & Gilly (1991) study on the transaction cost approach to consumer 
dissatisfaction mentioned this concept (of contractual satisfaction), but it was not 
developed further. A concept of unfair contractual arrangement was introduced in the 
literature of transaction cost by Klein (1980) and a recent study from Poppo & Zhou 
(2013) has further developed the concept. It is important to revisit fairness literature 
because fairness is a concept that is related to satisfaction (see Tse & Wilton, 1988) but 
does not cover all facets of satisfaction. The concepts of relationship (Crosby and 
Stevens, 1987) and information (Spreng et al, 1996) satisfaction are also closely related 
to contractual satisfaction but differ on the basis of attributes that are evaluated. In an 
attempt to study specific elements of satisfaction, Spreng and colleagues (1996) 
introduced the concept of information satisfaction.  The author defined the concept as a 
‘‘subjective satisfaction judgment of the information used in choosing a product’’ (p. 18). 
This study introduces a concept of contractual satisfaction in line with the interaction 
level of relationship satisfaction (Crosby and Stevens, 1987).  
 
To get a clear understanding on what contractual satisfaction entails, one needs to go 
back to Hill (1986) popular disconfirmation paradigm of consumer satisfaction. The key 
elements that have been consistently overlooked in the empirical works are drivers of 
expectation. Hill (1986) identified the components of expectation to be; the product, prior 
experience and information about the referents market activities. The basis for the debate 
on an aggregate (Oliver, 1997) versus transaction specific (Anderson & Sullivan, 1993; 
Spreng et al., 1996) evaluation of satisfaction is established in the expectation formation 
process. The important aspect which one can draw from the disconfirmation paradigm is 
that the elements that contribute toward satisfaction are independent. For example the 
quality of the product is one thing and the way it is offered is something else.     
 
Some firms can have a great product, yet weak market activities and information, while 
others can have completely opposite sets of dimensions that form the bases for 
expectation. Treating and evaluating each element in the process as independent allows 
us to obtain rich and very practical information. We define contractual satisfaction as an 
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ex post evaluation of experiences of inter-firm relationship that is governed by a contract. 
There is a lack of studies that have focused on contractual satisfaction.  
 
What distinguishes contractual satisfaction with other forms of satisfaction is the fact that 
the episodes evaluated are those that relate to contracts and not necessarily performance 
outcomes. Overall satisfaction does not account for the specific attributes of satisfaction 
and it is difficult to trace the source of satisfaction/dissatisfaction. At a management 
level, it is very helpful to obtain feedback on very specific attributes.  Contracts have 
both standards and normative expectations. Standards are those specifications set ex-ante, 
while normative are those aspects which partners perceive as moral obligations even 
though they are not written down. Contractual satisfaction on that matter covers 
evaluation of both agreed and normative expectations.  
 
2.2.1 Empirical Review on satisfaction 
Empirical findings from both consumer and channel/business relations literature have a 
range of findings. The extensive findings are partly a function of a broad list of constructs 
and theories in attempting to explain satisfaction. Since our focus is on contractual 
governance, our review will be based on key findings from the field of industrial business 
relations. We provided this review in table 2. 
 
In this table 2 we have also indicated the levels by which satisfaction was studied. 
Satisfaction can either be general/overall or transaction specific. Whereas the overall 
satisfaction reflects the evaluation of all experiences across all services in relationship 
(Jonsson & Zinelding, 2003), transaction specific focuses on specific experience for a 
particular service level. Most studies in both consumer and industrial/channel relations 
have focused on the overall satisfaction as opposed to transaction specific satisfaction 
(Anderson & Sullivan, 1993; Spreng et al., 1996). 
 
Empirical research on satisfaction has supported the positive impact of relational 
dimensions on satisfaction. These include the positive impact of trust (Caceres & 
Paparoidamis, 2007; Doucette, 1996; Mohr and Spekman, 1994; Razzaque & Boom 
(2003)), reputation (Jonson & Zinelding, 2003), relational norms (Doucette, 1996), 
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commitment (del Bosque Rodrı´guez,et al, 2006) and communication (Mohr and 
Spekman, 1994). Dependency and power have also been found to influence satisfaction 
(Dwyer, 1980; Razzaque & Boom, 2003).   
 
Transaction cost variables have also been found to influence satisfaction. Ghijsen and 
colleagues (2010) found a positive impact of asset specificity on satisfaction. Their 
finding was also supported by Ping (2003). Grønhaug & Gilly (1991) study that applied 
transaction cost to consumer satisfaction, found that dissatisfaction experienced can be 
‘‘related to market institutional arrangements outside the responsibility of the individual 
seller’’ (p. 180). They also found out that ‘‘many problems relate to realized risks are not 
covered in consumers’ contracts’’ (p. 175). 
 
The review we have provided (in the table 2 below) on a range of satisfaction studies that 
was conducted on satisfaction in the area of business or industrial relations, have 
indicated a consistent gap in terms of integrating contracts on the general model of 
satisfaction. This gap can be traced back to Crosby (1987) work on three key attributes of 
overall relationship satisfaction. This study will focus on this construct (contractual 
satisfaction) given the relevance we have pointed above.  
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Table 2: Empirical review 
Author(s) Level of 
Analysis 
Predictor 
Variables 
Context Definition of satisfaction Findings 
Ghijsen, Semeijn 
and Ernston 
(2010) 
Overall 
supplier 
satisfaction 
Specific assets, 
influence 
strategies, 
dependence, 
promise 
Germany 
automotive 
industry 
Define supplier satisfaction as ‘‘the 
feeling of equity with the relationship 
no matter what power imbalances 
exists’’ (Benton and Maloni 2005, 
p.19)  
 Influence strategies and capital 
specific assets had significant 
negative and positive on 
satisfaction respectively, while 
promises, human specific 
assets had no impact on 
satisfaction.  
del Bosque 
Rodríguez et al 
(2006) 
Economic 
and non-
economic 
dimensions 
of 
satisfaction 
Communication, 
trust, 
commitment  
Food sector 
distributors in 
Spain 
Economic satisfaction is the 
evaluation performed by a channel 
member of the economic results 
derived from his relationship with his 
partner, such as turnover, margins 
and discounts (Geyskens & 
Steenkamp, 2000, p. 667). 
 
The non-economic satisfaction refers 
to the evaluation of interactive 
experiences (Scheer & Stern, 1992) 
and it has been linked with exchanges 
that reflect the good psychological 
behavior of the members 
(Gassenheimer & Ramsey, 1994, 
p.667) 
Credibility, trust (credibility 
and benevolence), and 
commitment have a positive 
impact on non-economic 
satisfaction, while 
communication and 
commitment has a positive 
effect on economic satisfaction. 
Further, there is a positive 
relationship between economic 
and non- economic satisfaction.  
Benton and 
Maloni (2005). 
Overall 
satisfaction 
Power, 
performance 
Automobile 
industry in USA 
Supplier satisfaction is defined as the 
feeling of equity with the relationship 
no matter what power 
Power-affected buyer-supplier 
relationship had a significant 
impact on supplier satisfaction.  
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imbalance exists (p.5). 
 
Razzaque & Boon 
(2003) 
Overall Trust and 
dependence 
Experimental 
design 
A positive affective state resulting 
from the appraisal of all aspects of a 
firm’s working relationship with 
another (Frazier et al., 1989; Gaski & 
Nevin, 1985, p. 27) 
 
 
Trust and dependence have 
significant positive impact on 
satisfaction. The interaction 
between trust and dependence 
has a positive impact on 
satisfaction.  
Jonsson & 
Zineldin (2003) 
Overall 
relationship 
satisfaction 
Communication, 
adaptation, 
reputation, 
coercive power, 
non-coercive 
power, 
cooperation, 
relationship 
bonds, 
dependency and 
relationship 
benefits 
Swedish lumber 
dealers and their 
suppliers (single 
company versus 
many suppliers) 
Customers (buyers’) cognitive and 
affective evaluation based on 
personal experience across all service 
episodes within a relationship or an 
emotional response to the difference 
between what customers expect and 
what they ultimately receive. 
When not considering the level 
of trust and commitment, all 
predictor variables had a 
positive impact on relationship 
satisfaction with the exception 
of coercive power which had a 
negative impact.  
However to full understand the 
impact of these relational 
variables, the effect of trust and 
commitment should be 
controlled 
Ping (2003) Overall 
satisfaction 
Alternative 
attractiveness, 
relationship 
investment and 
voice 
Hardware 
retailers 
A result of comparison to alternatives 
(Thibaut & Kelley, 1959), as well as 
relationship reward, cost, and fairness  
 
Alternative attractiveness, 
relationship investment and 
voice were the most important 
antecedents of satisfaction 
Sanzo (2003) Overall 
satisfaction 
Trust, conflict, 
perceived value 
Spanish industrial 
firms 
It therefore includes an evaluation of 
the economical and non-economical 
aspects of the relationship. In this 
way, economic satisfaction can be 
understood as a positive affective 
Trust and perceived value have 
a positive impact on 
satisfaction, while conflict has 
a negative one.  
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response that one of the participants 
has, with respect to the economic 
rewards, derived from the 
relationship in which they are 
immersed—margins, sales volume. 
Noneconomic satisfaction implies a 
positive affective response towards 
relationship’s psychological aspects, 
in such a way that a satisfied 
participant enjoys working with the 
partner, (p. 329) 
Backhaus & 
Bauer (2001) 
Attribute 
satisfaction 
and overall 
satisfaction 
Critical 
incidents 
Industrial clients 
with 
transportation 
services of a 
major German 
logistics 
company 
Attitude satisfaction refers to 
evaluation concerning a particular 
attribute in exchange, while overall 
satisfaction is aggregates of several 
attributes 
The data suggest that negative 
incidents loom more 
significantly than positive 
incidents. The degree of 
nonlinear satisfaction 
formation increases 
significantly, with the strongest 
changes being measured for 
companies with positive 
incidents. Negative incidents 
strengthen the effect of low 
attribute satisfaction on 
overall satisfaction. Therefore, 
a negative incident appears to 
be most critical if the 
satisfaction level was already 
low. 
Geyskens & 
Steenkamp (2000) 
Economic 
and Social 
satisfaction 
Coercive and 
non-coercive 
power.  
Alcohol industry 
(barkeepers and 
brewery) 
Distinguished between economic and 
social satisfaction. Economic 
satisfaction is defined as a channel 
Contingent/non contingent use 
of no-coercive power has a 
positive impact on economic 
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member’s evaluation of the economic 
outcomes that flow from the 
relationship with its partner such as 
sales volume, margins, and discounts. 
Social satisfaction is defined as a 
channel member’s evaluation of the 
psychosocial aspects of its 
relationship, in that interaction with 
the exchange partner are fulfilling, 
gratifying, and facile (p.13) 
 
and social satisfaction. 
Contingent use of coercive 
power has a negative impact on 
social satisfaction. No-
contingent use of coercive 
power has negative impact on 
economic and social 
satisfaction 
Wong (2000) Overall 
satisfaction 
Co-operative 
culture, 
commitment, 
constructive 
controversy 
Not specified Used definitions from; Cadotte et al 
(1987) that is, an affective state that 
is the emotional reaction to a product 
or service experience. Oliver 1999 
definition of pleasurable fulfilment as 
also used. (P. 428) 
Cooperative culture, 
commitment and constructive 
controversy are three variables 
affecting supplier satisfaction 
Geyskens, 
Steenkamp & 
Kumar (1999) 
Overall 
satisfaction 
(economic 
and social) 
Various 
antecedents 
related to 
satisfaction.  
Literature review 
from past studies.  
Economic satisfaction is a positive 
response to the economic rewards 
that flow from the relationship with 
its partner, such as sales volume and 
margins. Non-economic satisfaction 
is a positive affective response to 
non-economic, psychosocial aspects 
of its relationship (p. 224). 
Economic and non-economic 
satisfaction are distinct 
constructs with differential 
relationships to various 
antecedents and consequences. 
Further satisfaction is 
conceptually and empirically 
separable from the related 
constructs of trust and 
commitment.  
Mayo, Richardson 
and Simpson 
(1998) 
Overall 
satisfaction 
Power and 
influence 
strategies 
Wholesale beer 
distributors 
Used the definition from Schul, little 
and Pride (1985) that satisfaction is 
an affective response of individual 
channel members toward the salient 
The use of power sources is a 
better predictor of satisfaction 
than the use of the influence 
strategy (Coercive power or 
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aspects of the channel organization 
(p. 18).  
influence has a negative 
impact, while non-coercive 
power/influence has a positive 
impact.  
Selnes (1998) Overall 
satisfaction 
Communication, 
commitment, 
conflict 
handling 
Food producers 
in Norway. 
Product line as 
cafeteria and 
restaurants 
No definition Communication, commitment 
and conflict handling had a 
positive impact on satisfaction 
Ghosh et al 
(1997) 
Overall 
satisfaction 
Expectation, 
relationship 
style, 
distribution size 
U.S.A industrial 
distributors 
No definition Among the expectation 
dimension, only price benefit 
influence satisfaction. The 
impact of expectation and 
outcomes on relationship 
satisfaction are moderated by 
relationship style and 
distributor size.  
Andaleeb (1996) Overall 
satisfaction 
Trust and 
dependence 
Business 
executives 
An overall positive affect and reflects 
the focal organization's (a buyer's) 
overall contentment regarding its 
relationship with another party (p.80) 
Trust and dependence have 
significant impact on 
satisfaction 
Gassenheimer, 
Calantone & 
Scully (1995) 
Overall 
satisfaction 
in the 
dealer’s 
supply 
selection 
process 
Norms, asset 
specificity, 
relationship 
quality 
Office 
systems/furniture 
industry 
Maintained Anderson and Narus 
(1984:45) definition that satisfaction 
is “a positive affective state resulting 
from the appraisal of all aspects of a 
firm’s working relationship with 
another firm”  
Satisfaction does not directly 
predict the increased share of 
purchases from the dealers.  
Gassenheimer & 
Ramsey (1994) 
Overall 
satisfaction 
(of a dealer) 
Power and 
dependence 
Office system 
and furniture 
industry 
Maintained Anderson and Narus 
(1984, p. 66) view that satisfaction is 
"a positive affective state resulting 
Mutual dependence and power 
dependence imbalances makes 
a difference in reseller 
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from the appraisal of all aspects of a 
firm's working relationship with 
another firm" 
 
 
 
satisfaction, but the impact 
hinges upon whether the 
supplier is the primary, 
secondary, or tertiary supplier 
in terms of annual purchases by 
the reseller.  
Ganesan (1994) Overall 
satisfaction 
(with 
previous 
outcomes) 
N: B- This was 
a reverse model, 
where 
satisfaction 
predicted trust 
and long-term 
orientation.  
Retail buyers and 
vendors 
supplying them 
A positive affective state based on the 
outcomes obtained from the 
relationship (p. 4). 
Satisfaction has a positive 
impact on trust (credibility and 
benevolence) and long-term 
orientation 
Ping (1993) Overall 
satisfaction 
Voice, loyalty, 
neglect, exit, 
opportunism 
Hardware 
retailers in USA 
No definition Voice has a positive impact on 
satisfaction, while exit and 
neglect had a negative one.  
Lewis  and 
Lambert (1991) 
Overall 
satisfaction 
Performance, 
reinvestment, 
dependence, 
credit 
Single fast food 
system 
No definition Amount of credit (or blame) 
has a positive impact on 
satisfaction. Satisfaction is the 
one’s partner across a variety 
of dimensions would directly 
influence satisfaction with the 
overall performance. There is a 
direct relationship between 
satisfaction with overall role 
performance 
Anderson & 
Narus (1990) 
Overall 
satisfaction 
Cooperation, 
conflict, relative 
dependence 
(influence over 
and by partner 
Manufacturer and 
distributor firms 
Cited Anderson and Narus (1984, p. 
66) that satisfaction is  ‘’a  positive 
affective state resulting from the 
appraisal of all aspects of the firm’s 
working relationship with another 
Trust and outcome given 
comparison levels have a direct 
positive impact on satisfaction, 
while conflict has a negative 
influence. Further dependence, 
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firm), outcomes 
given 
comparison 
levels 
firm’’  communication and 
cooperation had an indirect 
positive impact.  
Michie & Sibley, 
(1985) 
Overall 
satisfaction 
Coercive and 
non-coercive 
power  
Franchisees of a 
large firm 
No definition Franchisee satisfaction is 
explained by coercive and non-
coercive power sources  
Schul,  Little Jr. 
Pride (1985) 
Overall 
satisfaction 
Channel climate 
dimensions 
(Autonomy, 
consideration, 
initiating 
structure and 
reward 
orientation) 
Franchisee and 
Franchisor 
relations in the 
real estate 
brokerage 
industry 
Affective attitudes and feelings 
concerning the domain of 
characteristics describing the internal 
environment of the channel 
organization and the relationship 
between the channel member and 
other institutions in the channel 
arrangement.  
Initiating structure, 
consideration, autonomy and 
reward orientation have a 
positively related with 
satisfaction.  
Anderson & 
Narus (1984) 
Overall 
satisfaction.  
Comparison 
level, 
manufacturer 
control,  
Electronic 
distributors  
A positive affective state resulting 
from the appraisal of all aspects of a 
firm's working relationship with 
another firm. 
Comparison level had a 
positive impact on satisfaction 
while manufacturer control has 
a negative effect 
Ruekert and 
Churchill (1984) 
Overall 
satisfaction 
Channel 
satisfaction 
construct was 
divided into 
different 
measures (single 
and multi- item 
measures) 
Wholesalers and 
retailers 
Channel member satisfaction 
comprises the domain of all 
characteristics of the relationship 
between a channel member (the focal 
organization) and another institution 
in the channel (the target 
organization) which the focal 
organization finds rewarding, 
profitable, instrumental, and 
satisfying or frustrating, problematic, 
inhibiting, or unsatisfying (p. 227) 
Multi-item measures (which 
ask for differently, how 
satisfied the channel member is 
in the specific aspects of the 
relationship) and multi-item 
measure which asks for 
respondents’ cognition or belief 
about the working of the 
relationship have strong 
internal consistency, are highly 
correlated and behave as 
expected with other behavioral 
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constructs. 
Bagozzi (1980) Job 
satisfaction  
Motivation, 
performance, 
verbal 
intelligence 
Industrial sales 
persons and 
secondary 
information from 
company records 
No definition Job satisfaction was found to 
vary with performance. Further 
individual differences (such as 
self-esteem) functioned as 
important antecedents.  
Performance/satisfaction 
relation was shown to depend, 
in part, upon the degree to 
which individual evaluate 
outcomes associated with the 
job. The greater the value 
placed on job outcomes, the 
higher the level of satisfaction 
with attainment of subsequent 
rewards.  
Dwyer (1980) Overall 
channel 
members 
satisfaction 
Power bases, 
cooperativeness 
and perceived 
self-control 
Laboratory 
simulation 
No definition Satisfaction stems from 
perceived self-control over 
decision areas and perceived 
cooperativeness of the partners 
in the channel.  
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CHAPTER THREE                                                          
THEORETICAL REVIEW AND CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
 
3.0 Introduction 
This chapter presents the theories or frameworks that are relevant to this study. These 
include; transaction cost, relational governance, satisfaction and institution based view. 
The choice of these theories is based on their relevance to the studied phenomenon. We 
start this section with a conceptual framework followed by the presentation of these 
theories/frameworks.   
 
3.1 Conceptual Framework 
The literature on contractual governance suggests that contracts are not complete though 
the degree of completeness will vary from one contract to the other (Bernheim & 
Whinston, 1998). The reason why parties choose to undergo contractual governance is to 
ensure safeguard. This safeguard is not completely assured in the contractual setting (See 
Williamson, 1975). Literature on contracts also suggests that parties objectively decide to 
leave some aspects unspecified or allow for flexibility (Crocker and Reynolds, 1993).  
High level of contractual completeness has also been argued to generate opportunism 
(Woolthuis et al., 2005) and thus act as a negative signal. For example, in a marriage 
contract when one partner proposes on how to divide assets in case of a divorce; this 
might signal a divorce intention in the future. The partners in a contractual setting will 
have a contractual choice that is shaped by the cost and benefit analysis.  The optimal 
contractual choice is a point where the cost of designing a particular level of contractual 
completeness and the benefits of doing so is equal (Croker & Reynolds, 1993). Figure 2 
below provides the brief overview of this idea.   
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Figure 2: Conceptual framework 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The table 3 below summarizes the above conceptual model and specific relations to be 
tested. We organized these relations with respect to the papers where they were tested. 
The table provides the outcome variables, moderator/mediators, predictors and 
interactions.   
 
  
CONTRACTUAL  
COMPLETNESS 
CONTRACTUAL  
SATISFACTION 
INSTITUTIONAL 
CONTEXT 
 
Embedded cultural 
norms, rules and 
cognitive actions 
TRANSACTION COST 
Asset specificity 
Behavioural 
uncertainty 
Environmental 
uncertainty 
Ex-ante/ex-post costs 
Opportunism 
 
RELATIONAL 
GOVERNANCE 
Trust 
Networks 
Norms 
Reputation 
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Table 3: Overview of tested relations 
Paper# Predictor Variables Moderator/Mediator 
Variables 
     Interactions Outcome 
Variable 
1 Trust Institutional context   Contractual 
completeness 
Reputation (REPT)     
Ex ante costs (EAC)     
     
2 Relational norms 
(RELNORM) 
    
Foreignness of supplier 
(FC) 
  BUASPX TECHUNC Contingent 
adaptability and 
Term specificity 
Buyer asset specificity 
(BUASP) 
  BUASPXVOLUNC  
Technological 
uncertainty 
(TECHUNC) 
    
Volume uncertainty 
(VOLUNC) 
    
     
3 Contractual Term 
specificity (TSPC) 
Contingent 
adaptability 
  Contractual 
Satisfaction 
Contingent adaptability 
(CONTADAPT) 
Contractual term 
specificity 
   
Opportunism (OPPORT)     
Trust      
Reputation (REPT)     
     
4 Behavioral uncertainty 
(BU) 
Institutional context  ECEXBU Contractual 
satisfaction 
Ex ante contractual 
efforts (costs) * (ECE) 
  EPSXTRUST  
Ex post contractual 
specifications 
(contingent adaptability) 
* (EPS) 
    
Trust     
*Use of synonyms was based on the differences in journal preferences on the terms 
N.B: Contractual term specificity=ex-ante term specificity, 
Contingent adaptability= ex-post contractual specifications 
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3.2 Transaction Costs Theory, Contractual Governance 
Assigning governance mode on the basis of low (economica) transaction costs (Heide 
1994; Williamson, 1985) is the focus behind the transaction cost analysis. Under the 
assumption of bounded rationality, key attributes of transaction cost are asset specificity, 
uncertainty and frequency (Williamson, 1985). Transaction cost analysis (TCA) 
perspective argues that inter-firm exchanges that are vulnerable to unforeseen 
contingencies cannot be governed by complete contracts (Buvik & Grønhaug, 2000). 
TCA response to issues surrounding safeguarding is “either to implement stronger 
contractual safeguards or to impose vertical integration (Buvik & John, 2000; Heide & 
John, 1990). Without contractual governance guiding the inter-firm transactions, the 
moral hazard of opportunism will be extensively high (Peng & Heath, 1996). 
 
Vertical coordination is among the intermediate/relational forms of governance (Stern & 
Reve, 1980). According to Williamson (1985, 1991), the escalation of specific assets 
calls for vertical coordination as a mechanism for controlling the ex post transaction 
costs.  
  
Four central costs in transactions include; searching, contracting, monitoring and 
enforcing costs (Hennart, 1993; North, 1990; Williamson, 1985). All these costs differ in 
emerging markets with some markets displaying heterogeneous properties. Some 
markets, for example, will have low searching cost, but high enforcement costs.  
 
Contracting as a safeguard is viewed as primacy in western (Choi et al., 1999; Dyer, 
1997) though an alternative range of ‘‘self-enforcing’’ agreement (Sako, 1991; Telser, 
1980; Williamson, 1985) is viewed as a feasible solution in countries with weak 
institutions.  Self-enforcement agreements include, but not limited to: trust (Bradach and 
Eccles, 1989; Dore, 1983), reputation (Kreeps and Wilson, 1982; Weigelt and Carnerer, 
1988), as well as hostages (Williamson, 1983). Self-enforcement mechanism is not a 
thing for only developing or emerging markets, but even advanced economies like Japan 
still employ such safeguards with relatively ‘‘low maintenance cost’’ (Dyer, 1997). 
  
The question, about which form of safeguarding (contracting) is best, has been partly 
answered by the findings from the study conducted by Dyer (1997) on US and Japanese 
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auto industry. The findings showed that the Japanese firms were able to reduce their 
transaction costs in the long - run compared to USA (where most contracts are on a short-
term basis). In other words, the relational aspects that develops in long-term contracts, 
reduces the repetitive costs for establishing new contractual agreements.   
3.3 Relational Governance     
Relational governance (Dyer and Singh, 1998; Dyer and Chu, 2000) is the exchange that 
is as much driven by social dimensions (Gundlach & Achrol, 1993; Macneil, 1980). 
These dimensions play a critical economic role (Granovetter, 1985) in addressing the 
limitations posed by formal contracts (Poppo & Zenger, 2002).  
 
Relational norms are based on mutual expectations (Cannon, Achrol & Gundlach, 2000). 
Further, such norms give rise to more specific relational components like trust (Argyres, 
2007; Gulati, 1995), history (Crocker & Reynolds, 1993; Kramer, 1999) and reputation 
(Worden, 2003; Carson, Madhok & Wu, 2006). These provide safeguard (Jap & 
Anderson, 2003) or non-legal sanctions (Macaulay, 1963) in proportion to their presence 
in relational channels (Brown, Dev, & Lee, 2000; Heide & John, 1992). Reason firms 
conform to social norms is to gain legitimacy (Oliver, 1997) which reduce the transaction 
cost (Dyer, 1997), lower dependence on formal constraints (Hills, 1995) and improve 
performance (Griffith, 2002).   
 
Some researchers have examined whether relational governance functions as a substitute 
for complex explicit contracts (Bradach & Eccles, 1989; Dyer & Singh, 1998). Whereas 
some have supported the complementary view of relational governance (Aubert, Houde, 
Party & Rivard, 2006; Blomqvist, Hurmelinna & Seppänen, 2005; Hart and Moore, 2008; 
Klein, 1996; Möllering, 2002; Seppänen, Blomqvist & Sundqvist, 2007), others support 
the substitutive role (Gulati, 1995; Oxley 1997; Yu, Liao, Lin, 2006). These two roles are 
not contradictory to each other. Some authors have also argued that the extensive use of 
contracts can be a sign of mistrust (Bradach and Eccles, 1989) and thus evokes 
opportunistic behavior (Woolthuis et al., 2005).   
 
Empirical evidence tends to disconfirm the substitution view (Ivens (2005), but the 
complementary view is nevertheless to be disconfirmed (Bennett and Robson, 2004; 
Poppo and Zenger, 2002). Poppo and Zenger (2002) acknowledge that relational behavior 
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may contribute in the refinement of a formal contract (complement) during the 
negotiation phase. Practical example on complementary use of relational governance has 
been shown by Zhuo and colleagues where they pointed out that ‘‘partners who are 
meeting for the first time can rely on informal contracts to initiate business transactions in 
China; ‘‘only after time has passed and trust-based relationships are in place will parties 
use formal provisions to coordinate exchange’’ (2003: 93). In other words, trust evolves 
as a mechanism to enhance the contractual governance.  
 
3.4 Satisfaction   
The concept of satisfaction has been addressed in both consumer and industrial (Cardozo, 
1965, Churchill and Suprenant, 1982; Oliver, 1977; Tse & Wilton, 1988; Westbrook 
1981) marketing research (Gassenheimer & Ramsey, 1994; Andaleeb, 1996; Selnes, 
1998; Wong, 2000; Jonsson & Zineldin, 2003). 
 
Satisfaction is a positive personal cognitive or affective emotional response in 
comparison between desired and actual outcomes (Anderson, 1994; Jonsson & Zinelding, 
2003; Spreng, MacKenzie, & Olshavsky, 1996). Satisfaction happens in the course of a 
working relationship between firms (Anderson & Narus, 1984: 45). Although most 
studies on satisfaction have been on consumers (Anderson, 1996, 1998; Anderson & 
Sullivan, 1993; Giese & Cote, 2000; Spreng et al., 1996), the concept is applicable in 
diverse fields (Westbrook, 1981). 
 
In consumer research, satisfaction has been defined in various terms. These include; 
‘‘consumer’s response to the evaluation of the perceived discrepancy between prior 
expectations and actual performance of the product as perceived after its consumption’’ 
(Oliver and Swan, 1989: 204); a judgment that a product or service provided a 
pleasurable level of consumption’’ (Oliver, 1997: 13); ‘‘a feeling developed from an 
evaluation of the user experience’’ (Cadotte, Woodruff and Jenkins, 1987: 305); a global 
evaluative judgment about product usage/consumption (Westbrook,  1987: 260).  
 
In industrial business relations/channel literature, satisfaction has also been defined in 
various perspectives. These include; ‘‘an overall positive effect and reflects the focal 
organization's (a buyer's) overall contentment regarding its relationship with another 
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party’’ (Andaleeb, 1996: 80); and “a positive affective state resulting from the appraisal 
of all aspects of a firm’s working relationship with another firm” (Anderson and Narus, 
1984: 45). Satisfaction has also been defined in terms of power balance.  For example, 
Benton and Maloni (2005) defined it as the feeling of equity with the relationship no 
matter what power imbalance exists (p. 5). Geyskens & Steenkamp (2000) distinguished 
between economic and social satisfaction. They defined economic satisfaction as a 
channel member’s evaluation of the economic outcomes that flow from the relationship 
with its partner such as sales volume, margins, and discounts, while  social satisfaction 
was defined as a ‘‘channel member’s evaluation of the psychosocial aspects of its 
relationship, in that interaction with the exchange partner are fulfilling, gratifying, and 
facile’’ (p. 13). In consumer research there is a range of frameworks that have been used 
to study consumer satisfaction. We will present the most key ones. 
 
Confirmation/disconfirmation paradigm:  Confirmation/disconfirmation paradigm 
(Churchill and Surprentant, 1982; Hill, 1986; Oliver, 1980) is a widely used framework in 
studying consumer satisfaction. The paradigm can be traced back from the developments 
made by Oliver (1980) in interpreting the adaptation level theory (Helson, 1969). Among 
other things the adaptation theory suggests that one perceives stimuli relative to adopt 
standard. The disconfirmation paradigm is composed of four constructs; expectation, 
performance, disconfirmation and satisfaction. The expectation provides bases for 
comparison or establishes standards against which performance can be evaluated. Figure 
3 below provides a descriptive overview of the paradigm.  
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Figure 3: Disconfirmation paradigm 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
*P = Performance 
  E= Expectation 
 
Source: Hill, 1986:311 
 
Figure 3 above suggests that performance which is indicated by functional and 
technical quality is compared against expectations (attributed by product, prior 
experience, information, and market activities). When performance is equal to 
expectations, the outcome is the confirmation (neutral response). Deviation from 
expected performance is what can lead to satisfaction (when performance exceeds 
 Functional quality 
 Technical quality 
 
 Product itself 
 Prior experience 
 Information from referents 
 Marketing activities 
 
Perceived Performance 
Expectations 
Comparison 
p>E P~E P<E 
Positive 
Disconfirmation 
Confirmation Negative 
Disconfirmation 
Satisfaction Indifferent or 
Neutral 
Dissatisfaction 
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expectations) or dissatisfaction (when performance is below expectations). The 
validity and scale problems have challenged this mode (Teas, 1993; Babakus and 
Boller, 1992), thus most research is based on the performance or confirmation of 
expectation part of the model (Vikas, Ross, and Baldasare, 1998).  
 
Equity/inequity theory: Equity theory has also been used in assessing consumer 
satisfaction (Tse & Wilton, 1988). The theory can be traced back to Adams’ (1963) 
paper on inequity. An inequity exists for a person whenever his ‘‘perceived job 
inputs and/or outcomes stand psychologically in an obverse relation to what he 
perceives are the inputs and/or outcomes of others’’ (Adams, 1963: 424). There are 
two key components in this theory; input and outcomes. Input is anything that an 
exchange partner views being a valuable contribution in the transaction.  
 
For example in job setting this can be time, education, experience, etc. The 
outcome is what an individual in the exchange relationship receives after 
committing his/her valuable inputs. Equity occurs when the individual feels that 
the outcome matches with the inputs. Adams emphasized in the definition that ‘‘it 
is the perception by person of his and other's inputs and outcomes that must be 
dealt with, not necessarily the actual inputs and outcomes’’ (1963: 424). The 
author also noted on the impact of culture in shaping the perception on equity. He 
pointed the example of differences between USA and Japan when it comes to 
determinants of pay.  
 
For example, in Japan, there is little relationship between the type of work and pay. 
The key determinant of pay in Japan are; length of service, education, family size, 
age and very little on productivity. In taking to account the differences that exist 
between individuals, Huseman, Hatfield and Miles (1987) advanced the equity 
theory by suggesting how job satisfaction can be influenced by the differences in 
equity perceptions. The authors identified three types of individuals; benevolent, 
equity sensitive and entitle. Benevolent individuals are those that think much about 
giving than receiving (Rychlak, 1973). In other words, such individuals 
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(organizations) can sacrifice their own interests for that of others. Equity sensitives 
are those individuals who ‘‘feel distress when under-rewarded and guilt when 
over-rewarded’’. Entitleds are those individuals who are satisfied when over-
rewarded and feel distress when under or equitably rewarded. Figure 4 below 
summarizes this description.   
 
Figure 4: Equity and satisfaction 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Norms: Woodruff and colleagues (1983) used norms perspective in examining 
satisfaction. Norm perspective does not differ much with the confirmation-
disconfirmation but it is a short version of it. The authors used the experience as the base 
for establishing norms.  The experience can be related to a product or a brand (Woodruf, 
1983), but cultural norms have also been identified (Morris, 1976). According to 
Woodruf (1983) brand based norm occur when single brand controls a consumer’s 
experience, while product based-norms occur when the consumer has experience with 
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many brands of a given type or class of the product. These norms are in turn used to 
evaluate performance.    
 
Attribution: The view of people, according to attribution theory is that they are ‘‘rational 
information processors whose actions are influenced by their causal inferences (Folkes, 
1984:398). Consumers’ response to product failure is partly a function of perceived 
causes for the failure (Folkes, 1984). In describing the theory Folkes (1984) used the 
example of laundry detergent; ‘‘suppose a consumer uses a new laundry detergent and 
then discovers the laundry is not clean. According to Folkes, the consumer will search for 
a reason why this occurred and may arrive at any of several explanations’’ (1984: 398). 
Three main causal dimensions of attribution were identified to be stability, locus, and 
controllability (Folkes, 1984)  
‘‘Stability refers to whether causes are perceived as relatively permanent and 
unchanging or as temporary and fluctuating. Locus refers to whether the cause of 
failure has something to do with the consumer or is located somewhere in the 
production or distribution of the product. Controllability refers to whether the 
outcomes of the failure are related to buyer efforts or the firm (volitional and non-
volitional)’’ (Folkes, 1984: 399). 
 
Satisfaction research around industrial markets do not tend to use a specific framework, 
but rather tend to predict satisfaction using various construct from different theories 
(transaction cost, relational perspectives, institutional view and other related 
theories/perspectives).  
 
3.5 Institutions, Contracts and Emerging Markets 
Institutions are ‘‘regulative, normative, and cognitive structures and activities that 
provide stability and meaning to social behavior’’ (Scott, 1995: 33).  The institutional 
environment perspective relies on the ‘‘primacy of (1) regulatory (e.g., laws), (2) 
normative (e.g., professions), and (3) cognitive institutions (e.g., habitual actions) in 
influencing the legitimacy of channel members in the larger societal context’’ (Grewal & 
Dharwadkar, 2002:82). Albeit formal institutions are important, nevertheless this does 
not override the germaneness of informal institutions (Hill, 1995) as they can be effective 
and cost efficient over a long run (Dyer, 1997). In that respect there are commonly two 
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poles of institution view. These include efficiency (Coase, 1998; North, 1990; 
Williamson, 1985) and legitimacy (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Scott, 1995) poles. Those 
that focus on efficiency are also known as new institutionalism, while those on legitimacy 
are known as sociological orientation. Institutions do change not only by social and 
political pressure, but also through technological changes (Ingram & Silverman, 2002).     
 
Further, institutions do not just emerge, but are formulated by societies with the objective 
of bringing order and facilitating economic and social exchange (North, 1990; 
Williamson, 1985), with a span of effect covering politics, law and society (Peng et al, 
2008). Some institutional components like legal framework change slowly and take very 
long time to develop (Litwack, 1991), while others like rules (North, 1990) are complex 
and less predictable (Tan & Litschert, 1994). Performance influential nature of 
institutions (Tan & Litschert, 1994) makes them not just background conditions (Ingram 
and Silverman, 2002: 20), but of directional implications (Carroll, Goodstein & Gyenes, 
1988).    
 
Whereas researchers have held on to view of static institutions in emerging markets 
(Chung & Beamish, 2005), they are dynamic in prima facie (Oxley, 1997; Scott, 1995) 
with different components changing at a different pace (Hoskisson et al, 2000:253).    
 
What intensifies dynamics of institutions in emerging markets is the fact that, while new 
institutional dimensions have not yet developed (Peng, 2003), the old ones are eroded 
(Choi, Lee, Kim, 1999) or weakened (Peng & Zhou 2005) a situation which put emerging 
markets’ firms in a state of limbo or what Khanna and Palepu (1997) refers to as 
institutional vacuums. In responding to dynamics in emerging markets (Oxley, 1997), 
firms’ result in different performance levels (Ingram & Silverman, 2002).  
‘‘Deinstitutionalization’’ process (weakening or erosion of particular institutional 
dimensions) in emerging markets is ‘‘much more radical’’ (Roth& Kostova, 2003:317), 
giving firms' choices to apply informal substitute mechanisms (Xin & Pearce, 1996) due 
to immature formal systems. Kiggundu, Jorgensen, and Hafsi’s (1983) reviewed 94 
studies published during the 1956–1981 period on the application of mainstream 
organizational and management theories in developing countries. Their findings showed 
that, the studies that had technical core as a focus had less divergence, but significance 
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divergence was higher on studies dealing with relationships that are more institutional 
prone.  
 
According to Narayanan&Fahey (2005) such deviant findings call for more theoretical 
assumptions that do not take stability as the norm. Differences that exist in theoretical 
assumptions do not only apply to developed and developing markets, but between 
emerging markets themselves as they have different pace of dynamics (Hoskisson et al, 
2000)  resulted from differences in the transformation stages (Roth & Kostova, 2003).  
 
Institutional perspectives acknowledge the role of systems surrounding organizations in 
influencing social and organizational behavior (Scott, 1995). Managerial decisions have 
also been suggested to be partly a function of cultural values (Schneider and De Meyer, 
1991; Hofstede, 1980). Institutional environments may promote or hinder the 
construction of relational ties between partners (North, 1990). Macro-level theories such 
as institutions have proved to be relevant in studying organizations that operate in 
different environments (Shenka & Mary Ann von, 1994). The use of contracts is 
influenced by the institutional structure, and thus the contractual customization as 
response to hazards will differ across countries (Williamson, 1991; Joskow, 1988; Poppo 
and Zenger, 2002).   
 
Gewarld & Dharwadkar (2002) suggested that the institutional processes have influence 
on channel structure and processes. This view is consistent with Stern and Reve (1980) 
who suggested that the channel dyad is a social system influenced by economic and 
sociopolitical forces. Contracting is determined by the nature of transaction and 
corresponding institutional environment (Luo, 2005; Oxley, 1999). The institutional 
context in emerging markets is likely to limit theoretical generalizability of TCA (Lui, 
2009), a situation which will demand further research in understanding the nature of such 
a limitation and accompanied theoretical implications. Linking TCE with institution 
based theory has been attempted (Martinez & Dacin, 1999), but we need to move from 
connections to core explanations. 
 
Institutional environments have received limited theoretical and empirical attention 
because of the lack of a comprehensive framework that can enable researchers to assess 
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the implications of the institutional environment in an orderly manner (Gewarld & 
Dharwadkar, 2002:84). Further, the authors argued that many organizational theorists 
have focused on traditional environmental approaches that ignore both the institutional 
influences on actors in an organizational system and the way in which institutional 
perspectives are imported into organizations as underlying invisible assumptions. 
 
There are two ways to look at institutions. One is to look at the processes that describe 
institutions (rules, norms and cognitive actions); second is to look at the outcome brought 
by the forces that combines all these institutional parameters. The legitimate concern 
manifests the outcome of the institutional forces that pressurize firms to comply. 
Suchman views legitimacy as ‘‘a generalized perception or assumption that the actions of 
an entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially constructed system of 
norms, values, beliefs, and definitions’’ (1995: 574). It is important to point out that the 
rules, normative and cognitive aspects form the legitimate concern of institutions 
(DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Suchman, 1995).  
 
The institutions that result from institutional processes (rules, norms, cognitive actions) 
can be identified by their patterns (Jepperson, 1991), and have the ability to recur 
(Friedland and Alford, 1991). Institutions in this regard describe the rules, expectations, 
and actions to which organizations must conform to receive legitimacy (Myer and Scott, 
1983). Regulations are concerned with compliance with government rules and sanctions 
(Kelman, 1987), normative institutions are concerned with compliance to socially 
accepted norms and behaviors (Selznick, 1984) and cognitive actions are concerned with 
compliance with cultural values (Berger and Luckmann, 1967; Hofstede, 1980).   
 
Studying institutions by first looking at the legitimacy concern, then back to the 
processes, is one of the ways for studying the theories that incorporate the institutional 
dimensions. When the institutional processes and structures are taken together they form 
the institutional environment or context (Gewarld & Dharwadkar, 2002). The institutional 
context consists of ‘‘the accepted rules of the game’’ and thus establish the pattern for the 
transactions to take place (Jepperson, 1991; North, 1990). This institutional context exerts 
normative pressure on organizations to change, is distinct from the market context, which 
exerts efficiency-based pressure on organizations (Newman, 2000:603). Firms adjust to 
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institutional pressures for survival and for obtaining scarce resources (DiMaggio & 
Powell, 1991; Meyer & Rowan, 1977).  
 
Most research works on contractual governance have taken the institutional environment 
as given (Williamson, 1996). The trend remained so, even after Williamson suggested 
that we should treat the institutional environment as a ‘‘set of parameters, changes in 
which elicit shifts in the comparative costs of governance’’ (1991: 287). Institutions like 
rules (legal framework) does not only influence the transaction cost (Peng, 2003), but 
also facilitates the weak-based relational ties (Peng & Zhuo, 2005). Treating institutional 
parameters as dynamic can be resolved by using different institutional contexts which are 
dissimilar (heterogeneous). Oxley suggested that the empirical problems can be mitigated 
by ‘‘finding sufficient heterogeneity in the institutional environments to support the 
cross-sectional analysis’’ (1999:284). Studies that compare two contexts or samples from 
two countries can benefit much by inferring firms’ actions from the institutional 
perspective. Institutions can have as systemic impact across all social dimensions of 
dyadic exchange (Gewarld & Dharwadkar, 2002) making an added value in having 
comparative studies that involved different institutional contexts.   
 
Empirical studies have found that business transactions in emerging economies to a large 
extent are based on relational exchanges, building of mutual trust and cooperative norms 
(Li, Poppo and Zhou, 2008; Zhang and Li, 2008), mainly due to inadequate legal and 
regulatory frameworks – known as institutional voids”  (Zhou and Peng, 2010: 357). It 
has been suggested that as the shift toward formal market-supporting institutions in such 
countries, will lead to moving from relational exchanges to arm’s length transactions 
(Peng, 2003; Zhou and Peng, 2010).  Arm’s length transaction is a “rule-based, 
impersonal exchange with third-party enforcement” (Peng (2003: 280). Consistent with 
Peng (2003), a study from Sheng and colleagues (2011) found that business ties are more 
beneficial when legal enforcement is inefficient. If this observation is correct, the 
contractual drivers will differ between relatively advanced emerging markets (such as 
Poland) and advancing or less advanced emerging markets (such as Tanzania).  
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Empirical works on culture have also supported the influence of culture on contracts. 
Collective societies have a negative tendency towards detailed contracts (Wagner, 1995) 
and thus there could be differences in the interpretation of contracts as an outcome of 
cultural orientation. Steensma and colleagues (2000) pointed out that firms with a 
tendency of uncertainty avoidance have a strong preference for codification and the 
establishment of formal rules or detailed contractual terms. This observation is consistent 
with Wuyts and Geyskens (2005) who also suggested that the uncertainty avoidance 
culture tends to increase the level of details in the contracts. The reverse is likewise true 
for firms with fewer tendencies for uncertainty avoidance. Collectivist firms not only use 
less detailed contracts (Wagner, 1995) but do prefer long contracts (Sako and Helper, 
1998). Detailed contracts tend to be inconsistent with the group view and thus signal 
potential conflicts between partners (Steensma et al. 2000). Power-distance also increases 
the need for detailed contracts (Wuyts & Geyskens, 2005). Power distance firms prefer 
explicit descriptions of tasks (Bates et al., 1995) and control over their partners' actions 
(Shane, 1994). High-versus low context culture argument has also been used by Larsen 
and colleagues (2002) to explain the influence of culture on contracts. The authors argued 
that in a high context culture, contracts are less detailed and parties rely more on verbal 
than non-verbal communication. 
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CHAPTER FOUR                                                          
RESEARCH METHOD AND                                      
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
 
4.0 Introduction 
This chapter presents and discusses the research approach and methodological issues 
applied in this thesis. The presentation of research approach and the methodology is 
relevant for understanding the background by which the findings are built upon. Further, 
we provide the descriptive statistics concerning the data used. We start with the 
presentation of the research approach, followed by research design. Data collection 
method will then be presented, followed by data analysis. The assessment on the quality 
aspect of the study will be presented at the end.  
 
4.1 Research Approach: 
The research approach can be viewed as a conscious reasoning (Pierce, 1931). It is 
important to present the research approach in the academic writing so as to ensure the 
quality of results (Cresswell et al, 2007). 
 
Qualitative and quantitative analysis approaches are commonly used in studying 
contractual governance. Whereas, mathematical models are also important in this field, 
deep insights can be obtained from using real data. We preferred to use a quantitative 
approach because most of the theories we have used are well established.    
 
The institutional context is very important in the study of contractual governance. One of 
the major critics in the area of transaction cost and contractual governance is taking 
institutions as given. Williamson specifically pointed out that the research in the 
transaction cost, ‘‘has exclusively focused on the mechanisms of governance, whereby 
economic agents align transactions with governance structures to affect economizing 
outcomes, taking the institutional environment as given’’ (1996: 5). This problem is to a 
large degree attributed by the limitation in obtaining institutional data. Further the studies 
that have tried to include the institutional context in examining contractual governance 
have been limited by the use of data from homogeneous institutional contexts. The 
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heterogeneous institutional context can provide a good setting for conducting contractual 
governance studies in emerging markets (Oxley, 1999).  
 
Theories are not built up separately from institutions. Theories need to be subjected to 
various contextual settings in obtaining better predictive (inference) power. This study 
has two levels of analysis; firm and institutional levels. Integrating the firm and 
institutional level data is critical for obtaining better prediction on specific constructs 
across institutional settings. We have defined the institutional context in terms of 
embedded cultural norms, regulations, and cognitive actions.  
 
This study examined the contractual governance in emerging markets from the 
perspectives of structural formulation of contracts (in terms of completeness levels) and 
the satisfaction outcome derived from such arrangement. Satisfaction component is very 
important in building smooth long-term relationships. Contractual arrangement is not a 
mechanical structure; but rather a social structure that governs an exchange. Whereas, 
there is a need to assess the structural component, it is also important to analyze the 
psychological aspects.  
 
The deductive process was used in doing this study. In the deductive approach, the 
researcher deduces the hypothesis (hypotheses) that must then be subjected to empirical 
tests (Bryman, 2004). The concepts involved in the research are embedded within the 
hypotheses. Figure 5 below provides a brief summary of the deduction process. 
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Figure 5: Deduction process 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Bryman (2004: 9) 
 
4.2 Research Design 
Research design deals with a logical problem and not a logistical problem (Yin, 1989: 
29). This study used a survey in collecting data. The main use of the survey is to collect 
primary data for a particular research project (Zikmund et al, 2010). Research design in 
this respect is a function of research questions and objectives (Bryman & Bell, 2007). 
The term ‘survey’ is used in a variety of ways, but commonly refers to collection of 
standardized information from a specific population, or some sample from one, usually 
but not necessarily by means of a questionnaire or interview (Robson, 1996: 49). Further, 
sample tends to be large in surveys.  The questions asked in surveys are usually of a type 
that requires careful attention to how samples are drawn. It is important to point out that 
the interest of data in the survey is not on individuals but ‘‘on profiles and generalized 
statistics drawn from the total sample and generalized to the population’’ (Robson, 
1996:49). Survey thus provides ‘‘a quick, efficient and relatively accurate means for 
assessing the information about a population’’ (Zikmund et al, 2010).  
 
1. Theory 
2. Hypothesis 
3. Data collection 
4. Findings 
5. Hypothesis confirmed or rejected 
6. Revision of theory 
 78 
 
4.3 Data Collection Methods  
Instruments that are used in collecting the information will depend on the problem that is 
investigated. McQueen & Knussen specifically pointed that the research methods vary 
due to ‘‘relative advantage and disadvantages in differing contexts, in terms of 
complexity, type of data they generate and the underlying philosophies’’ (2002: 34). The 
quantitative research strategy falls within the domain of deductive theoretical approach 
and their ontological orientation is considered to be positivism. Positivism has different 
views for different authors, but the view we use here is from Bryman (2004) who view it 
as an epistemological position that advocates the application of the methods of natural 
sciences to study the social reality and beyond. We preferred this form of scientific 
approach due to its relatively easy in proving the quality of the findings (in terms of 
validity and reliability). Quality of inferences can be challenging when there is no good-
established mechanism in place. This argument to a large extent favors the use of 
quantitative data gathering strategy.       
 
4.3.1 Self-administered questionnaires 
The instruments used in data collections are determined by the problem at hand. Well-
constructed questionnaire based research ‘‘can act as an amalgam of observational and 
experimental approaches, with responses to questions serving as observations across a 
wide range of individuals’’ (McQueen & Knussen, 2010:14). Self-administered 
questionnaires apart from being cheap and efficient in providing large amounts of data, 
‘‘it allows for anonymity, which can encourage frankness when sensitive areas are 
involved’’ (Robson 1996, 129). Self-administered questionnaires can be paper or 
electronic based. In these two categories, there are also different ways to reach the 
respondents. Figure 6 below provides a description of such classification 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 79 
 
Figure 6: Paper and electronic based questionnaires 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Key: The bolded text is the segments which were used in this study 
 
In designing survey questions there are several ways. These included close (fixed 
questions) and open-ended questions. Fixed questions allow respondents to choose 
between two or more answers (Mitchell & Jolley, 2007). Those that allow respondents to 
choose only two responses are dichotomous while those which allow for several 
questions are multi-item. The multi-item questions are mostly evaluated using a Likert 
scale. Traditionally, most psychologists have assumed that a participant who strongly 
agrees (a ‘‘5’’) and who merely agrees (a ‘‘4) differ by as much, in terms of how they 
feel, as a participant who is undecided (a ‘‘3’’) differs from someone who disagrees (a 
‘‘2’’) (Mitchell & Jolley, 2007: 225). According to the authors, the Likert type scale 
yields an interval data. Open-ended questions allow respondents to answer in their own 
words. We use a combination of both closed and open-ended questions to obtain 
information from respondents. 
 
Self-administered 
questionnaire 
Paper 
questionnaire   
Electronic 
questionnaire 
Mail In-person 
drop-off 
Inserts Email Internet 
Web 
Interactive 
Kiosk 
Mobile 
Phones 
Fax 
Used in Tanzania 
Used in Poland 
Source: Zikmund et al, 2010: 219 
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In delivering questionnaires, different methods can be used depending on the context. 
Zikmund and colleagues (2010) pointed that different cultures have different norms when 
it comes to use of the telephone. The authors gave an example of business to business 
researchers in Latin American where people do not open for strangers on the telephone, 
thus in such situations researchers prefer personal interview. Web based survey was used 
for delivering the questionnaires in Poland. The use of web based survey software in 
Poland is justified by its global ranking on e-readiness.  
 
Report on the global information technology report has ranked Poland on 49
th
 position 
out of 142 countries, while Tanzania ranks at 127
th
 position (Bilbao-Osorio et al, 2013). 
According to this report, the leading country (Finland) has 5.98 scores. In comparison to 
the leading country, Poland had 4.19 scores, while Tanzania had 2.92. The software that 
was used for conducting a web survey is called SurveyXact. This is one of the powerful 
tools for conducting research in social sciences. SurveyXact allows the researcher to 
monitor the trend of responses in real time. It also allows a researcher to impose 
restrictions on how the questions should be filled. A researcher can, for example, limit 
the number of questions that a participant can escape from filling the questionnaire. 
Further the tool is one of the low cost, fast and convenient. In Poland, firms were first 
contacted by telephone and later an email containing the questionnaire was sent via 
SurveyXact software. The advantage of combining the two methods was to ensure that 
the targeted participants were willing to take part in the study and reduce the follow-up 
time.  Figure 7 below provides a snapshot window of the software.  
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Figure 7: SurveyXact window view 
 
Source: Surveyxact.com/user page 
 
In Tanzania, questionnaires were delivered personally to the firms after have been 
contacted via phone. This method has been referred to as the door- to-door (Zikmund et 
al, 2010). According to Zikmund and colleagues (2010), the door-to-door involves the 
presence of the interviewer. Such a presence plays a greater advantage by increasing the 
participation rate and the representation of the population than mail questionnaires. It is 
likewise significant to point out that in Tanzania, personal delivery was preferred than 
web based methods due to low e-readiness level (Bilbao-Osorio et al, 2013).  In addition, 
most people in Tanzania tend to be comfortable with more personal than the in-personal 
communication.  Follow-ups on the questionnaires were made personally so as to ensure 
fastest response. In both countries, the data collection task was carried out in two phases. 
In Poland, the first phase involved about 60 firms, while in Tanzania, it involved about 
100 firms.   
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4.3.2 Personal-interview 
The interview is ‘‘a kind of conversation; a conversation with a purpose’’ (Robson, 1996: 
228).  Further, according to the author, the interview is a straightforward, flexible, 
adaptable and non-probability way of finding things out. Interviews vary in terms of 
structure. The structures range from fully structured (where a set of question are 
predetermined) and semi-structured (where the interview has worked out a set of 
questions in advance but free to modify). To carry out a large scale study like this, it is 
always important to get an insight from the practitioners. Such an insight cannot be 
obtained by only reading theories. The study was conducted in a new setting, thus there 
was a need to obtain such an insight. A Preliminary interview was carried in Tanzania 
using an anonymous firm. There was no strong need for conducting such an insight 
interview in Poland because previous research has been performed in closely similar 
countries. The type of the interview conducted was semi-structured, consisting of 
questions that reflected different angles that we intended to investigate. The interview 
lasted for about one hour.  
 
4.3.3 Documentary review 
Secondary data came from a variety of sources (reports, newspapers, archives) but these 
sources can be categorized as either internal or external. Whereas internal data sources 
are created and recorded by organizations (inside the organization), external data are 
generated and recorded by an entity other than the researcher’s organization (Zikmund et 
al, 2010). The increased use of internet technology has allowed most of data sources to be 
in electronic formats and stored online. Further, most organizations have electronic 
portals that store information which can be publicly accessed.  
 
The study reviewed several documents in coming up with the rationale for the 
heterogeneity of the economies used. Reports were accessed from reputable organizations 
such as the World Bank, United Nations, World Economic Forum, Transparency 
International and national portals of respective nations. Country specific portals are 
important when it comes to obtaining the sample of potential firms to be used in a survey. 
 83 
 
Interactive reports have also been used. For examples Hofstede center allowed us to 
compare the economies and customize the reports on cultural differences.   
 
4.3.4 Sample selection 
A sample is a ‘‘subset, or some part of a larger population’’ (Zikmund et al, 2010: 387). 
There are various types of sampling plan. These are divided based on ‘‘probability 
(where the probability of the selection of each respondent is known), and on non-
probability samples (where the probability is not known)’’ (Robson, 1996:136). 
Probability sampling is also known as a representative sampling, meaning that the sample 
taken is used as a representation of the entire population. On the other hand, an inference 
cannot be made with non-probability sampling. Probability sampling involves a random 
selection of a list of the population (known in the survey parlance as the ‘sampling 
frame’) of the required number of people in the sample’’ (Robson, 1996:137). The simple 
random sample, in which ‘‘each member of the population has an equal probability of 
being selected, is the best-known probability sample’’ (Zikmund et al, 2010:395).  
 
In this study, we based on probability selection. Sometimes one can argue that a selection 
of sample for the list of firms like those involved in contracts is purposive. Though this 
line of thinking can hold, it is also important to remember that the choice of population 
by which research decides to use is a purposive (objective) decision. The research work 
by default is objective and thus the choice of the units or the sample is influenced by the 
researcher’s decision. The mechanism which the units are drawn from the targeted 
population is what represents the probability aspect. In the study of contracts it is 
somehow different from the study of other concepts in social sciences. The focus in the 
area of contractual governance is the exchange itself.   
 
Though it sounds to be difficult in ensuring the random selection of response units, we 
structured the questionnaires in such a way that the selection of exchange units had an 
equal chance. We did this by allowing the respondents to choose between the first, 
second or largest supplier (Rokkan et al, 2003). These terms are arbitrary from the 
perspective of respondents. This means that the probability of a particular exchange 
relation to be chosen in answering the questionnaire was 1/3. The immediate question 
that follows here is the inference to the population. This should not be considered to be 
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problematic because the specific questions that the respondents will have to answer 
consists of the variables which inquires for the structure of the exchange and the 
characteristics of the exchange partner involved, thus generalizability is not a concern. In 
Poland a sample frame of 1800 firms was targeted (From directory of Poland companies, 
2011), while Tanzania the targeted sample frame was about 750 firms (Listed companies 
in Tanzania Revenue Authority, 2011). 
 
4.4 Choice of Context 
This study focused on manufacturing firms in Tanzania and Poland, using the buying side 
of a relationship. Manufacturing firms are likely to have more contractual relations with 
suppliers than other firms. Choice of context is as relevant as the choice of sample when 
it comes to cross country studies. After identifying the need for contextual comparison, 
the next critical challenge was to choose the countries relevant to the study setting. The 
decision was to involve countries within the cluster of emerging markets, but with 
heterogeneous institutions. Poland and Tanzania seemed to fit this perspective. In the 
background section we have provided a detailed explanation on the aspects that 
distinguishes the two countries. In the section of country profiles, we will also provide a 
descriptive charts and graphs indicating the dynamics and heterogeneity of these 
countries. Data that are used are at least 8 years and above. 
 
4.5 Measurements1 
Questionnaire items were measured using a 5-point Likert scale. We will provide a brief 
overview of the measures used, but specific items will be provided in the appendix 
section of each paper. To ensure reliability, an exploratory followed by a confirmatory 
factor analysis was conducted. Most of the constructs used had been developed and tested 
in previous studies, including the control variables. However, some measured used 
needed to be adjusted to fit the new context.  
 
 
                                                          
1
 Some measurements have different names or labels in different papers due to the different outlets where they 
were sent for publication. Whenever there are synonyms that are used for a constructs, we will indicate that. These 
constructs are contractual completeness and Ex ante contractual effort.   
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4.5.1 Dependent variables 
 
Contractual Completeness (ex-ante term specificity
2
 and contingent adaptability
3
): In 
assessing contractual completeness both single item and multi item measures have been 
used. Example of a single item measure is the study by Hendrikse & Windsperger (2010) 
which used the context of franchisor-franchisee relationship. In this study, the authors 
asked managers to rate the degree of contractual completeness on a five-point scale. The 
following question was used: “The cooperation between the franchisor and the franchisee 
is regulated in a detailed manner in the contract”. The higher the indicator, the higher was 
the degree of contractual completeness.   
 
Masten & Reynolds (1993) on the other hand measured contractual completeness in the 
context of Air force engine purchase by looking at the price structure. The degree to 
which price allows flexibility (such as setting ceiling prices and allow parties to justify 
the price by indicating costs) was incomplete, but if pricing was fixed this was said to be 
relatively complete. Major problem experienced by Masten and Reynolds (1993) in 
measuring completeness by this way was the use of ordinal data; however the authors 
admitted that contractual completeness is a continuous variable.  
 
Aubert et al (2006) operationalized contractual completeness in IT outsourcing context 
using three different categories; performance clauses (planned cost reduction, planned 
performance levels to be reached, penalties for bad performance, bonus for exceptional 
performance, sharing benefits between the firm and the supplier, contractual renewal 
options); Adjustment Policies (break contract clause, arbitration procedure, re-negotiation 
periods planned ex ante); Co-ordination mechanisms (evaluation and monitoring of 
supplier, meeting with users, exchange assignments). Each item was given a specific 
number and its frequency in appearing in the contracts.  
 
                                                          
2
 Contractual term specificity (TSPC) = Ongoing/ex-ante term specificity (EXTSPC). 
3
 Contingent Adaptability (CONTADAPT) = Adaptability (ADAPT) = Ex post specification (EPS) 
These different terms were used to fit different channels (journals) where some papers were sent for publication. 
We maintained these terms in this thesis so as to ensure the consistency with the earlier published versions.  
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Luo (2002) on the other hand assessed joint venture contracts using two dimensions; term 
specificity and contingent adaptability. In each of the two aspects, the author used five 
points Likert scale. Items for term specificity were; (1) how to set up the joint venture; 
(2) how to operate and manage the joint venture; (3) how to cooperate and resolve 
conflict between partners; and (4) how to terminate the joint venture. The items for 
contingent adaptability included; (a) term specification is adaptive for issues that are 
particularly vulnerable to an uncertain environment or resource availability; (b) the 
contract has specified major principles or guidelines for handling unanticipated 
contingencies as they arise; and (c) the contract has provided alternative solutions for 
responding to various contingencies that are likely to arise.  
 
Reuer & Arin ᷈o (2007) built on their previous paper (Reuer & Arin᷈o, 2002) and identified 
two key factors in the study of contractual dimensions within the context of strategic 
alliances. The factors they identified were; enforcement provisions (confidentiality 
provisions, restriction on proprietary information, termination provision, arbitration 
clauses, lawsuit provision) and coordination provisions (rights to report of relevant 
transactions, notification rights for departures from the agreement, auditing rights). In the 
analysis the authors used aggregated (weighted and un-weighted) as well as separate 
dimensions. However, the authors pointed out that those stringency-weighted and un-
weighted indexes of contractual complexity are highly correlated. 
 
Saussier (2000) used 6 items in assessing the degree of contractual completeness. These 
include; quantities buyer should purchase; quantities supplier should provide; Penalties in 
case of buyer default; penalties in case of seller default; renegotiation options. In these 
items, if only price is specified it gets a value of zero, the value increases as number of 
clauses increase (up to value of 6). Wuyts & Geyskens (2005) used the measures from 
Lusch and Brown (1996). The items the authors used described the level of detail with 
which the original contract prescribes roles, responsibilities, expected performance, and 
how to handle unplanned events and conflicts. Zhuo and colleagues (2003) study used a 
binary code in measuring contractual provision. The value was zero (0) if no provision 
and one (1) if there was provision. Similar dichotomous (dummy) variable was used by 
Lyons (1994) in assessing contracts.  
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In connection to the idea of completeness other authors extended towards contractual 
complexity (Reuer & Arin ᷈o, 2007; Barthelemy & Quelin, 2006) but the 
operationalization of the concept does not differ with the idea of completeness. 
Barthelemy & Quelin (2006) used five key clauses in assessing contractual complexity: 
These were control clauses; incentive clauses; price clauses; flexibility clauses; end of 
contract clauses. Authors then operationalized each type of clause using three to five 
dummy variables arranged in increasing levels of complexity. For instance, in the case of 
price clauses, they used the following three dummy variables: (1) fixed price; (2) price 
indexing of price on a market average cost; and (3) price indexing on best vendors’ prices 
through ‘benchmarking’. Based on the five types of clauses, they developed an overall 
measurement of contract complexity that was constructed as the sum of the 18 weighted 
provisions divided by 38 (i.e. the sum of all weights).  
 
Parkhe (1993) developed a checklist of contractual safeguards obtained from a computer-
assisted search of the legal literature and documented the following eight classes of 
provisions: (1) periodic written reports of all relevant transactions; (2) prompt written 
notice of any departures from the agreement; (3) the right to examine and audit all 
relevant records; (4) designation of certain information as proprietary and subject to the 
confidentiality provisions of the contract; (5) non-use of proprietary information even 
after termination of agreement; (6) termination of the agreement; (7) arbitration clauses; 
and (8) lawsuit provisions. In this study our focus is on a contractual completeness with a 
key emphasis on the two dimensions (term specificity and contingent adaptability).  
 
Contractual satisfaction: Satisfaction in inter-firm industrial relations has traditionally 
been measured by multiple items (Brown, Lusch, & Smith, 1991; Geyskens & 
Steenkamp, 2000; Ruekert & Churchill, 1984; Schul, Little, & Pride, 1985), which use 
both cognitive and affective components (Eggert & Ulaga, 2002). Some studies have 
uniquely captured the cognitive dimension, while others have captured the affective 
(Eggert &Ulaga, 2002).  
 
The measures we used are based on the satisfying perspective of contracts (Bolton & 
Faure-Grimaud, 2010) but new items were developed to fit the study context. Andaleeb 
(1996) measured satisfaction using three items (in 7 points Likert scale). These items 
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reflected whether the relationship between partners was positive and the partners are 
satisfied.  
 
Razzaque & Boon (2003) measured satisfaction by using items from three levels; 
performance and the achievement of goals; propensity to make positive recommendation 
after satisfying encounter; other aspects of relationship. Relatively similar measures were 
also used by Jonsson & Zineldin (2003). These measures are also consistent within the 
literature of inter-firm relations. It should not be a surprise to find some measures of 
performance used in measuring satisfaction. There is a very high correlation between the 
measures of satisfaction and performance (Churchill and Surprentant, 1982). Citing the 
works of Hunt and Nevin (1974) and Wilkinson (1979), Dwyer (1980) argued that 
performance was one of the several elements that contribute to satisfaction, which also 
impact satisfaction.  
 
Contractual satisfaction measures should not differ from the above perspectives above 
but it focuses on contracts rather than general relationship satisfaction. In line with the 
literature above, this study has used six items with 5-points Likert scale in assessing the 
degree to which partners were satisfied with contractual arrangements.  
 
4.5.2 Independent variables  
 
Reputation (REPT) is one of the well-established measures from the media (for example 
fortune 500 and fortune 1000 companies). Measures from fortune covers items related to 
product, financial performance, the ability to attract and keep talented workers, social 
responsibility (Fortune, 2000). Unidimensional measures have been previously used in 
measuring this construct (Goldberg & Hartwick, 1990). In this study, we have adapted 
measures from Fombrum and Shanley (1990). Seven items were used, reflecting the 
degree to which the buyer perceived the partner to have a good reputation. After 
performing a factor analysis, all the factor loadings were within the acceptable range 
(greater than .50).  
 
History looks at long-term inter-firm understanding and reflects both experience and 
time. Argyres and colleagues (2007) captured this concept by using the length of time 
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(weeks) by which the partners engaged in a relationship. The study developed new 
measures for this construct. Four items were used and three of them were retained after 
factor analysis. Ex ante contractual costs/efforts (EAC/ECE) reflects the financial and 
non-financial expenses incurred by the buyer prior to the commencement of the 
relationship with the supplier. This concept is consistent with that used by Segal (1999) 
but new measures were developed to fit this study. Five items were used and all were 
retained after performing a factor analysis. Buyer asset specificity (BUASP) was adapted 
from Stump & Heide (1996). The concept reflects the degree to which the buyer has 
specific assets involved in the relationship. It was measured using five items, reduced to 
three items (after factor analysis) for further analysis.  
 
Buyer perceived risk (PRISK) measures were initially developed by Gwald, Wüllenwebe 
& Weitzel (2006) and later refined by Gellings and Wüllenwebe (2007). For this study, 
they were further refined to reflect the current study focus. The concept was measured by 
six items, five of which were retained after factor analysis. Trust was adapted from 
Carson et al. (2006) and was measured using seven items that reflect the degree to which 
partners have mutual expectations and understanding. After performing a factor analysis, 
three factors loaded well. The dropped items were those that focused on how conflicts 
were resolved and how the adaptation was handled. This suggests that the concept of trust 
is within the perspectives of mutual expectations and understanding.   
 
 Buyer-perceived opportunism (OPPORT) reflects the self-seeking behavior of partners 
(Williamson, 1975). This study adapted items from Rokkan, Heide, and Wathne (2003). 
The authors used measures relating to the context of outsourcing contracts. The measures 
reflected the non-cooperative and cheating behaviors of the supplier. We used six items 
in measuring the concept. After performing a factor analysis, three items were removed 
due to low loadings. Behavioral uncertainty (BU) reflects the degree of difficulty 
associated with assessing the performance of a transaction partner (Rindfleisch, 1997). 
The measures used in measuring this concept were adopted from Buvik & Andersen 
(2002). This study used five items in measuring the concept. After performing a factor 
analysis, four items were retained and one was deleted due to low factor loadings.  
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Network relations (NEWREL) focus on the connections between firms (Holm et al., 
1996; Mitchell, 1973; Nohria & Eccles, 1992). Four items were used to measure this 
concept. After performing a factor analysis three items were retained and one was deleted 
due to low factor loading. Buyer dependence (BUDEP) was adapted from Heide (1994). 
The concept measures the extent to which the buyer is dependent upon the supplier. Four 
items were used (on a five point Likert scale) and all were retained after factor analysis.  
 
The concept of environmental uncertainty was divided into two sub-concepts: volume 
uncertainty (Anderson, 1985) and technological uncertainty (Achrol, 1996). 
Technological uncertainty (TECHUNC) reflects the degree to which there are variations 
in technology or an inability to forecast technological requirements (Geyskens et al., 
2006). The concept was measured with three items (on a five point Likert scale). Volume 
uncertainty (VOLUNC) reflects the degree to which volume requirements fluctuate or 
there is an inability to forecast volume requirements (Geyskens et al., 2006). The concept 
was measured using two items (on a five point Likert scale). The foreignness of supply 
firm (FC) was measured by a dummy variable taking a value of 1 when a relationship 
involves foreign supplier and 0 otherwise.   
 
Relational norms (RELNM):  Macneil listed about 10 key norms (1980) but Heide and 
John (1992) and later other authors (Antia and Frazier, 2001; Jap and Genesan, 2000) 
used three different types of norms; flexibly, solidarity and information exchange. 
In this study, we used a total of eleven items covering flexibility, solidarity and 
information exchange. After conducting a factor analysis, flexibility and solidarity 
measures loaded on one factor (four items), while information exchange had a separate 
factor (four items). According to Noordewier, John, and Nevin (1990), these dimensions 
originate from single higher order norm, thus their convergence does not pose any 
challenge in the analysis. Further, context specific factors can also influence the way 
respondents perceive concerning flexibility and solidarity. The two separate factors were 
combined into equally weighted composite score (Heide & John, 1992) for testing the 
hypotheses. Size of the firm was measured by the number of employees. 
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4.6 Data Analysis   
Data cleaning was first conducted before the analysis. This involved the inspection of 
missing data. Missing data arise when respondents fail to reply to a question, willingly or 
by accident (Bryman, 2004).  In identifying missing data, we followed a four step 
approach that has been proposed by Hair et al (2010). The first steps is to determine the 
type of missing data (whether the missing data are part of the research design and under 
the control of the researcher or whether the ‘‘cause’’ and impacts are truly unknown. 
Second is to determine the extent of missing data (examining the patterns of the missing 
data and determine the extent of missing data for individual variables and overall). The 
third step is to diagnose the randomness of the missing data process and forth is to select 
the imputation method.  
 
According to Hair et al (2010) the rule of thumb is that if the percentage of missing data 
is below 10 (for individual cases or observation), it can be ignored. In Poland, 
SurveyXact software allowed to impose restrictions on how respondents answer the 
questions. All questions consisting key variable for analysis were restricted in the system, 
meaning that a respondent was not able to skip a relevant question, thus we did not 
experience a significant problem of missing data in Poland. In Tanzania, proper 
information was delivered to respondents before filling the questionnaires. This also 
resulted in the few missing (below the cutoff point recommended) data that missed at 
random. Though the missing data were not a serious problem, we had to replace them 
using mean (Hair et al, 2010) due to restrictions in some of the analytical tools we used 
(AMOS and SmartPLS).  
 
Outlier is another area to look when it comes to data cleaning. An outlier is an extreme 
value in the distribution. When such a value is very high or low, it can distort the mean 
and range (Bryman, 2004). Data were analyzed for the outliers. Detection of outliers can 
be done by several methods such as; univariate, bivariate and multivariate methods. We 
used the univariate method and maintained a standard score of 4 as a rule of thumb for a 
large sample (Hair et al, 2010) and datasets for the two countries did not have a problem 
of outliers.   
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Normality check was also performed. The most ‘‘fundamental assumption in the 
multivariate data analysis is normality, referring to the ‘‘shape of the data distribution for 
an individual metric variable and its correspondence to the normal distribution’’ (Hair et 
al, 2010:71). Kurtosis and Skewness are some of relevant measures for testing the 
normality, although normality plots are essential for large sample sizes. Whereas kurtosis 
measure the ‘‘peakedness or flatness of distribution (when compared with a normal 
distribution), Skewness measure the ‘‘symmetry of a distribution; in most instances the 
comparison is made to a normal distribution’’ (Hair et al, 2010: 35, 36). According to the 
authors, the most common z distribution values are +/-2.58 (.01 significance level) and 
+/-1.96, which corresponds to a .05 error level. Shapiro-Wilks test was used for both 
kurtosis and Skewness and the results supported the normality criterion.  
  
Although based on sample size, normality cannot have any problem if other assumptions 
hold; we decided to take extra measures in addition to Liveness cut point. We requested 
normality plots due to problems of this test (Liveness cut point) with sample size (Hair et 
al, 2010). Findings indicated that data were normal.    
 
After cleaning the data we established the constructs for our analysis. This stage is also 
referred to as data reduction. To do this we started with the exploratory factor analysis. 
The software we used for this task was SPSS19. Factors that had scores of .50 and above 
were selected because most of the constructs had well established theoretical base. In this 
process we used both rotated and un-rotated solutions. After the exploratory analysis, we 
used AMOS19 to conduct a confirmatory factor analysis. As the names stand, it confirms 
the factors. This test is also important for assessing the factor reliability.   
The task of forming constructs was followed by testing the specific relations. This stage 
involved different techniques, such as ordinary least square regression, structural 
equation modeling and ANOVA. We also used a range of software such as SPSS 19, 
AMOS 19 and SmartPLS. Multiple regression analysis is a statistical technique that can 
be used to analyze the relationship between a single dependent (criterion) and several 
independent (predictor) variables. The two key objectives of multiple regression analysis 
is to ‘‘maximize the overall predictive power of the independent variables and comparing 
two or more sets of independent variables to ascertain the predictive power of each 
variate’’ (Hair et al, 2010: 169).  
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There are two key errors that one has to resolve in the multiple regression analysis. One 
is the measurement error and the second is the specification error. While ‘‘measurement 
error refers to the degree to which the variable is an accurate and consistent measure of 
the concept being studied, the specification error is concerned with the inclusion of 
irrelevant variables’’ (Hair et al, 2010: 172). We corrected for the measurement error by 
using the summated scales which reduced the reliance on a single variable in measuring 
the concept. Further, the specification error was resolved by including variables which 
had  a strong theoretical base. ANOVA is a statistical method that can be used to 
determine whether sample of two or more groups come from a population with equal 
means (Hair et al, 2010). This test was used for cross country comparison of the variables 
used in the regression analysis. Data were also standardized (using mean) for 
comparative purpose (Aiken & West, 1991). Supplementary tests such as the 
computation of effect size and chow tests were used to confirm the findings (Mastumoto 
et al, 2001).    
 
Structural equation modeling is another comprehensive statistical approach in testing 
hypotheses about relations among observed and latent variables (Hoyle, 1995). SEM lies 
in the family of factor analysis and multiple regression analysis.  In addition to SEM, we 
applied PLS (partial least square) path modeling method to estimate our theoretical model 
using SmartPLS software (Ringle, Wende, Will, 2005) in paper 3.  The advantage of 
using PLS over other tools is that it does not lead to estimation problems or improper or 
non-convergent results (Hensler, Ringle and Sinkovics, 2009). For researches that aim at 
predictions, simulation studies that compare PLS with covariance-based SEM confirm 
that PLS path modeling is particularly suitable as a means to avoid improper solution 
(Reinartz, Haenlein, and Hensler, 2009). 
 
Non response bias and key informant problem are areas where researchers need to 
address because they can impact the findings significantly. Non response bias occurs 
whenever some members of the sample refuse to cooperate, cannot be contacted, or for 
some reason cannot supply the required data (Bryman, 2004:87).  Following Armstrong 
and Overton’s (1977) procedure for testing response bias, we used ANOVA for testing 
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subsamples of early and late responses in both countries with no significant differences 
(P>0.05) found.   
 
In addition, a common method variance problem was tested. The common method 
variance problem is likely in a situation where questionnaires are answered by key 
informants (Campbell & Fiske, 1959), leading to systemic contamination of correlation 
among variables (Parkhe, 1993). Harman’s single-factor test (1967) argued that the 
problem exists when all of the variables are entered together; a general factor that 
accounts for most of the variance will result. After performing factor analysis, several 
factors with eigen - values greater than one were extracted, suggesting that this study did 
not have a serious problem of common method variance. 
 
4.7 Quality Assessment 
Quality assessment is important in any research. This applies to both quantitative and 
qualitative research methods. The quality assessment provides confidence to the users of 
the results. Key areas that need to be addressed when it comes to quality are; validity, 
reliability and generalizability. In this section we review each of these areas and provide 
evidence on how they have been assured in this study. 
 
4.7.1 Validity: 
Validity is the degree to which a measure provides accurate representation (Hair et al, 
2010). There are different categories of validity. These includes; ‘‘face validity (reflects 
the content of the concept in question), concurrent validity (introduce a criterion on 
which cases are known to differ and that is relevant to the concept in use), predictive 
validity (involves the use of a future criterion measure, rather than a contemporary one), 
construct validity and convergent validity’’ (Bryman, 2004: 72). The common ones are 
convergent, discriminant and nomological validity. The definitions on the validity 
concepts that are provided below are based on Hair and colleagues (2010: 126). 
Convergent validity: ‘‘assess the degree to which two measures of the same 
concept are correlated. The strategy is to look for alternative measures of the 
concept and then correlate them with the summated scale. High correlations here 
indicated that the measure is measuring the intended concept’’.  
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Discriminant validity is the ‘‘degree to which two conceptually similar concepts 
are distinct. The empirical test is the correlation among measures, but this time 
the summated scale is correlated with a similar, but conceptually distinct measure. 
The correlation should demonstrate the summated scale is sufficiently different 
from the other similar concepts’’. 
 
Nomological validity: ‘‘refer to degree that the summated scale makes accurate 
predictions of the concepts in a theoretically based model. The strategy is to 
identify theoretically supported relationships from prior research or accepted 
principles and then assess that the scale is correlated with other known measures 
of the concept’’.  
 
Nomological validity is also concerned with the relationship between the concepts and 
their (observable) measures. We have used different data analysis tools and thus the 
assessment of validity will cut across all the tools. In assessing discriminant validity we 
applied Fornell and Larcker’s (1991) rigorous criterion (Anderson & Gerbing, 1993). For 
the discriminant validity to be supported, the average variance extracted (AVE) for two 
factors should be greater than the square of their correlations. The test for the 
discriminant validity was supported in all constructs used. To test for convergence or 
internal validity we used both factor loadings (should be .5 or greater) and construct 
reliability (should be .7 or higher) (Hair et al, 2010). All factors loadings (from both 
exploratory and confirmatory factor analysis) and construct reliability (CR) fulfilled this 
rule of thumb (see correlation tables in the papers), so our constructs had convergence 
validity.  
 
Before talking about nomological validity, we will like to say something about face 
validity. Normally many authors do not comment about this because one should test for 
face validity before doing other tests on the construct. Face validity is normally tested 
during theory development. Most of the constructs used in this study were based on 
previous literature. Nomological validity is normally tested by looking at the inter-item 
correlations if they make sense (Hair et al, 2010). All constructs went through a 
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nomological validity test by checking the factor loading patterns and their inter-item 
correlations.  
 
4.7.2 Reliability 
Unless a measure is reliable, it cannot be valid (Robson, 1996: 67). Reliability is the 
degree to which the observed variable measures the ‘‘true’’ value and is ‘‘error’’ free, 
thus it is the opposite of measurement error (Hair et al, 2010:8). There are three factors 
that are involved when considering whether a measure is reliable. Bryman (2004: 71) 
identified these factors as; ‘‘stability (whether a measure is stable over time), internal-
reliability (whether the indicators that make up the scale or index are consistent) and 
inter-observer consistency (whether there is subjective judgment involved in recording or 
translation of data into categories and when more than one observer is involved in such 
activity)’’.  
 
Since no single item is a perfect measure of a concept, we rely on a series of diagnostic 
measures to assess internal consistency (Hair et al, 2010). One is to relate each separate 
item, including the item to total correlation. Rules of thus suggest that the item-to-total 
correlations should exceed .50 and that the inter item correlations should exceed .30. 
Second is reliability coefficient, which assesses the consistency of the entire scale with 
correlation alpha, being mostly widely used measure. The generally agreed lower limit 
for cronbach’s alpha is .70, although it may decrease to .60 in exploratory research. In 
this study the values of cronbach’s alpha fulfilled the required rule of thumb (.70) (see the 
appendix on measures for each paper). I must also stress this point that the study did not 
just fulfill an internal reliability, but also the external one. Most of the constructs 
indicated similar patterns across the two countries. This is the strength of quantitative 
approach when it comes to reliability. The study had two phases in data collection for 
both countries and there was no significant variation across the samples (from the two 
waves).   
 
Collinearity check is also important for assessing the data quality. Multicollinearity 
occurs when two or more variables are highly correlated. When this problem occurs, it 
makes the interpretation less reliable (Hair et al, 2010). The two common ways for 
assessing the multi-collinearity problem is tolerance and its inverse (the variance inflation 
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factor). The suggested cut off point is Tolerance of .01 (corresponding to VIF value of 
10.0). The values for VIF in this study was far below this cut of point (below 5), 
suggesting that the multicollinearity was not a problem (see the regression tables in each 
paper).   
 
4.8 Descriptive Statistics and Sample Profile 
This section provides data profiles for the two countries used in the study (in table 4). 
The profile covers sample size, response rate, number of employees, annual sales, supply 
frequency and international composition of supply partners. 
 
Table 4: Data profiles 
Item Tanzania  Poland 
Sample size 240 201 
Response rate 31.25% 33% 
Average number of employees 1,020 255 
Average annual sales (USD) 7,270,004 16, 558, 089 
Average frequency (per month) 6 5 
Minimum length of relationship 1 1 
Number of subsidiaries of international 
companies 
5.4% 11% 
Number of joint ventures with international 
partners 
8.4% 8.7% 
Number of domestic companies owned by 
local citizens 
57.1% 56.5% 
Number of foreign suppliers 29.2% 23% 
 
Table 5 and 6 provide the composition of contractual specifications between the local and 
the international partners with respect to location of arbitration for the two countries 
(Poland and Tanzania respectively). Further the two tables (5 and 6) provide a number of 
supplier and their respective countries. The location of arbitration is one of the signals for 
contractual completeness. Figures 8 to 13 give a series of institutional contextual 
comparison for the two countries.   
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Table 5 International Suppliers to Polish Firms 
COUNTRY No. of firms 
that specified 
arbitration to 
take place in 
home country 
No. of firms that 
specified 
arbitration to take 
place in the host 
country 
No. of firms 
that did not 
specify the 
arbitration 
location 
No. firms that 
specified 
arbitration to take 
place in a third 
part country 
Total 
no. of 
firms 
Austria  2   2 
Belgium - - 1  1 
China 2 1 1 1 5 
Czech - 1 4  5 
Denmark 2 - 1  3 
France - 3 1 1 5 
Germany 13 4 1 2 20 
Holland 1 2 - 1 4 
Italy 1   1 2 
Japan - 1 -  1 
Portugal   1  1 
Korea   1  1 
Romania  1   1 
Russia 1 -   1 
Spain 1 2 -  3 
Sweden  1   1 
Switzerland 2    2 
Taiwan  1   1 
Thailand - - 1  1 
USA 2  1  3 
UK 1 1 -  2 
TOTAL  26 20 13 6 65 
% 40 30.8 20 9.2 100 
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Table 6 International Suppliers to Tanzanian Firms 
Country No. of firms 
that specified  
arbitration to 
take place in 
home country 
No. of firms 
that specified 
arbitration to 
take place in 
host country 
No. of firms 
that did not 
specified 
location of 
arbitration 
No. of firms 
that specified 
arbitration to 
take place in a 
third part 
country 
Total no. of 
firms 
Australia    1 1 
Brazil   1  1 
Canada 1 1  1 3 
China 3 10 13 1 27 
France  1 3  4 
Germany 1  2  3 
Hungary  1   1 
Holland 1  1  2 
India 3 3 4  10 
Iran   1  1 
Japan -  2  2 
Libya 1    1 
Singapore 1    1 
South Africa 2 4 5  11 
Thailand  1   1 
UAE 1 1   2 
UK   2  2 
USA 1 1 2  3 
Total 15 23 36 3 77 
% 19.45 29.9 46.75 3.9 100 
 
The comparison covers cultural, regulatory and normative aspects. Figure 8 compares the 
cultural index between the two countries. The comparison indicate that Tanzania and 
Poland are closely similar in terms of power distance and long term orientation, but differ 
in terms of individualism, masculinity and uncertainty avoidance. Poland ranks higher in 
all the items that differentiate the two countries.  
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Figure 8: Cultural comparison index 
 
 
Source: Constructed from Hofstede Centre, 2014
4
 
Key: PDI-Power distance; IDV-individualism; MAS-Masculinity; UAI-Uncertainty 
avoidance; LTO- Long-term orientation. 
 
 
Figure 9 up to 11 provide a regulatory assessment for the two countries from years 2004-
2014 using the rule of law dimensions. In the rule of law we present three key areas that 
are related to enforcing contracts; number of procedures, length of time it take from 
opening to closing the case and cost ($)  in terms of percentage of claims. The general 
picture is that Poland has made a significant reform in a regulatory area compared to 
Tanzania.     
 
In figure 9 we assess the procedures for opening the case for the two countries. The 
figure indicates that the procedures for the two countries have been increasing from 
2004-2008, then remained static. From mid-2011 to date, the number of procedures for 
enforcing contracts in Poland is decreasing while in Tanzania not much has changed. 
 
                                                          
4
 The figure was constructed based on the Hofstede centre. This can be accesses at http://geert-
hofstede.com/countries.html 
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Figure 9: Comparison of contractual procedures 
 
Source: World Bank, 2014 
 
Figure 10 compares the length of time (days) it takes to enforce contracts in the two 
countries. The figure indicates that the length of time has been decreasing for Poland but 
increasing in Tanzania.  
 
Figure 10: Comparison of length of time for enforcing contracts 
 
Source: World Bank, 2014 
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Figure 11 compares the cost for enforcing contracts for the two countries. The cost is 
computed by percentage of claims. The figure suggests that the cost of enforcing 
contracts has decreased in the two countries with Poland showing a significant drop.   
 
Figure 11: Comparison of the cost of enforcing contracts 
 
Source: World Bank, 2014 
 
Figure 12 compares corruption perception index for the two countries. The index is 
considered better when the values are higher. The corruption index is used here as proxy 
for normative dimension of institution. The figure 12 below indicates that the corruption 
problem has dropped significantly in Poland, while there has been a little change in 
Tanzania.  
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Figure 12: Comparison of corruption perception index scores (1-10, the higher the 
better) 
 
Transparency International, 2001-2013 
 
Figure 13 compares the effectiveness of private information bureau in covering 
individuals’ information. The figure provides only data for Poland because such bureau 
does not exist in Tanzania. The information is relevant for the study of contracts because 
it relates to search cost. When it is possible to obtain the information on individuals, the 
search costs can significantly decrease. The figure suggests that the coverage of the 
private information bureau has increased significantly in Poland.    
  
Figure 13: Percentage coverage of private information bureau (Poland) 
 
Source: World Bank, 2014 
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      CHAPTER FIVE                                                        
CONTRACTUAL COMPLETENESS
5
 
 
 A COMPARISON OF CONTRACTUAL TERM SPECIFICTIY IN TWO 
HETEROGENEOUS EMERGING MARKETS 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Contractual governance has been one of challenging topics in inter-firm relations, given 
the assumption that contracts are considered incomplete. The complexity of the subject 
has partly led to fewer studies that have taken the topic further in examining its 
international aspect. Prior researchers have focused on understanding contractual 
incompleteness, but the institutional role of contracts has not been well addressed in 
empirical studies. This paper addresses these shortcomings by examining contractual 
completeness in two heterogeneous emerging markets (Tanzania and Poland). The terms 
advanced (Poland) and less advanced (Tanzania) are used to distinguish these two 
emerging markets and are also used in the development of the hypotheses.  
 
The findings indicate that relational dimensions (reputation and history) and ex-ante costs 
have complementary effect on contractual completeness. The effect was stronger in more 
advanced than in less advanced emerging markets.  This paper suggests the drivers of 
contractual term specificity differ in the strength of effects rather than the direction of 
effect across the heterogeneous emerging markets. 
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Contractual term specificity; reputation; history; ex-ante contractual efforts 
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5.0 Introduction 
 
Contractual governance has been one of challenging topics in inter-firm relations, given 
the assumption that contracts are considered incomplete (Williamson, 1975). The 
complexity of the subject has partly led to fewer studies that have taken the topic further 
in examining its international aspect. Prior researchers have focused on understanding 
contractual incompleteness, but the institutional role of contracts has not been well 
addressed in empirical studies. The first generation studies on incomplete contracts 
(Grossman & Hart, 1986; Hart & Moore, 1990) suggest the incompleteness to be resulted 
from exogenous constraints (that result in high contractual enforcement costs at the 
execution stage), while the second generation (Hart & Moore, 2008; Tirole, 2009; Bolton 
& Faure-Grimaud, 2010) suggests the constraints to be endogenous (under the 
assumption of bounded rationality).  
 
Some researchers have focused on intentional incompleteness (Saussier, 2000; Crocker & 
Reynolds, 1993), which is associated with the tradeoffs between ex-ante crafting costs 
and ex post inefficiencies (Crocker & Reynolds, 1993). The choice of incompleteness has 
also been associated with the assumption that a high specification of verifiable aspects 
may worsen the unverifiable ones (Bernheim & Whinston, 1998). Saussier (2000) defines 
contractual completeness as the specification of all contractual dimensions without 
necessarily using all the information.    
 
Luo (2002) pointed out that contractual completeness is made up of two dimensions; 
contingent adaptability and term specificity. According to Luo, ‘‘contingency 
adaptability is the extent to which unanticipated contingencies are accounted for and 
relevant guidelines for handling these contingencies are delineated in a contract, while 
term specificity concerns how specific and detailed the terms are’’ (2002: 905). This 
paper focuses on the first dimension of completeness that is derived from term 
specificity. This approach is consistent with Parkhe (1993) who focused on the degree of 
formal safeguard in assessing completeness. Further, there are challenges in applying the 
second dimension (contingent adaptability) in studying contracts. Reuer and Arin ᷈o (2002, 
2003) and Arin ᷈o and Reuer (2004) pointed out that the lack of detailed knowledge 
concerning the transaction (which is likely to be the case in cross sectional comparison of 
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contracts) makes it difficult to compare contracts along the second dimension (contingent 
adaptability). This challenge will likely heighten when different institutions are involved.   
 
Recent researches have moved towards the concept of contractual complexity (Reuer & 
Arin᷈o, 2007; Barthélemy and Quélin, 2006) by extending the first dimension. Complexity 
and completeness seems to be competing aspects of a contract because when one 
increases the number of clauses (as an attempt to boost the completeness), the level of 
complexity increases. Focusing on contractual completeness as opposed to 
incompleteness is relevant for minimizing opportunistic behavior and ex post 
renegotiations (Saussier, 2000). It is also important to study contractual completeness 
because it is a signal that informs us about the level of market transformation and the 
social structures within the context of inter-firm relations. Contractual completeness can 
also inform the potential entrant about strategic positioning when it comes to inter-firm 
relations in a new or unfamiliar foreign market. In relation to the emerging market, 
contractual completeness strongly reflects the transaction composition (dimensions) and 
the stage of market transformation (from informal to formal transactions). Discussing the 
institutional differences or general context surrounding transaction was missing in earlier 
literature of contracts.  
 
The roles on which drivers play behind contractual completeness across heterogeneous 
institutions have not been adequately addressed. Whether the drivers are complementary 
or substitutive, we still miss a discussion on the level of influence on such roles across 
heterogeneous emerging markets. China, Central and Eastern Europe were two of the 
most significant markets to emerge at the end of the 1990s (Hoskisson et al, 2000). 
Emerging markets now include, but are not limited to, the transitional economies of 
Central and Eastern Europe and the former states of the Soviet Union, some Asian 
economies (China, Taiwan, Thailand, etc.), the Middle East and Africa.   
 
In addition, a general limitation across the contractual literature has been a lack of 
distinction between context-specific and relational-specific dimensions of contractual 
completeness. To overcome this limitation, this study aims to take a step further in 
examining the drivers (of contractual completeness) within the contextual settings of two 
heterogeneous emerging markets (Tanzania and Poland).    
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The terms advanced (Poland) and less advanced (Tanzania) are used to distinguish the 
two countries. The two countries were chosen for this study as they have some core 
similarities and differences (more detailed explanation is provided in the context section). 
Their similarities include their historical landscapes (moving from socialist to capitalist 
economies), having approximately the same population density, and economic growth 
prospects. Core differences include the levels of economic maturity, their legal 
frameworks, business cultures, and market composition. These differences form a large 
portion of the contextual factors. This study will use theoretical perspectives of 
transaction cost and relational governance to determine the differences in the drivers of 
contractual completeness across heterogeneous emerging markets.  
 
We expect to find differences in the dimensions that influence contractual completeness 
due to the different contextual factors highlighted above. We purport to resolve the 
following key questions: What are the central elements that influence contractual 
completeness? What is the nature of that influence (do the factors increase or decrease the 
level of contractual completeness)? Are there any key differences or similarities across 
these markets?  
 
This paper is organized as follows: In the first section 5.1 we provide a contextual setting 
and rationale. In section 5.2 we present a literature review on contractual governance, 
relational governance and institutional perspectives. We then present the hypotheses in 
section 5.3. The methodology is presented in section 5.4, followed by a presentation of 
the results, discussion and conclusions in sections 5.5 and 5.6 respectively.  
 
5.1 Contextual Setting and Rationale  
Emerging markets have recently been of interest for investors because of their ability to 
withstand weaknesses (economic shocks) compared to the matured ones (Oprita
b
, 2012). 
Recent statistics have shown that  38.9% of world manufacturing goods are now coming 
from developing markets, 57.6% from developed markets and 3.5% of transition markets, 
with both developing and transition markets constantly raising while developed markets 
continually falling (UNCTAD, 2012). Meyer & Peng pointed out that ‘’there are often 
hidden features and assumptions that are often unnoticed when conducting research in 
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mature market economies and thus scholars have struggled with how to incorporate the 
specific contextual influences into their theoretical reasoning’’ (2005:601).  Williamson 
(1993) also recognized the challenges posed by institutions and suggested them to be 
taken as ‘’shifting parameters’’.  
 
Most studies on emerging markets are also limited by involving similar regions or groups 
such as Asian or Eastern and Central Europe. Part of the problem is on the assumption 
that emerging markets are similar but in reality they are different. What distinguishes 
them is the intensity and nature of institutional dynamics (Hafsi &Farashi, 2005). These 
dynamics have also been suggested to be important for testing theories (Mayer & Peng, 
2005). We have few studies that have aggressively compared the business to business 
theories in dissimilar markets. Inter-comparison of dissimilar emerging markets will 
provide us with deeper knowledge. Most firms coming from particular groups present a 
set of homogeneous characteristics which are mostly common to all firms in a particular 
region. 
 
Countries that have been selected in this study come from two distinctive regions; East 
and Central Europe for Poland, and Sub-Saharan Africa for Tanzania.  Eastern and 
Central Europe apart from been considered attractive debt market after the Eurozone 
crisis (Oprita
a
, 2012), has also been an interesting place for testing organizational theories 
due to transition processes (Meyer & Peng, 2005). Sub-Sahara on the other hand is the 
second world region with high economic prospects for years between the years 2011-20, 
first region being emerging Asia (Economist, 2011). Apart from the interests in these 
regions, the two countries selected have indicated attractive features which can draw both 
scholarly and practitioners’ attention now and future. In following sections we provide 
some comparative highlights in terms of economic performance, institutional 
performance and culture.   
 
5.1.1 Economic and institutional performance 
Poland, which is the biggest country in ECE (East and Central Europe), is the only one in 
ECE that had post economic growth during the 2009 recession and is one of the attractive 
debt market, that was created by Eurozone crisis (Oprita., 2012). Poland economic 
landscape has been a success relative to other ECE members (S&P Indices, 2010). In 
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comparison to the year 2004, Poland inward FDI (foreign direct investment) flows 
between the years 2009-2011 was doubled (UNCTAD, 2012).   
 
Tanzania on the other hand has a unique economic prospect in Africa, and was noted to 
be one of the fastest growing economies in the region (Economist, 2011). Tanzania has 
attracted 82% of new FDI projects since 2003 (Ernest & Yong, 2012). Compared to the 
year 2005, Tanzania inward FDI have almost doubled in 2011 (UNCTAD, 2012). The 
country is also among top 5 FDI attractions in Africa between the years 2003-2011 (Ernst 
& Yong’s, 2012).  
 
For comparison of institution performance between the two countries, the study used 
World Bank (2012) dataset.  The dataset indicates that between the years 2003-2005 both 
countries’ ease of doing business was relatively the same. From 2006 to mid-2007, it was 
easier to manage business in Tanzania than Poland, but after mid-2007 to date, it is 
comparatively easier to manage business in Poland than in Tanzania. With respect to the 
micro-economic performance (annual growth rates) for the years 1994-2009, the World 
Bank’s dataset indicates Tanzania to be doing relatively better in terms of growth rates 
for the entire period compared to Poland. The dataset also indicates the rule of law, 
corruption index, government effectiveness and regulatory quality for both countries. For 
all these indices, Poland is doing relatively better than Tanzania. 
 
5.1.2 History and size  
Besides these unique economic trends the two countries have other key comparable 
features that make it interesting for comparison. Both countries have gone through 
socialistic ideologies which later were changed into more capitalistic ones. Tanzania’s 
socialistic ideology, commonly known as Ujamaa (Africa socialism), can be similar in 
most ways to the Polish socialistic ideology.  Village collectivization was resisted in 
Poland as well as in Tanzania (Lofchie, 1978).  In terms of populations, the two countries 
have comparable population sizes of about 38,415,284 (July 2012 est.) in Poland and 
43,601,796 (July 2012 est.) in Tanzania (Fact book, 2012).  
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5.1.3 Culture  
In terms of culture, the dataset from Hofstede (2012) on national culture comparison 
index show key similarities and differences in the two countries. The index consists of 
five dimensions (power distance, individualism, masculinity, uncertainty avoidance, 
long-term orientation). Power distance, which measures the extent by which people 
accept hierarchical order, was quite similar in Tanzania (score 70) and Poland (score 68). 
Individualism, which measures the degree of interdependence a society maintains among 
its members, is different between Tanzania (25) and Poland (60), indicating that Poland is 
more individualistic while Tanzania is a relatively collectivistic country.  Masculinity, 
which measures the degree to which a society is driven by competition, achievement and 
success compared to femininity which indicates the degree to which a society tends to 
show care and quality of life, is different between the two countries; with Poland being 
more masculine country (score 64), while Tanzania is considered to be a more feminine 
society (score 40). Uncertainty avoidance is the extent to which the members of a culture 
feel threatened by ambiguous or unknown situations. Countries exhibiting high 
uncertainty avoidance maintain rigid codes of belief and behavior and are intolerant of 
unorthodox behavior and ideas.  Poland is considered to be a highly uncertainty 
avoidance country (score 93) compared to Tanzania (score 50). Long term orientation, 
which measures the degree to which a society perspective is in the long-term as opposed 
to short-term, was relatively similar between Tanzania (score 30) and Poland (32) 
meaning they are both short-term oriented countries. To summarize, Poland and Tanzania 
are relatively similar in terms of power distance and long-term orientation but are 
different in terms of individualism, masculinity and uncertainty avoidance.  
 
 
5.2 Theoretical Review 
 
5.2.1 Contractual governance  
The contractual-based governance emphasizes the use of a formalized, legally-binding 
agreement, or a contract to govern the inter-firm partnership (Lee & Cavusgil, 2006). 
Most inter-firm relationships between two independent firms are based on contracts 
(Buvik & Haugland, 2005).  A contractual agreement falls under hybrid governance 
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(governance modes that are between markets and hierarchy). One of the key focuses in 
transaction cost analysis (TCA) is the assignment of specific governance mode to 
minimize transaction costs (Heide, 1994; Williamson, 1985).  
 
Contractual efforts (costs) include searching, monitoring and enforcing (Hennart, 1993; 
North, 1990; Williamson, 1985). Motive of using a contract is mitigation of opportunistic 
risks (Luo, 2005) derived from specific assets (Barney & Hansen, 1994; Williamson, 
1985; Zaheer & Venkatraman, 1995). Macneil (1980:4) has viewed formal contracts as 
‘‘promise or set of promises for the breach of which the law gives a remedy, or the 
performance of which the law in some way recognizes as duty’’. For practical sense, a 
formal contract is mostly customized to a specific transaction, and provides a detailed 
description of the partners’ responsibilities.  
 
Formal contracts reduce power imbalances that build an exit barrier (Bucklin and 
Sengupta, 1993). Bilateral hybrid governance structures such as contracts provide a 
means for safeguarding specific assets as well as enhancing closer inter-firm ties 
(Rindfleisch & Heide, 1997). The Nature of transaction (for example complexity of 
dimensions and assets involved (Joskow, 1988)) and the corresponding institutional 
environment are key determinants of contracting (Luo, 2005; Oxley, 1999).  
 
5.2.2 Relational based governance.  
 
Relational governance is an exchange that is driven by social dimensions (Macneil, 1980; 
Gundlach & Achrol, 1993). The level of social dimensions which are ‘’distinctly human 
in origin’’ (Oliver, 1997:699) is likely to vary from one exchange to the other. Ferguson, 
Paulin, & Bergeron categorized this continuum by pointing that ’weak social norms or a 
reliance on a strict implementation of the formal contract reflect transactional 
governance, and strong norms or less reliance on the formal contract indicate relational 
governance’’ (2005:219).  Relational governance (Dyer & Singh, 1998; Dyer & Chu, 
2000; Gulati & Nickerson, 2008; Mellewigt et al., 2007) overcomes the bounds posed by 
formal market governance or contractual safeguards (Poppo & Zenger, 2002). The 
enforcement mechanism for the relational governance is through social sanctions 
(Macaulay, 1963).   
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Relationships are established on mutual expectations (Cannon et al., 2000) and give rise 
to more specific relational components like trust (Argyres, 2007; Gulati, 1995), history 
(Crocker & Reynolds, 1993; Kramer, 1999) and reputation (Worden, 2003; Carson, 
Madhok, & Wu, 2006) that provide safeguard (Jap & Anderson, 2003) or non- legal 
sanctions (Macaulay, 1963) in proportion to their presence in relational channels (Brown, 
Dev, & Lee, 2000; Heide & John, 1992). Firms conform to social norms so as to gain 
legitimacy (Oliver, 1997) which reduce the transaction cost (Dyer, 1997), decrease 
dependence on formal constraints (Hills, 1995) and improve performance (Griffith, 
2002).  
 
5.2.3 Comparison of relational and contractual governance approach  
 
Relational and contractual governance approach has their similarity on their focus on 
ensuring safeguard of assets. Both forms are hybrid governance structures, but they have 
differences (though their focus remains the same). While, for example, relational 
governance pay attention to establishing relationship in ensuring safeguard, contractual 
approach, focus on specification of terms which is seen as less relational. Due to such 
difference, the enforcement mechanism for relational governance is the social sanctions 
which act as informal enforcement, while courts of law are enforcement mechanism for 
formal contracts. The ability for relational governance to function with an informal 
enforcement mechanism makes it dominant in an environment where the formal 
institutional mechanisms are not strong. To what degree relational governance influence 
formal contractual agreements are of a particular interest in business relationships, but it 
has not been well explored in literature. Formal Contracts are complex and costly 
compared to relational governance, which is relatively effective with less cost (Lee & 
Cavusgil, 2006). Many aspects of transactions cannot be specified by contracts due to 
unforeseeable future contingencies (Poppo & Zenger, 2002). 
 
Relational governance plays a major role in overcoming the pointed limitations (Macneil, 
1978). Through relational governance, contracts can be updated, leading to a more 
complete version that can enhance better inter-firm relations (Poppo & Zenger, 2002). In 
the same vein the lowered opportunistic behavior through contractual governance can 
 134 
 
enhance relational governance. In addition, the contract formulation process can increase 
relational prospects between the firms. Broadly speaking, relational governance and 
contractual governance may rather complement than oppose each other.    
 
5.2.4 Institutional perspective 
Institutions refer to the rules, expectations, and actions to which organizations must 
conform to receive legitimacy (Meyer and Scott, 1983). Institutions can thus be defined 
as the ‘‘regulative, normative, and cognitive structures and activities that provide stability 
and meaning to social behavior’’ (Scott, 1995: 33). Regulations are concerned with 
compliance with government rules and sanctions (Kelman, 1987), normative institutions 
are concerned with compliance to socially accepted norms and behaviors (Selznick, 
1984) while cognitive actions concern with compliance to cultural values (Berger and 
Luckmann, 1967; Hofstede, 1980).   
 
When the institutional processes and structures are taken together they form the 
institutional environment or context (Gewarld & Dharwadkar, 2002). Exchange activities 
are arranged within the embedded economic, political, and cultural environment (Dacin 
et al., 2002, North, 1990). The institutional context establishes the path for the 
transactions to take place (Jepperson, 1991; North, 1990). The function of the 
institutional context should be distinguished from that of the market. Whereas the 
institutional context exerts normative pressure on organizations to change, the market 
context exerts efficiency-based pressure on organizations (Newman, 2000:603). 
Adjusting with institutional pressures is important for survival and for obtaining scarce 
resources (DiMaggio & Powell, 1991; Meyer & Rowan, 1977).  
 
Traditional research on contractual governance has taken the institutional environment as 
a static (Chung & Beamish, 2005; Williamson, 1996). The institutional environment is 
not just a mere background condition (Ingram and Silverman, 2002: 20) but a dynamic 
(Hafsi &Farashi, 2005; Oxley, 1997; Scott, 1995) one.  The dynamics of institutions exert 
influence on the organizational performance (Tan & Litschert, 1994). Institutions like 
rules (legal framework) does not only influence the transaction cost (Peng (2003), but 
also facilitates the weak-based relational ties (Peng & Zhou, 2005).  The institutional 
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context in emerging markets is unique, and thus the generalization from other advanced 
economies has been challenged (Lui, 2009).  
 
The institutional environment may encourage or distorts the development of relational 
ties between partners (North, 1990). Grewal & Dharwadkar (2002) has also suggested 
that the institutional processes have influence on channel structure and processes. 
Contracting is determined by exchange features (such as transaction cost dimensions and 
relational aspects) and corresponding institutional environment (Luo, 2005; Oxley, 1999) 
and thus the use of contracts is influenced by the institutional structure. The response to 
contractual hazards will thus differ across countries (Williamson, 1991; Joskow, 1988; 
Poppo and Zenger, 2002).   
 
Culture, which is one of the cognitive dimensions of an institution, has an influence on 
contracts. Managerial decisions have also been suggested to be a function of cultural 
values (Schneider and De Meyer, 1991; Hofstede, 1980). Uncertainty avoidance, 
individualism/collectivism, and power distance (Hofstede, 1980) are key dimensions of 
culture which influence contracts in different ways. Firms with uncertainty avoidance 
tendency have a strong preference for codification and the establishment of formal rules 
or detailed contractual terms (Steensma et al., 2000; Wuyts & Geyskens, 2005). On the 
other hand, firms from collectivist cultures prefer longer (Sako and Helper, 1998) and 
less detailed contracts (Wagner, 1995). Power-distance increases the need for detailed 
specification on contracts (Wuyts & Geyskens, 2005), thus firms from power distance 
culture prefer explicit descriptions of tasks (Bates et al., 1995) and control over their 
partners' actions (Shane, 1994). High-versus low context cultural dimensions have also 
been used in the arguments for the role of culture on contracts (Larsen et al, 2002). The 
authors argued that in a high context culture, the contracts are less detailed and parties 
rely more on verbal than non-verbal communication. 
 
Regulatory regime is another area within the institutional perspective which exerts 
influence on contract (Williamson, 1991; Joskow, 1988). According to Gewarld & 
Dharwadkar, ‘‘regulatory institutions often are sufficiently powerful to impose direct 
constraints, in the form of authoritative orders, or indirect constraints through rigorous 
rules and regulations’’ (2002: 85).  Luo (2005) has also pointed to the influence of legal 
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or regulatory system of contractual governance. This was supported by findings from 
Zhou and Poppo (2010) which suggested that the legal enforceability has a significant 
influence on the contractual governance. Further, the normative dimension of institutions 
influences the channel member behavior (Gewarld & Dharwadkar, 2002).  
 
Empirical studies have found that business transactions in emerging economies to a large 
degree rely on relational exchanges such as mutual trust and cooperative norms (Li, 
Poppo and Zhou, 2008; Zhang and Li, 2008), mainly due to inadequate legal and 
regulatory frameworks –commonly referred to as institutional voids”  (Zhou and Peng, 
2010: 357). Differences in the cultural dimensions and level of market transformation 
across the two markets, is expected to influence the degree of effects (of independent 
variables) on contractual completeness.   
 
The influence of institutions is strong in relational than technical aspects.  Kiggundu, 
Jorgensen, and Hafsi’s (1983) reviewed 94 studies published during the 1956–1981 
period on the application of mainstream organizational and management theories in 
developing countries. Their findings showed that, the studies that had technical core had 
less divergence, but significant divergence was higher on studies dealing with 
relationships that are more institutional prone.   
 
5.3 Hypothesis Development 
 
5.3.1 Degree of contractual completeness  
Most definitions of contractual completeness focus on term specification (Brown, 
Potoski, & Van Slyke, 2007; Saussier, 2000). Based on the second-generation view of 
contracts, completeness can be viewed as the degree of detail used to describe activities 
and objectives, which may cover all possible situations and contingencies (Al-Najjar, 
1995; Brown et al., 2007; Hendrikse & Windsperger, 2010; Saussier, 2000). Hendrikse 
and Windsperger define contractual completeness as the “ratio between specific rights 
and residual rights where specific rights refer to detailed specification of decision action 
in the ex-ante period and residual rights refer to the planning of decision procedures 
which enable decision making about specific actions in the ex post period” (2010:4).  
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Aspects that hinder contractual completeness can occur before the contractual period (ex- 
ante) or after (ex post). While the latter is associated with adaptation problems (Grossman 
& Hart, 1986; Hart & Moore, 1990), the former is associated with the bounded rationality 
of the contractual partners (Bolton & Faure-Grimaud, 2009; Hart & Moore, 2008; Tirole, 
2009). Although contractual completeness is hard to achieve (Bernheim & Whinston, 
1998; Nakhla, 2003; Neu, 1991), it is possible to study the degree of contractual 
completeness (Al-Najjar, 1995; Brown et al., 2007; Hendrikse & Windsperger, 2010; 
Saussier, 2000). Both relational and non-relational factors are important in addressing 
contractual completeness.  
 
Institutional context has been argued to have an important role in contractual governance 
(Williamson, 1991). The literature on institutions has already indicated the relevance of 
including the contextual surrounding in the study of contractual governance. It is 
important to provide a clue to these perspectives of contractual completeness so as to 
empower firms with better predictions that ensure proper strategic alignment when 
dealing with different emerging markets. The following section discusses the effects on 
contractual completeness.   
5.3.2 Effect on the degree of contractual completeness  
The selection of independent variables for this study is based on the relational and 
contractual governance literatures. Classical factors such as asset specificity are also 
included in the list of controls. The choice of the specific variables that are used is based 
on their usage in past literature. Reputation (Al-Najjar, 1995, Bernstein, 1992), prior 
relations or history (Argyres et al., 2007) and ex-ante costs (Crocker & Reynolds, 1993) 
are all important variables in studying contractual governance. Institutions have an 
important role on contracts (Wagner, 1995; Luo, 2005; Oxley, 1999). 
 
5.3.2.1 Reputation 
Reputation is the “base of an organizational identity” (Worden, 2003:39), and an 
intangible firm’s asset (Fombrun & Shanley, 1990; Williamson, 1985). Further, the 
reputation provides safeguards or social sanctions (Carson et al., 2006), increases 
flexibility (Al-Najjar, 1995), and lowers perceived risk (Lorenz, 1999). Reputation in 
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other words, is an informal written guarantee (Akerlof, 1970). In emerging markets, 
where the parties to a contract are less likely to be known to each other (Choi et al., 
1999), reputation may play a dominant role. Akerlof (1970) pointed out that when there 
are difficulties in assessing the quality, a good name can be an alternative to go with.  
 
Reputable firms have developed their image over a long period. Klein and Leffler (1981) 
model pointed out that a firm acquire reputation by making sunk costs, which are 
important to maintain because the short-term gains from cheating will be offset by the 
long-term losses that are resulted from damaged reputation. According to Akerlof (1970), 
‘‘the cost of dishonesty (acting in non-reputable fashion) lies not only in the amount by 
which the purchaser is cheated; it includes the loss incurred from driving legitimate 
business out of existence’’ (pg. 495).   
 
Reputable firms usually offer reliable information to their partners when drafting 
agreements as a one of the means to maintain their image. This minimizes the adverse 
selection problems that can have a negative effect on the contractual completeness. One 
can also argue that the detailed drafting of contracts is not necessary when dealing with 
reputable partners, but this argument looks only at the one side perspective of the dyad. A 
reputable firm will try to avoid ambiguity by providing details, so as to protect its name 
in the process of carrying out the transaction. Reputable firms will also prove their status 
and distinguish themselves with others in terms of providing the relevant information to 
their buyers. The tendency of reputable firms to prove their worthiness and defend their 
name, pushes contracts to be more complete in terms of depth, reliability and quality of 
the information. Thus;  
 
H1a: Seller reputation has a positive effect on the degree of contractual 
completeness in emerging markets.    
 
To argue for the strength of reputation impact on contracts between the advanced and less 
advanced emerging markets, it is important to point out the contextual aspects that 
surround reputation.  In more advanced emerging markets, the firm’s reputation can 
easily be traced and such data is likely to be more reliable compared to the one from less 
advanced emerging markets. The existence of private information bureaus which collect 
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key information on firms and individuals makes a reliable and unbiased check. Further 
the private information bureau acts as a control mechanism for firms’ behavior.   
 
Differences in institutions are also important for determining the strength of impact of 
relational dimensions like reputation on contracts. Higher uncertainty avoidance 
(Steensma et al., 2000; Wuyts & Geyskens, 2005) and low-context culture in Poland will 
support for the use of more detailed contracts. Though this might not be a distinctive 
feature in all advanced emerging markets, we will expect a move toward formal 
exchanges (impersonal exchanges) to generate the high need for more detailed 
contractual specifications in such markets. 
 
Bernstein (1992) used an example from the diamond industry by indicating how this 
industry has been moving from a ‘‘homogeneous group-based, extralegal contractual 
regime’’ (such as reputation) to one that ‘‘relies increasingly on information technology’’ 
(pg. 40). The increased role of information technology in gathering reliable information 
concerning the reputation of firms is increasingly vivid in advanced emerging markets.  
 
What Bernstein suggests, is the move from using extra-legal regime as a substitute for 
contracts to using them as an integral part of the contractual making process. When the 
institutions are not strong enough, the tendency is to move from complementary to a 
substitutive based approach (using informal based exchange). Though this is an important 
phenomenon to provide a detailed explanation; it is beyond the scope of this paper. 
Consistent with Bernstein (1992) view, we expect the provision of detailed information 
from reputable partners to be even more critical in relatively advanced emerging markets 
because of strong third party monitoring mechanism. Thus, we hypothesize; 
 
H1b: Seller reputation has a stronger positive effect on contractual completeness 
in more advanced than in less advanced emerging markets.   
 
5.3.2.2 History 
History functions as a repository for trust (Kramer, 1999; Lindskold, 1978), information 
(Balakrishnan & Koza, 1993) and knowledge (Macaulay, 1963).  History in a relationship 
takes time to develop (Dwyer, Schurr, & Oh, 1987), but its outcome can lead to improved 
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safeguards (Joskow, 1987) and enhanced inter-firm understanding (Argyres et al., 2007; 
Mayer & Argyres, 2004), particularly in handling contingencies (Crocker & Reynolds, 
1993; Luo, 2002). All these ingredients of long-term contracts can be influenced by the 
historical aspects of the relationship.  
 
We define history as a series of events or episodes accumulated over time in a course of a 
particular relationship. Such episodes or events provide a rich source of knowledge or 
information concerning partners. When there is a history involved in the relationship, 
firms will have accumulated deeper insights on their partners, which cannot be achieved 
by other means. History can begin even before contracts have been drawn up. The deeper 
information obtained from having a history with another firm can be a vital and reliable 
reference when making an agreement and is likely to result in a more complete contract.  
 
Previous findings have also indicated a significant role of history on contracts. For 
example Argyres and colleagues (2007) found a significant complementary (positive) 
effect of history on contingency planning. Crocker & Reynolds (1993) examined the 
relationship between contractual incompleteness and opportunistic behavior using the 
context of Air force engine procurement with contracts from the 1970s and 1980s. Their 
findings suggested that the contract is more complete when there is a history of dispute 
among the parties.  We thus hypothesize;  
 
H2a: History has a positive effect on the degree of contractual completeness in 
emerging markets. 
 
 History’s effect on contracts can also be influenced by institutions (Dieleman & Sachs, 
2006; Peng, Lee, & Wang, 2005; Peng & Zhou, 2005). It is one thing to obtain important 
information related to the exchange, and it is another to use it into a contractual setting. 
Literature in contracting has previously suggested that parties can intentionally leave out 
some unspecified aspects of a relationship (Crocker & Reynolds, 1993). Culture has also 
been associated with such choices. For example, Wagner (1995) argued that the 
collective cultures will have a negative tendency towards the detailed specification of 
contracts.  
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Sometimes when the parties decided to push for detailed specifications it might turn out 
to be a signal for mistrust (Bradach and Eccles 1989). In a marriage contract, for 
example, when one of the partner proposes to include in a contract a clause related to 
how they should divide their properties in case of a divorce, this might send a negative 
signal (an intention for potential future divorce) to the other party. When markets move 
toward a relatively formal structure, the rules of the game become formalized (Peng, 
2003; Zhou and Peng, 2010), but a complementary effect of relational governance can 
still be visible. This is consistent with the argument that the use of contracts is influenced 
by the institutional structure, and thus the contractual customization as response to 
hazards will differ across countries (Williamson, 1991; Joskow, 1988; Poppo and Zenger, 
2002).  
 
Practical example of the complementary role of relational governance has been shown by 
Zhou and colleagues where they pointed out that ‘‘partners who are meeting for the first 
time can rely on informal contracts to initiate business transactions in China; only after 
time has passed and trust-based relationships are in place will parties use formal 
provisions to coordinate the exchange (2003: 93). In other words, history (as a proxy for 
trust) plays an important role in the establishment of formal contracts in some societies. If 
the observation of Zhuo and colleagues (2003) is correct, then we will expect to see 
history, having a stronger impact on contractual completeness in relatively advanced than 
less advanced emerging markets. The rationale for such effect is based on the improved 
perceived enforceability as a legal regime improves (Zhou & Poppo, 2010) and the 
availability of information that accumulates from history in the relationship. Thus;  
 
H2b: History has a stronger positive effect on contractual completeness in more 
advanced than in less advanced emerging markets. 
 
5.3.2.3 Ex-ante contractual efforts (costs) 
Ex-ante costs are relevant for establishing or specifying contractual terms. Spier (1992) 
and Battigalli & Maggi (2008) model of contractual incompleteness involved drafting or 
ex-ante costs and thus they are an important part in establishing contracts.  Specifying a 
contract for the first time with any supplier involves certain costs (Segal, 1999; Zheng, 
Roehrich, & Lewis, 2008), which depend on the situation at hand (Anderlin & Felli, 
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1999) and the nature of the parties involved (Foss & Foss, 2010). The key ex-ante 
contractual efforts are searching and contractual drafting (Hennart, 1993; North, 1990; 
Williamson, 1985), which take the form of consultation in an attempt to resolve the 
information asymmetry problem (Milgrom & Robert, 1982).   
 
Ex-ante contractual efforts will increase as environmental complexity increases, resulting 
in lower benefits from having “optimal contracts” (Segal, 1999). The efforts for acquiring 
proper information and ultimately finding a relevant partner are reflected in the increase 
in contractual efforts. Crocker & Reynolds (1993) model suggested that an optimal 
contract is an outcome of a tradeoff between the costs of having a complete contract, 
versus the benefits associated with such a decision. In their model, the authors indicated 
that an increased effort results in an increased level of contractual completeness. 
Battigalli & Maggi (2008) also pointed out on the influence of writing costs on the level 
of contractual details. We expect that costs which are involved in establishing contractual 
terms have a positive impact on the contractual completeness. Thus;  
 
H3a: Ex-ante contractual efforts have a positive effect on contractual 
completeness in emerging markets 
 
With specific reference to emerging markets, Choi, Lee and Kim noted that “the identity 
of a potential partner is not easily known in emerging business environments and the 
potential measurement and enforcement costs can be prohibitively high” (1999:198). In a 
situation where the partners have no prior knowledge of one another, they will have to 
incur some efforts in order to obtain the important information which can be used to 
enhance the quality of the contractual agreement. When the costs are relatively higher, it 
will hinder the parties from writing complete contracts (see Posner, 1992: 92-9).   
 
Ex-ante information is relatively easier to access in more than in less advanced emerging 
markets. This is partly attributed by better institutional structures in the advanced 
emerging markets.  Further, the existence of the private information bureau and advanced 
technology in the advanced emerging markets can significantly reduce the search costs. 
This implies that the firms in advanced emerging markets have a threshold level of 
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information value prior to contractual arrangements. Such added advantage is valuable in 
the contractual formulation process.  
 
In addition, the value that exists on relational ties in advanced emerging markets can be 
of more use in such markets than in relatively less advanced emerging markets due of the 
improved formal legal enforcement. Perceived legal enforcement (Zhou & Poppo, 2010) 
that will likely be enhanced by the improvement in market institutions in advanced 
emerging markets, can improve the efficiency of utilizing the ex-ante contractual efforts 
in the designing of contracts. The impact of ex-ante efforts on contractual completeness is 
thus expected to be stronger in advanced than less advanced emerging market. Thus we 
hypothesize;  
 
H3b: Ex-ante contractual efforts have a stronger positive impact on contractual 
completeness in more advanced than in less advanced emerging economies. 
 
5.3.2.4 Control variables 
We also controlled for several factors that could influence the degree of contractual 
completeness. The choice of factors was based on previous literature on contractual 
governance. Buyer asset specificity (BUASP) was included because transaction cost 
theory predicts that exchange relationships with high asset specificity will use more 
formal contracts for governance when the transaction cannot be internalized (Joskow, 
1988; Lui et al., 2009).  
 
The foreignness of supplier was included due to the different contractual requirements 
that can emerge in international buyer-supplier relations when different nations are 
involved (Woodcock & Geringer, 1991), and because of the role of culture and its 
implications for inter-firm relations (Shane, 1992).  
 
Finally, we included size, based on its inclusion in previous studies on inter-firm relations 
(Agarwal & Ramaswami, 1992; Gomes-Casseres, 1989). Large firms are mostly well 
structured and have well organized communication system than small firms. In small 
firms it is likely easy to know the transaction partners in person. These features push 
large firms to have detailed agreements than small ones. 
 144 
 
5.4 Research Methods 
 
5.4.1 Research design 
The survey was used in obtaining data for this study. The survey enables a researcher to 
collect ‘‘a standardized information from a specific population, or some sample from one, 
usually but not necessarily by means of a questionnaire or interview’’ (Robson, 1996: 
49). A survey tends to be large in size, especially when the focus is on empirical analysis. 
This is to ensure a high degree of confidence on the inferences made to the rest of the 
population. Among the advantages a survey offers to a researcher is fast, efficient and 
relatively high degree of accuracy in assessing information about a population (Zikmund 
et al, 2010).  
 
5.4.2 Data collection method 
Researchers use different research methods when collecting data from different 
institutional contexts. McQueen & Knussen specifically pointed out that research 
methods vary due to ‘‘relative advantage and disadvantages in differing contexts, in 
terms of complexity, type of data they generate and the underlying philosophies’’ (2002: 
34). The study focused on supplier-buyer relations of manufacturing firms in Tanzania 
and Poland, with data being collected from the buying side of the relationships.  
 
The reason why the two countries were chosen has been provided in the introduction. 
Manufacturing firms were relevant to this topic because they are likely to engage in 
contractual relations with their suppliers. Firms that participated in this study were 
required to make their preferred list of three suppliers (first, second or third largest) 
whom to choose for answering the questionnaire (Rokkan et al, 2003).  This form of 
choice was used to increase the variation in the sample. Different data collection 
techniques were applied to the two countries. In the section below, we provide a detailed 
examination of data collection methods used.   
 
5.4.2.1 Self-administered questionnaire 
Self-administered questionnaire is a common mechanism in doing a survey. Apart from 
being cheap and efficient, the method ‘‘allows for anonymity, which can encourage 
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frankness when sensitive areas are involved’’ (Robson, 1996: 129). Self-administered 
questionnaires can be delivered through a paper (via postal, door to door) or electronic 
(via web) format. The different delivery formats and mediums can be influenced by 
institutional context. In some cultures, for example, telephone is not a proper way of 
gathering data (Zikmund et al, 2010). The level of e-readiness can hinder the use of web 
survey. In Poland we decided to use web based survey on delivering the questionnaires. 
This method was justified by the good global e-readiness ranking of Poland (Bilbao-
Osorio et al, 2013).  
 
We used SurveyXact software in doing the web survey in Poland. This is one of the 
powerful tools for web based survey in social sciences. The software allows the 
researcher to monitor the trend of responses in real time. It also allows researcher to 
guide the respondent on how the questions should be filled. Further, it can allow the 
researcher to fix the mandatory questions that must be answered. The software was also 
used together with a telephone so as to increase the response rate. Firms were first 
contacted by telephone and later an email containing the questionnaire was sent via 
SurveyXact software.    
 
In Tanzania we used paper based questionnaires which were delivered in person or 
through a door-to door (Zikmund et al, 2010). The presence of the interviewer in door-to-
door method increases both the participation rate and the representative sample of the 
population than mail questionnaires. In Tanzania this method was preferred than web 
based methods due to low e-readiness levels. Further the institutional contexts (culture) in 
Tanzania favor personal communication than the in-person one.  Telephone 
communication was also used so as to lower the non-response rate. To do this, the firms 
were first contacted by telephone and once they agree to participate, the questionnaire 
was then delivered in person. Follow-ups were also made personally so as to ensure 
fastest response. 
 
5.4.2.2 Documentary review 
We used a variety of sources (reports, newspapers, archives) to obtain secondary data. 
Reputable sources are important when it comes to the validity and reliability aspects of 
information. Data sources for the secondary data that we used in this study came from 
 146 
 
reputable organizations such as the World Bank, United Nations, World Economic 
Forum, Transparency International and national portals of respective nations. The 
extensive amount of secondary data was important, so as to come up with comparable 
institutional settings.  
 
5.4.3 Sample Selection and data profile 
A sample is a ‘‘subset, or some part of a larger population’’ (Zikmund et al, 2010: 387) 
that one can use to make an inference to the rest of the population. The choice of sample 
can be based on ‘‘probability (where the probability of the selection of each respondent is 
known), or on non-probability (where the probability is not known)’’ (Robson, 
1996:136).  
 
In this study, we based on probability selection, but one can also argue that it is a 
purposive (non-probability method). The research work by default is objective and thus 
the selection of study units is influenced by the researcher’s decision. Probability based 
selection is determined by the mechanism on which the units are drawn from the targeted 
population.  When studying contracts it is a bit unique from the study of other concepts in 
the social sciences because the focus is on the exchange itself.  
 
When a focus is on exchange, it is possible to induce the randomness in the selection of a 
particular exchange that need to be evaluated. We did this by allowing the respondents to 
choose between first, second or largest supplier (see Rokkan et al, 2003). This means that 
the probability of a particular exchange relation to be selected in answering the 
questionnaire is 1/3. The immediate question that follows here is the inference to the 
population and the bias. Bias is a problem in social researches (Bryman, 2004). The bias 
can originate from researcher’s judgment (Bryman, 2004) or from the respondent's 
behavior. The bias from the researcher is not critical in this study, because most of 
dimensions that were tested had strong theoretical roots. Further, the biases from 
respondents did not pose any serious threat to the findings because the data used to 
originate from different independent sources.  
 
In Poland a sample frame of 1800 firms was targeted (From directory of Poland 
companies, 2011), while Tanzania the targeted sample frame was about 750 firms (Listed 
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companies in Tanzania Revenue Authority, 2011). The final samples were then drawn 
from this targeted sample frame (201 in Poland and 240 in Tanzania).  
 
Out of 1800 initial contacted firms, 400 companies partially completed the questionnaire 
while 201 fully completed it. Partially completed questionnaires were not used because 
the amount of information missing was substantial. This means that the final sample used 
for analysis was 201, which is about 33% response rate (computation of response rate 
included the partially completed questionnaires). The average number of employees in 
the firms was 255, annual sales were about USD 16,558,089 (conversion rate: 
1USD=3.1PLN). Average supply frequency was five times per month and the minimum 
length of relationship was one year. 11.7% of the suppliers were domestic subsidiaries of 
international companies, 8.7% were joint ventures with an international partner, 56.5% 
were domestic companies owned by local citizens, and 23.0% were foreign suppliers. 
Minimum length of relationship was one year.  
 
The number of companies targeted in Tanzania was 750. The final number of completed 
questionnaires received was 240 making a response rate of around 31%. On average, 
these firms had 1,020 employees, annual sales turnover of around USD7, 270, 00410 
(conversion rate: 1USD=1,593 TZS). The average supply frequency was six times per 
month. 5.4% of the suppliers were domestic subsidiaries of international companies, 
8.4% were joint ventures with an international partner, 57.1% were domestic companies 
owned by local citizens, and 29.2% were foreign suppliers. The minimum length of 
relationship was one year.  
 
5.4.4 Measurements 
Questionnaire items were measured using a 5-point Likert scale. A list of the measures 
used in this study is presented in the appendix 1. The appendix 1 provides detailed 
information on loadings, Cronbach’s alpha, composite reliability and average variance 
extracted for both countries. To ensure reliability, an exploratory followed by a 
confirmatory factor analysis was conducted. Most of the constructs used had been 
developed and tested previously in other studies, including the control variables. 
However, some measured needed to be adjusted to fit the new context.  
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Contractual completeness (COMPL)
6
 was adapted from several studies (Aubert et al., 
2006; Hendriske & Windsperger, 2010; Luo, 2002). In this study, we focused on the Ex-
ante contractual term specificity side of contractual completeness (Parkhe, 1993). Term 
specificity is concerned with how terms are specified (Luo, 2002. Using the context of 
IJV contract, Luo (2002) used a 5-points Likert scale in assessing the level at which terms 
were specific. In this study we modified the previous measures to fit with the study 
context. A total of six items was used in measuring the concept of contractual 
completeness (focusing only on the ex-ante contractual term specificity). After 
performing a factor analysis, four items loaded well, while the remaining had poor 
loadings.    
 
Reputation (REPT) was adapted from Fombrum and Shanley (1990). The concept was 
measured by seven items reflecting the degree to which the buyer perceived the 
reputation of the partner as good. Six items were retained. History looks at long-term 
inter-firm understanding, reflecting both experience and time. Argyres and colleagues 
(2007) used the length of time (weeks) by which the partners have engaged in the 
relationship. The study developed new measures for this construct. Four items were used 
and three of them were retained.  
 
 Ex-ante contractual costs /efforts (EAC/ECE) reflects the financial and non-financial 
expenses incurred by the buyer prior to the commencement of the relationship with the 
supplier. This concept is consistent with that used by Segal (1999) but new measures 
were developed specifically for this study. After conducting a factor analysis, five items 
were used and all were retained. Buyer asset specificity (BUASP) was adapted from 
Stump & Heide (1996). The concept reflects the degree to which the buyer has specific 
assets involved in the relationship. It was measured using five items and three were 
retained after factor analysis. The foreignness of supply firm (FC) was measured by a 
dummy variable with 1 indicating a foreign company and 0 indicating a domestic one. 
Size of the firm was measured by the number of employees.  
 
                                                          
6
 Contractual completeness is made up of term specificity and contingent adaptability (Luo, 2002). In this paper we 
assessed contractual completeness focusing on terms of term specificity. 
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5.4.5 Data analysis 
We used SPSS 19 in doing the analysis. The analysis started with the establishment of 
factors. The exploratory factor analysis was conducted by the use of SPSS19 software. 
Most concepts have been established in previous research, thus we selected the factors 
that had scores of.50 or above. The solutions for factors were based on both rotated 
(varimax) and no-rotated factor solutions.  To confirm the factors that were obtained from 
the exploratory findings, we used a confirmatory factor analysis with the help of 
AMOS19 software. Constructs were standardized for each respondent (buyer). Further 
the scale that was used has similar range (5-points) for both countries.  
 
The task of forming constructs was followed by testing the specific relations. This stage 
involved different techniques, such as ordinary least square regression, structural 
equation modeling and ANOVA. Multiple regressions enable one to analyze the 
relationship between a single dependent (criterion) and several independent (predictor) 
variables. The two key objectives of this technique is to ‘‘maximize the overall predictive 
power of the independent variables and compare two or more sets of independent 
variables to ascertain the predictive power of each variate’’ (Hair et al, 2010: 169).  
 
Measurement and specification errors can pose challenge in doing analysis using multiple 
regression analysis; however, we corrected both errors by using the summated scales and 
variables that have a strong theoretical base respectively (Hair et al, 2010). ANOVA is an 
important method when comparing two or more groups. We applied this test in 
comparing the differences in the variables’ impact across the two countries.  Data were 
also standardized (using mean) for comparative purpose (Aiken & West, 1991). We also 
supplemented this test with the effect size computation and chow tests (Matsumoto, 
2001). These tests provided the relevant information which was not captured in ANOVA.   
 
5.4.6 Validity 
Validity is concerned with the extent to which a measure can accurately represent what it 
is supposed to (Hair et al, 2010). Key aspects of validity that are commonly tested are 
discriminant, convergent, and nomological validity.  
Discriminant validity was assessed using Fornell and Larcker’s (1991) rigorous criterion 
(Anderson & Gerbing, 1993). According to this test, the discriminant validity is vivid 
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when the average variance extracted (AVE) for two factors are greater than the square of 
the correlation between the two factors. The results presented in tables 7 and 8 confirm 
this test. This finding persists even for the high correlations in the Poland data (ex- ante 
contractual costs and reputation, r=0. 71; contractual completeness and reputation, r=0. 
58) as well as in the Tanzania data (contractual completeness and reputation, r=0. 60).  
 
To test for convergence or internal validity we used both factor loadings and construct 
validity. The rule of thumb is that the factor loadings need to be.5 or greater and construct 
reliability need to be.7 or higher (Nunnally, 1978; Hair et al, 2010). All factors loadings 
and construct reliably (CR) fulfilled this rule of thumb (results are available in the 
appendix 1), so our constructs had convergence validity.  
 
Nomological validity is normally tested by observing or inspecting the inter-item 
correlations if they make sense (Hair et al, 2010). The inter-item correlations were 
inspected and their pattern had a theoretical sense. Face validity was not a concern 
because this was established during theory development.  
 
5.4.7 Reliability 
Reliability is the degree to which the observed variable measures the ‘‘true’’ value and is 
‘‘error’’ free (Hair et al, 2010:8). Factors that are important to observe when it comes to 
reliability are; ‘‘stability (whether a measure is stable over time), internal-reliability 
(whether the indicators that make up the scale or index are consistent) and inter-observer 
consistency (whether there is subjective judgment involved in recording or translation of 
data into categories and when more than one observer is involved in such activity)’’ 
(Bryman (2004: 71).  
 
Reliability can hardly be assessed by a single measure (Hair et al, 2010), so we used a 
series of measures. According to Hair and colleagues (2010) there are two key 
alternatives for assessing reliability. One is to relate each separate item, including the 
item to total correlation. Rule of thumb is that the item-to-total correlations exceed.50 
and that the inter item correlations exceed.30. Second is reliability coefficient, which 
assesses the consistency of the entire scale with correlation alpha, being most widely used 
measure. The generally agreed lower limit for cronbach’s alpha is.70, although it may 
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decrease to.60 in exploratory research. The values of cronbach’s alpha fulfilled the 
required rule of thumb (see results in appendix 1). This study has not only achieved 
internal reliability, but also external because most of the constructs indicated similar 
patterns across the two countries. 
 
Additionally, a common method variance (Campbell & Fiske, 1959) was a likely threat 
because the questionnaires were answered by key informants. This problem is a result of 
the correlations among data variables that may be systematically contaminated (Parkhe, 
1993). When a common method variance problem exists, a single factor will emerge 
from factor analysis when all the variables are entered together, or a general factor that 
accounts for most of the variance will result (Harman, 1967). We performed a factor 
analysis where all variables were entered in the analysis and each construct had a unique 
factor solution (there was a factor for each construct). Another method for detecting 
common method variance problem is the marker variable. We did not prefer this method 
due to its limitation of not being able to distinguish between the measures of a construct 
and a construct itself. Therefore, it appears that this study does not suffer from common 
method variance.  
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Table 7 
 
Poland correlation 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
COMPL   .81          
REPT   .60
**
 .85      
HISTORY   .50
**
 .44
**
 .71     
EAC    .43
**
 .29
**
 .14
*
         .78    
BUASP    .00 .05 .  .21
**
 .22
**
 .75   
FC   -.09 -.11  .02 .01 .04 na  
SIZE   -.08 -.04 -.14
*
  .01 -.04 .15
*
 na 
MEAN  3.04 3.74 3.55 3.04 1.94 .22 255.43 
SD  1.09 .69 .75 1.09 1.01 .42 1444.83 
N=240   
Diagonal elements in bold are the square roots of the average variance extracted for the constructs measured reflectively with multiple items. 
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Table 8 
Tanzania Correlation 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
COMP   .80       
REPT   .58
**
 .85      
HISTORY   .33
**
 .48
**
 .74     
EAC   .50
**
 .71
**
 .37
**
 .78    
BUASP   .37
**
 .52
**
 .31
**
 .50
**
 .73   
FC   .12 .04 .03 -.04 .02 na  
SIZE   -.08 -.12 -.15
*
  -.18
**
 .02 .14
*
 na 
MEAN  4.27 4.18 4.05 4.01 3.98 .29 1965.40 
SD  .51 .56 .73 .70 .68 .46 14906.71 
N=240   
Diagonal elements in bold are the square roots of the average variance extracted for the constructs measured reflectively with multiple items. 
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5.5 Results 
The results shown in tables 9 were produced through a stepwise regression model. In step 
1, all control variables were included. In steps 2, the main effects were entered. To 
account for differences in significant effects, an independent sample t-test was used. 
Cohen d and effect size r (see table 10) were also computed 
 
Table 9 
Regression Results 
Dependent variable: Degree of contractual completeness 
 POLAND TANZANIA 
Variables HYPOTHESES MODEL1 MODEL2 MODEL 1 MODEL 2 
   β      t     β      t β t β t 
Controls          
BUASP  
.00 .06 -.06 -1.06 .37 6.2*** .07 1.15 
SIZE  
-.07 -.95 -.04 -.76 -.11 -1.8** -.01 -.19 
FC  
-.08 -1.1 -.01 -.25 .13 2.2** .10 1.83** 
Main Effects   
   
  
  
REPT H1a&b   
.39 5.59*** 
  
.37 4.75*** 
HISTORY H2a&b   
.20 2.95*** 
  
.13 2.23** 
EAC H3a&b   
.29 5.14*** 
  
.17 2.19** 
R
2  0.013 0.46*** .16*** .38*** 
Adj. R
2
  .002 0.45*** .15*** .36*** 
F-value  .86 27.9*** 14.9*** 23.7*** 
N  201 201 240 240 
Incremental R
2
  - .45*** - .22*** 
F1  - 54*** - 27.4*** 
Maximum VIF  1.03 1.7 1.02 2.22 
*
if p<0.1;     **if p<0.05;                    ***if p<0.01;                     F1 =F-value of incremental R
2 
(one tail t-test was used)
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Model 1 (control variables) produced the following results: Poland: R
2
Adj=0. 002, F 
(198, 3) =. 86, p>0.1; Tanzania: R
2
Adj=0. 15, F (237, 3) = 14.9, p<0.001. Model 2 (main 
effects) R
2
Adj=0. 45, F (195, 6) = 27.9, p<0.001 for Poland and R
2
Adj=0. 36, F (234, 6) 
= 23.7, p<0.001 for Tanzania. Incremental effects of the added model (M2-M1) is 
significant for Poland (∆R2Adj=0.45, p<0.001) and Tanzania (∆R2Adj=0.22, p<0.001).  
In addition, the results of the Chow test suggest that there is a significant difference 
between the regression models produced in the two countries as well as the individual 
dimensions (F (201, 228) = 3.4, p<0.05).  
 
5.5.1 Hypothesis tests. 
 
H1a suggested a positive effect of reputation on the degree of contractual completeness, 
while H1b suggested a stronger effect in the advanced emerging country than in the less 
advanced emerging country. H1a was supported (tables 9) in both Tanzania (β=0. 37, t=4. 
75, p<0.001) and Poland (β=0. 39, t= 5.59, p<0.001). Table 10 reveals a significant 
difference between these two results (Tanzania (M = 4.2, SD = 0.56); Poland (M = 3.7, 
SD =0 .05), t (383) = 7.3, p <0.001, d = 1.3), implying that the reputation effect is 
stronger in Poland than in Tanzania and thus supporting H1b. This is also supported by 
the results of the Chow test (F (201, 239) =15, p <0.001).  
 
H2a suggested a positive effect of a history between the partners on the degree of 
contractual completeness, while H2b suggested there is a stronger effect in advanced 
emerging markets. H2a was supported (see table 9) in Tanzania (β=0.13, t=2.23, p<0.01) 
and Poland (β=.20, t=2.95, p<.001). Further examination of table 10 supports H2b as a 
significant difference between the two countries is indicated (Poland: M = 3.6, SD = 
0.75; Tanzania: M = 4.05, SD = 0.73; t (439) = 7.15 p <0.001, d = 0.67). This difference 
was also supported by the Chow test (F (201, 239) =3.8, p<0.001), implying the effect of 
a history between the partners is stronger in Poland than in Tanzania.  
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Table 10 
Assessment of Effect Size by Country Using Independent Sample t-Test 
VARIABLE COUNTRY M* SD t df d r  p 
REPT PL 3.7 0.05 7.3 383 1.3 0.53 <0.001 
TZ 4.2 0.56 
HISTORY PL 3.6 0.75 7.15 439 0.67 0.32 <0.001 
TZ 4.05 0.73 
EAC PL 3.04 1.09 11.8 327 1.3 0.5 <0.001 
TZ 4.0 0.70 
         
* d=Cohen d, r=Effect size 
 
 
H3 suggested that ex-ante contractual efforts have a stronger positive effect on 
contractual completeness in advanced than in less advanced emerging markets. Table 9 
support the hypothesis (β=0.17, t=2.19 p<0.001 for Tanzania and β=0.29, t= 5.14, 
p<0.001 for Poland). Further results shown in table 10 indicate a significant difference 
between the two countries for this construct (Tanzania: M = 4.0, SD = 0.70; Poland: M = 
3.04, SD = 1.09; t (327) = 11.8, p <0.001, d = 1.3). The results of the Chow test (F (201, 
239) = 87, p<0.001) supports this.   
 
5.5.2 Control Variables 
All the control variables used in model 1 had a significant effect in Tanzania [BUASP 
(β=0.37, t= 6.2, p<0.01); Size (β=-0.11, t= -1.8, p<0.05); FC (β=0.13, t= 2.2, p<0.05)] but 
none was significant in Poland [BUASP (β=0.00, t= .06, p>0.1); Size (β=-0.07, t= -.95, 
p>0.1); FC (β=-0.08, t= -1.13, p>0.1)]. In model 2 the only foreignness of supply firm 
remained significant in Tanzania FC (β=0.10, t= 1.83, p<0.05)], but not in Poland .The 
rest of the variables (buyer asset specificity and size) were not significant in both Poland 
and Tanzania. This implies that foreignness of the supply firm had a significant impact on 
the degree of contractual completeness.   
 
5.6 Discussion 
Level of contractual completeness will likely vary with institutional contexts. Understanding 
the drivers of contractual completeness in different contexts is important because, in 
today’s business world, a large part of the final product is a combination of multiple 
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firms. The turn of the 21st century has been characterized by major players coming from 
emerging markets. The literature in the area of contracting has moved from looking at the 
limitations in achieving complete contracts (Bernheim & Whinston, 1998; Furlotti, 2007; 
Macaulay, 1963; Macneil, 1980; Neu, 1991; Nakhla, 2003) towards how completeness is 
influenced (Al-Najjar, 1995; Brown et al., 2007; Hendrikse & Windsperger, 2010; 
Saussier, 2000). This second move is important because, an optimal contract (Crocker & 
Reynolds, 1993) is partly a function of the degree of its completeness.  
 
The findings from this study increments the theory of contracting by addressing both the 
exogenous (Grossman & Hart, 1986; Hart & Moore, 1990) and endogenous (Bolton & 
Faure-Grimaud, 2010; Hart & Moore, 2008; Tirole, 2009) perspectives of contracts. The 
endogenous here refers to the specific variables within the inter-firm relationship 
(reputation, history and costs) while the exogenous refers to the external constraints 
(institutional context).  
 
The importance of these findings lies not in whether we have found similarities or 
differences, but why. Providing sufficient explanation of the results is an important part 
of this study. Most of the hypotheses were structured in such a way that, not only do they 
investigate the directions of the effects but also a comparison across two countries.  
 
The area where there has been much debate when it comes to contractual governance is 
the complementary (Aubert et al., 2006; Blomqvist, Hurmelinna & Seppänen, 2005; Hart 
and Moore, 2008; Klein, 1996; Möllering, 2002; Seppänen, Blomqvist & Sundqvist, 
2007) versus the substitutive roles (Gulati, 1995; Oxley, 1997; Yu, Liao, Lin, 2006). 
Literature on contractual governance has extensively supported the complementary role 
of relational dimensions. Although this kind of debate approached an end, the 
institutional perspective moved it back. The basic argument has been that due to cultural 
and institutional differences, the relational dimensions could substitute the contractual 
governance especially in emerging markets. The studies that took place in China and 
Eastern Europe (Xin & Pearce, 1996; Roth & Kostova, 2003; Peng & Zhou, 2005) have 
indicated the support on the institutional role in the contractual governance.  
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While even data from within countries seemed to contradict each other, the concern has 
been on how these relational dimensions differ in terms of their roles across different 
emerging markets. The heterogeneous markets provide us with better tests for our models 
in this topic (Oxley, 1999). The most visible thing in most of the emerging markets is 
their constant transformation (Roth & Kostova, 2003). When we have dynamics in the 
institutional environment, it is a great challenge to theories that assume a static 
environment.  
 
When markets move from informal based towards formal structures, the question is; what 
is the implication to the theoretical predictions. In a constant changing world, a strong 
theory is the one that will not only predict the direction of effects in relation to particular 
concepts, but also its effect relative to the institutional surroundings. The embedded 
structures of culture, norms and cognitive actions, forms a large part of what we call an 
institutional environment.  
 
The finding from this study has confirmed the previous findings on the complementary 
effect of relational governance on contractual completeness. Reputation and history in the 
relationship have been found to have a positive impact on contractual completeness. 
Further, the effect was stronger in an advanced than in a less advanced emerging market. 
If one draws a continuum of the complementary roles of relational governance, such a 
continuum will consists of weaker and stronger values. What the findings suggests is that, 
when institutions are aligned towards the market, the values for complementary role are 
on the strong side, but when the institutions move toward non-market, those values are 
weaker (substitutive effect).  
 
This explanation gives us a light on why some studies that were done earlier in emerging 
markets found some contradictory results when it came to substitutive and 
complementary roles. Hendriske & Hu (2009) conducted a case based study on 
contractual completeness in Chinese firms. Three out of four cases were found to have a 
positive association between reputation and contractual completeness, where one case 
found a negative link. Building upon Acheson (1985) study that was done around fishing 
markets, Shelaski & Klein (1995) argued that reputation plays a significant positive role 
in safeguarding.  
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When the time gap is significantly large, the changes in the institutional parameters can 
also affect the studies that might have been done earlier. For example, in Poland, the 
change in the rule of law (enforcement) between the years 2003 to 2014 is extensively 
large (Word Bank, 2014). To have a generalized view of the role which relational 
dimensions play in contractual governance, the institutional factors are important to be 
involved in the explanation.  
 
Cost is another important area when it comes to achieving complete contracts. Crocker 
and Reynolds (1993) model on optimal contracts indicated that the cost component is a 
key dimension to be assessed when it comes to having an optimal. Such costs include, but 
not limited to; searching, drafting and writing costs. Depending on the economy, these 
costs tend to vary. The more a market becomes formal, the more likely that some costs 
will drop. The shift toward formal market-supporting institutions in emerging markets, 
will lead to moving from relational exchanges to arm’s length transactions (Peng, 2003; 
Zhou and Peng, 2010).  Arm’s length transaction is a “rule-based, impersonal exchange 
with third-party enforcement” (Peng (2003: 280). When we observe the mean score 
values for these costs (in table 10), Tanzania has a high mean score (4.0) than Poland 
(3.04) on ex-ante contractual costs (efforts). The difference between these two mean 
values was statistically significant. In relatively advanced emerging economies, there are 
alternative mechanisms to track the identity of the parties involved. For example, in 
Poland, there is a private bureau that covers about 90 percent of the population (World 
Bank, 2014). In Tanzania such a bureau does not exist, making some aspects of ex-ante 
costs (efforts) relatively higher.  
 
What is even more important is to examine the impact of these ex-ante costs (efforts) on 
contractual governance and specifically on the level of contractual completeness. From 
the observation that we have indicated on the mean score, one should expect that firms in 
advanced emerging markets have a threshold level of information or an added advantage 
that is relatively higher than firms in less advanced emerging markets. In advanced 
emerging markets, when the efforts are added on top of this threshold level, the outcome 
will be a relatively more complete contract. If the similar level of ex-ante cost (effort) is 
applied to a firm in a less advanced emerging market, the level of contractual 
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completeness will be relatively low in the score values due to the disadvantages that exist 
from the beginning. This explanation is confirmed with our findings, where we found a 
stronger impact of ex-ante costs (efforts) on contractual completeness in a more advanced 
(Poland) than in relatively less advanced emerging market (Tanzania).  
 
In relation to control variables, we found that it was only foreignness of supply firm 
which had a significant positive impact on contractual completeness in Tanzania but not 
in Poland. The argument for this impact can go both ways; the foreign firms and the local 
firms. In a situation where it is difficult to obtain third party information about the 
individuals and firms, it is critical for the foreign firm to tighten the terms due to many 
unknowns. On the other hand, most of the local firms in relatively less advanced 
emerging markets have relatively less exposure to international arrangements and will 
likely take with cautious such arrangement whenever they appear. The literature in the 
area of culture suggests that culture has a significant influence when it comes to making 
decisions (Schneider and De Meyer, 1991; Hofstede, 1980) such as contracts. It is worth 
noting on the large difference concerning buyer asset specificity between the two 
countries. The correlation between buyer asset specificity and contractual completeness 
was very weak in Poland compared to Tanzania. Aubert et al, (2006) did not find 
conclusive results on the impact of asset specificity on contractual completeness. 
Differences that exist due to standardized approached to contractual design can be 
explored in the future, because they can influence the association between contractual 
completeness and asset specificity.      
 
At this point it is important to make sense of these findings from the institutional 
perspective. The contextual surrounding of the organization has an important impact on 
its behavior (Scott, 1995). At a managerial level, most of the decisions that are 
undertaken are to a large extent a by-product of cultural values (Schneider and De Meyer, 
1991; Hofstede, 1980). The contextual surrounding or the institutional environment can 
encourage or discourage inter-firm relations (North, 1990). This study has an important 
feature because it looks micro level theories and makes inferences at a macro level.  
 
Shenka & Mary Ann von (1994) pointed out that the macro-level theories such as 
institutions have proved to be relevant when studying organizations operating in different 
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environments.  Channel dyad is a social system (Stern and Reve, 1980) thus the ways by 
which firms respond to contractual hazards differ across countries (Williamson, 1991; 
Joskow, 1988; Poppo and Zenger, 2002).  Such differences can be partly accounted by 
the institutional processes (Grewal & Dharwadkar, 2002).  Though it is clear that the 
contracting is determined by the nature of transaction and corresponding institutional 
environment (Luo, 2005; Oxley, 1999), much still has to be done in integrating the 
dynamics of institutions in the contractual literature. The broader interest after 
acknowledging the processes within the institutional context is on how we can make a 
sense of such processes in the micro-level theories.  
 
Generalizability is another area of concern when it comes to studies on inter-firm 
contractual relations. This study responds partly to quest from Lui (2009) where he 
pointed that the institutional context in emerging markets is likely to limit theoretical 
generalizability of the TCA, a situation which will demand further research in 
understanding the nature of such a limitation and accompanied theoretical implications. 
 
Though the generalizability of these findings to other advanced and less advanced 
emerging markets is limited due to the use of only two countries, this study does identify 
the roles of the key drivers of contractual completeness and how they differ across the 
economies of different levels of advancement. The key point this paper makes is that, 
relational dimensions are not merely substitutes for contracts in emerging markets but 
that their role is factor- and context-dependent. Further, the cost component can 
significantly contribute to changes in the contractual structures across different 
economies.  
 
5.6.1 Managerial implications 
The growing need for greater international trade connects firms from different 
backgrounds. The move towards establishing these connections needs to be carefully 
planned and executed. The area of contractual governance is a widely used mechanism 
for most inter-firm relations. Understanding the dynamics and institutional perspective 
involved is even of far more important.   
 
 162 
 
As the study indicates, the use of relational based dimensions is not an optional; it is an 
essential part in the contractual process. When there is a long history of inter-firm 
relations, or when managers deal with reputable partners, this should not be an easy ride 
moment, but they need to optimize such advantages in formulating better and relatively 
optimal (more complete) contracts. When firms move or do transactions with firms from 
advanced emerging markets, they will expect to play much more similar pattern with 
locals when it comes to establishing the contractual arrangements, but more work will be 
required in relatively less advanced emerging markets.  
 
In a relatively less advanced emerging market, having a dyadic relationship involving a 
local and international partner, means that the degree of contractual completeness has to 
increase. Though the need to increase the level of contractual completeness is very 
significant by such a composition (local and international partner), the relational 
dimensions are important to develop and at the same time the ex-ante costs are expected 
to be high. The same level of efforts and the relational development will still lead to less 
complete contracts compared those in advanced emerging markets. Managers should thus 
orient themselves to adjusting with the various institutional contexts. A great deal of 
learning and build acceptance in those settings of less advanced emerging markets will 
help to reduce much of the adverse outcomes.    
 
5.6.2 Study limitations and further research  
This study is limited in terms of the following aspects: First, it used only two countries 
from emerging markets for comparison. This limits the generalizability of the findings to 
other emerging markets. Furthermore, the study used manufacturing firms and thus the 
findings might not apply to non-manufacturing firms. Next, the study relies on responses 
drawn from the buying side of the relationship, but there are ongoing discussions in the 
literature concerning the relevance of using data from both sides of the dyad.  
 
This study is also limited by investigating only inter-firm contractual relations and no 
other forms of contracts between firms and individuals. The way the institutional context 
was used has also limitations. The institutional concept has not been broken down into 
specific variable. This makes it difficult to attribute the observed effects with some 
particular institutional variable.  The measures for contractual completeness are not well 
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established in the literature. We are suggesting the use of more different items in the 
future. Data that has been used are cross-sectional. This makes it difficult to provide 
sufficient treatment of concepts like history and its influence on contractual 
completeness.  
 
Further research can investigate on the concept of contingent adaptability. It is also 
important to investigate the influence of firms’ nature (types) on contractual 
completeness. For example the manufacturing companies are different from non-
manufacturing. It could be more interesting to investigate in more detail the role of 
institutions in contracts. The institution is a broad concept; the concepts can be broken 
down in some specific variables when investigating such a role. The level of analysis 
should also be taken into account in future research. For example, the country and firm 
level of analysis can be used. This is only possible when there is a large number of a 
countries involved. The use of panel data can improve some explanations that cannot be 
captured by cross-sectional data. We suggest future studies to also utilize different forms 
of data (panel and cross-sectional).  
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Appendix 1 
Measurement of Factors in Tanzania and Poland 
 
CONSTRUCT ITEM SOURCE TZ LOADING PL LOADING 
CONTRACTUAL 
COMPLETENESS 
(COMPL) 
αTZ= 0.78 
CRTZ=0.95 
AVETZ=0.72 
 
αPL=0.87 
CRPL=0.88 
AVEPL=0.66 
Parties’ liabilities are well specified Luo (2002), 
Aubert et al. 
(2000), Hendriske 
& Windsperger, 
(2010) 
0.680 0.879 
Responsibilities of both parties are well 
specified 
0.654 0.786 
Information flow is well specified 0.696 0.834 
Confidentiality of information exchange is 
well specified 
0.668 0.696 
REPUTATION (REPT) 
αTZ=0.79 
CRTZ=0.95 
AVETZ=0.72 
 
αPL=0.90 
CRPL=0.96 
AVEPL=0.77 
The quality of the products and services of 
this supplier is high 
Fombrum & 
Shanley (1990) 
0.639 0.631 
This supplier is performing well financially  0.653 0.682 
This supplier has the ability to attract, 
develop, and keep talented people 
0.706 0.739 
This supplier is socially and 
environmentally responsible 
0.745 0.795 
This supplier behaves ethically and is 
reliable 
 0.700 0.778 
This supplier is well respected in society 0.744 0.800 
HISTORY 
αTZ = .88 
CRTZ=.85 
We have known this supplier for long time  .792 .702 
We have enough understanding of this 
supplier 
.839 .713 
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AVETZ=.50 
 
αPL =.85 
AVEPL=.56 
CRTPL=.88 
We have a rich history with this supplier  .813 .842 
We have strong connections with this 
supplier which started long time ago  
.801 .848 
Given our experience with this supplier, we 
consider him as part of our firm  
.744 .751 
Given a long history of with this supplier, 
our relationship can hardly end up easily  
.772 .735 
EX-ANTE 
CONTRACTUAL 
COSTS (EAC) 
αTZ= 0.84 
CRTZ=0.80 
AVETZ=0.61 
 
αPL=0.91 
CRPL=0.90 
AVEPL=0.61 
We consulted lawyers and consultants in 
drafting contractual terms with this 
supplier 
Segal (1999) 0.712 0.771 
We put great care and time in to 
establishing contractual terms with this 
supplier 
0.783 0.82 
We ensured that each of the terms related 
to this contract with the supplier was well 
specified 
0.838 0.909 
We ensured that the contract would be 
enforceable 
0.748 0.910 
We ensured that the contract covered all 
dimensions of the relationship with this 
supplier 
0.824 0.899 
BUYER ASSET 
SPECIFICITY(BUASP) 
αTZ= 0.70 
CRTZ=0.80 
We have made significant investments in 
equipment dedicated to our relationship 
with this supplier 
Stump & Heide 
(1996) 
0.793 0.869 
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AVETZ=0.53 
 
αPL=0.84 
CRPL=0.77 
AVEPL=0.57 
We have made adjustments in order to deal 
with this supplier 
0.787 0.897 
Training our people to deal with this 
supplier has involved substantial 
commitments of time and money 
0.764 0.845 
αTZ, αPL =alpha in the Tanzania and Poland data, CRTZ ,CRPL = composite reliability in Tanzania and Poland; AVETZ , 
AVEPL =average variance extracted in Tanzania and Poland data respectively. 
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CHAPTER SIX
7
                                                                
ADAPTABILITY AND EX-ANTE CONTRACTUAL TERM 
SPECIFICITY 
ADVANCEMENTS AND THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS 
Abstract  
 
Governance choices have been an important part of economizing transactions. Studies 
on contractual governance have followed an incremental path. A two dimensional 
view of contracts developments, i.e. contingent adaptability and ex-ante contractual 
term specificity is one of such developments.  
 
The influences on these two dimensions have not been well explored in the literature. 
It is important to understand the influencing factors behind these dimensions so as to 
have sound theoretical and practical bases for their application. Further, such an 
understanding will improve efficiency in the contractual governance design.   The 
findings from this study suggest some differences and similarities between these key 
contractual components.   
 
Key Words: 
Contingent adaptability; ex-ante contractual term specificity; environmental uncertainty; 
supplier foreignness; cultural distance; relational norms 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
  
                                                          
7
 Emmanuel Chao (2013), updated version of the Paper published in the Journal of relationship marketing, vol. 
12 (3), 165-190 
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6.0 Introduction 
Contractual governance is an important area in inter-firm relations because governance 
choices play a central role in economizing transactions. Discussion on contracting has 
followed an incremental path both in content and context. To a large extent, the 
discussion has revolved around two generations of theories on incomplete contracting. 
First-generation theories (Grossman & Hart, 1986; Hart & Moore, 1990) suggest that 
the limitations resulted from specifying transactions are external, while second 
generation theories (Bolton & Faure-Grimaud, 2009; Hart & Moore, 2008; Tirole, 
2009) argues that these limitations are within the partners themselves. These two 
views do not differ, but complement each other. Whereas the first generation explains 
the environmental influence on the transaction, the second explains the nature of 
transacting partners.      
 
Whereas the primacy of contracting view is that contracts are not complete 
(Williamson, 1975, 1979) due to the costs of specifying transactions on paper and due 
to the bounded rationality of the contracting agents, the degree of completeness varies 
not only across transactions but across contexts. The discussion on the degree of 
contractual completeness is of little relevance without knowing the theoretical 
implications of such variations, leaving out the question of whether or not we have 
complete contracts.  
 
Besides the two generational views on contracting mentioned above, Luo (2002) 
indicated that contracting is a two dimensional concept, i.e. term specificity (the extent 
to which relevant terms and clauses are specified) and contingent adaptability. 
Contractual term specificity can also be named as on-going contractual term 
specificity (because it deals with the governance of existing contractual relations) or 
ex-ante term specifications (because terms are specified before the contractual 
relationship). Specifically, Luo argued that “a complete contract should be such that it 
simultaneously obviates opportunism through term specificity and bolsters adaptation 
through contingency adaptability” (2002: 904).  
 
Although this claim was backed up by empirical findings, it has left a wide vacuum in 
terms of where these two dimensions fit within the two-generational perspective of 
contracting. Luo’s (2002) findings also leave some challenging questions about which 
 181 
 
dimensions, firms need to pay attention to and under what conditions. These 
challenging questions have also existed in the past (Klein, 1989).   
 
Applying a dichotomous nature of contracts can improve our understanding on which 
dimensions, firms need to pay attention to, and under what conditions. Separating out 
these two conceptual dimensions of contracting (contingent adaptability and ex-ante 
contractual term specificity), however, requires a rigorous theoretical testing of 
whether or not divergent predictions exists. Contractual governance has a rich 
traditional approach drawn from transaction cost analysis (theory) and relational 
governance theories.  
 
Whereas transaction cost analysis (theory) respond to issues surrounding safeguarding 
by either implementing stronger contractual safeguards or imposing vertical 
integration (Buvik & John, 2000; Heide & John, 1990; Lusch & Brown, 1996), 
relational governance (Dyer & Chu, 2000; Gulati & Nickerson, 2008) overcomes the 
bounds posed by formal market governance or contractual safeguards (Poppo & 
Zenger, 2002) through provision of informal enforcement mechanisms. This study 
adds an element from a cultural view (Hofstede, 1984) to this classical approach.  
Contractual relations involving partners from different background will likely differ 
from those of similar. The study makes a contribution through further developing the 
theoretical understanding of the two key contractual dimensions and the driving 
factors behind them. 
  
6.1 Literature Review and Hypotheses 
 
6.1.1 Contingent adaptability and ex-ante contractual term specificity 
Contracts are “legally binding agreements” (Macneil, 1978) that specify the 
“obligations and roles of both parties in the relationship” (Vandaele, Rangarajan, 
Gemmel, & Lievens, 2007: 240). Contracts provide the opportunity for the parties 
involved to carry out the actions needed to achieve mutual goals. They enable joint 
rules for the collaboration to be established (Blomqvist, Hurmelinna, & Seppänen, 
2005: 498) as well as ensuring safeguard (Lusch & Brown, 1996) is in place. Contracts 
are not complete (Williamson, 1975, 1985) due to the human limitation or un-
foreseeing future contingencies. Thus, it can be said that there is always an empty 
space in contractual relations.    
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The empty space is what is sometimes referred to as contingent adaptability, or what 
Luo (2002) termed as “mutually agreed tolerance zone or excuse doctrine” for dealing 
with unexpected events. Contingent adaptability stipulates principles, guidelines and 
possible solutions for dealing with conflicts and contingencies (Luo, 2002). The 
message is that both term specificity and contingent adaptability are confronted by 
exogenous and endogenous problems that are heightened by the contracting parties’ 
rational limitations.    
 
According to Luo (2002), term specificity and contingent adaptability are the two key 
dimensions of contracts. Term specificity concerns “how specific and detailed the 
terms are, contingency adaptability involves how to contractually respond to future 
problems, conflicts, and contingencies” (Luo, 2002: 905). Term specificity is 
necessary for ensuring confidence, a common understanding and safeguarding of 
assets (Lazzarini, Miller, & Zenger, 2006).   
 
Adaptability has also been referred to as flexibility, and can be thought of as an 
assurance that modifications can be made should circumstances change (Heide & 
John, 1992). Though adaptability is necessary to overcome unforeseen events, it has 
some limitations. One major limitation is the dependence upon both parties’ 
willingness to adapt, implying an enforceability problem. Due to such limitations, 
cooperation is important for adaptability to be successful (Poppo & Zenger, 2002). 
Following (Luo, 2002), we will divide the elements of contracts into these two key 
dimensions and develop a theoretical understanding of when they are required and 
drivers behind them.  
 
6.1.2 Effects on adaptability and ex-ante contractual term specificity 
 
6.1.2.1 Relational governance and norms  
Rationalism (relationship) is much focused on mutual expectations (Cannon, Achrol 
&Gundlach, 2000). As a higher order norm (Noordewier, 1990) relationalism give rise 
to other relational dimensions. These relational dimensions or norms are key drivers to 
relational governance.  Relational norm are expectations about attitudes and behaviors 
that both parties have when working cooperatively together to achieve mutual and 
individual goals (Cannon, Achrol, & Gundlach, 2000: 183). They can also be defined 
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as the bilateral expectations that the exchange partners will act in ways that assist each 
other during the course of the relationship (Joshi & Campbell, 2003).  
 
An extensive view of norms was provided by Heide & John (1992). They suggested 
that “discrete exchange norms contain expectations about an individual or competitive 
interactions between exchange partners and are based on the expectation of mutuality 
of interest, essentially prescribing stewardship behavior” (1992: 34). Continuity 
expectations, flexibility and information exchange are important dimensions of norms 
mentioned in the marketing literature (Heide & John, 1992; Kumar, Scheer, & 
Steemkamp, 1995).  
 
Relational governance can overcome adaptive limitations by fostering flexibility, 
which is important for ensuring long-lasting relationships, reducing performance 
measurement problems, providing safeguards against exchange hazards and improving 
cooperative interaction among firms (Dwyer et al.,  1987; Jap & Anderson, 2003; Ring 
& Ven, 1994). A relational contract allows the parties to utilize their detailed 
knowledge of the specific situation and to adapt to new information as it becomes 
available (Baker, Gibbons, & Murphy, 2002).  
 
Relations are also important in overcoming barriers in contractual relations. Based on 
the discussion above, relational norms enable parties to adapt to new situations, 
because of the perceived social benefits such as belonging and dependence (Uzzi, 
1997; Granovetter, 1992). Relational norms can also overcome the information 
asymmetry problem and assist partners with adequate and reliable information that 
they can utilize in specifying contractual terms. Thus we hypothesize;   
 
H1: Relational norms have a positive effect on contingent adaptability. 
 
H1b: Relational norms have a positive effect on contractual term specificity. 
 
6.1.2.2 Different cultural backgrounds 
Hofstede (1980:19) defined culture as the ‘‘interactive aggregate of common 
characteristics that influence a group’s response to its environment’’. In a general 
view, culture is a collective programming of people (Hofstede, 1980), so it is expected 
to differ across countries (Hofstede, 1984). Culture may provide ‘‘detailed 
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prescriptions (norms) for specific classes of situations’’, while leaving other domains 
relatively unregulated (Tse et al, 1988:82). One of the measurements of cultural 
difference that became popular was cultural distance that was introduced by Kogut and 
Singh (1988). The cultural distance measure aggregated quantitative measures of 
cultural difference using the Hofstede’s (1980) research. This measure, however, was 
criticized for treating cultural difference as symmetrical (direction of the difference 
was not given a consideration) (Shenkar, 2001).  
 
Cultural friction as a new metaphor for measuring cultural distance (Shenkar, Luo & 
Yeheskel, 2008) was introduced as an alternative remedy for the critics surrounding 
the cultural distance. The authors argued that the use of this new metaphor ‘‘denotes 
shifting the emphasis from abstract differences toward the contact between specific 
entities, onto their partisan concerns’’ (Shenkar et al, 2008: 911). Whether it is a 
psychic distance (Johanson & Vahlne, 1977), a cultural distance (Kogut and Singh, 
1988) or a cultural friction (Shenkar et al, 2008), a take home message is that there are 
differences that exist between individuals who come from different cultural 
orientations. The transaction that involves purely domestic firms is expected to differ 
from the one which involve a local and an international partner.   
 
In domestic buyer-seller relations, the transaction parties are expected to be more 
familiar with current standards of trade (Buvik & Andersen, 2002: 3). On the other 
hand, in international buyer-seller relations, the setting and execution of contracts are 
expected to be challenging (Hurrigan, 1988) due to cultural difference (Shenkar and 
Zeira, 1992) that can lead to ‘‘subjective interpretation’’ (Cavusgil et al., 2004: 13). In 
addition to cultural distance, there are other different types of distance that partners 
have to overcome (Rosson and Ford, 1982) such as; technological, social, time and 
geography (Ford, 1984).    
 
In a transaction that involves partners from different backgrounds, it is relatively 
difficult to specify contractual terms ex-ante or adapt to changes compared to a setting 
where the exchange involve partners from the same background. Whereas ex ante term 
specificity relies on efficient third party enforcement, adaptability requires better 
relations among partners. These key ingredients face challenges in international inter-
firm relations. Shane (1992) found that in countries with differences in the levels of 
trust (in comparison to U.S.); the U.S. multinationals were less likely to establish their 
foreign affiliates.    
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The Woodcock and Geringer (1991) work on cultural difference between international 
joint venture partners suggested that the cultural differences lead to an inefficient 
principal agent contract. In this study, we looked at the cultural influence using the 
presence of foreign partner in a relationship because the nature of partners is important 
in understanding the transaction. We expect the foreignness of the partners in the 
relationship to have a negative effect on both contingent adaptability and ex-ante 
contractual term specificity. Thus;  
 
H2a: The foreignness of the partner in a relationship has a negative effect on 
contingent adaptability. 
 
H2b: The foreignness of the partner in a relationship has a negative effect on 
ex-ante contractual term specificity. 
 
6.1.2.3 Transaction cost theory and contractual governance 
Under the assumption of bounded rationality, key attributes of the transaction cost are 
asset specificity, uncertainty and frequency (Williamson, 1985). The most used 
dimensions, across literature on transaction cost are asset specificity and uncertainty. 
Uncertainty can be behavioral or can arise from the environmental conditions. We will 
use asset specificity and environmental uncertainty because they have key relevance in 
contractual governance (Anderson & Weitz, 1986; Joskow, 1988; Lui, 2009). Specific 
assets are defined as the “durable investments that are undertaken in support of 
particular transactions, the opportunity cost of which investments are much lower in 
best alternative uses or by alternative users should the original transaction be 
prematurely terminated” (Williamson, 1985: 5). According to Williamson, there are 
five kinds of specific assets: (1) site specificity; (2) physical asset specificity, (3) 
human asset specificity; (4) dedicated assets; (5) brand name capital (1989: 144).  
 
The more specific input requirements there are in a firm’s production process, the less 
likely it is that a market solution will work (Chandler, Mckelvie, & Davidson, 2009). 
This situation will force firms to adapt non-market governance solutions. Due to 
contractual limitations, other mechanisms such as hostage effects (Williamson, 1985) 
and relational governance are important in increasing both safeguarding and 
cooperation (Hendrikse & Windsperger, 2010), especially in situations with high asset 
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specificity. Though specifying terms tightly is important, adaptability is also necessary 
to ensure that both parties have the flexibility to deal with contingencies.  
 
Formal contractual governance is mostly used when there are specific assets involved 
and the transaction cannot be internalized (Joskow, 1988; Lui, 2009).  Inter-firm 
relations that involve specific assets will push for both term specificity and 
adaptability due to the risks involved (such as opportunism or technological changes). 
Classical argument is that adaptability is necessary for taking account of the 
unforeseen (due to limitations of specifying terms) but there are other aspects 
surrounding the degree to which adaptability and term specificity are integrated in 
contractual relations.   
 
Whether it is a buyer or supplier who have invested specific assets in the relationship, 
the major concern is how to devise a mechanism that ensure their safety. This concern 
calls for both formal and informal mechanisms that ensure safeguard through the 
proper establishment of contractual terms (ex- ante) and the adaptability plan in case 
of unforeseen contingencies. Previous research has found support on the impact of 
assets in increasing the contractual term specifications (Crocker and Masten, 1988; 
Goldberg and Erickson, 1987), however, when the level of assets is very high, such 
contractual specifications cannot completely ensure safeguard (Cannon et al., 2000; 
Williamson, 1979). Contingency provisions can increase the partners’ willingness to 
participate in the exchange (Klein, 1993) and thus mitigate their vulnerability. We thus 
expect a direct positive effect of buyer asset specificity on both adaptability and ex-
ante term specificity; however interactive effects are also expected (will be integrated 
in the coming sections).  
 
H3a: Buyer asset specificity has a positive effect on contingent adaptability 
 
H3b: Buyer asset specificity has a positive effect on ex-ante contractual term 
specificity 
 
Environmental uncertainty has been viewed as “unanticipated changes in 
circumstances surrounding an exchange” (Noordewier, 1990: 82). Environmental 
uncertainty as a concept is complex to capture (Rindfleisch, 1997). Klein, for example, 
pointed out that environmental uncertainty is a “too broad concept and that its different 
facets lead to both desire for flexibility and a motivation to reduce transaction cost” 
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(1989: 256). If there is little or no uncertainty associated with a transaction, ‘‘the buyer 
can specify all (or almost all) the contingencies that might impinge on contract 
execution and thus defend against supplier opportunism” (Walker & Weber, 1984: 
375). In other words, environmental uncertainty makes it difficult to specify 
contractual terms (Anderson & Weitz, 1986). A general argument is that uncertainty 
tends to generate opportunistic behavior (Klein, Crawford, and Alchian, 1978).  
 
An interaction effect between asset specificity and environmental uncertainty is also 
expected because the predictive content of the transaction cost is based upon the 
presence of specific assets in the relationship (Williamson, 1998). There are different 
ways on which environmental uncertainty is categorized, but the common ones are 
technological and volume uncertainty (Geyskens et al., 2006; Walker & Weber, 1984).  
The following discussion argues for both direct effects and the interactive effect 
between asset specificity and environmental uncertainty dimensions on contracts.  
 
Technological uncertainty is the inability to predict with precision the technical 
requirements of a relationship (Walker & Weber, 1984). Such uncertainty may come 
from ‘‘unpredictable changes in the standards or specifications of components or end 
product or from general technological development” (Geyskens et al., 2006: 521). 
Firms experiencing technological uncertainty do not establish long-lasting linkages as 
they wish to retain flexibility and be able to terminate relationships and switch with a 
partner with more appropriate technological capabilities (Balakrishnan & Wernerfelt, 
1986). From the buyer’s perspective, ‘‘technological uncertainty increases the risk of 
technological obsolescence, which in turn reduces the value of the supplier hostage” 
(Stump & Heide, 1996: 433).  
 
Most firms are well structured to adjust to technological changes in ensuring their 
survival. Firms like Microsoft and Apple do constantly update their technology for 
similar reasons. Such adjustments are the driving force for longevity of agreements in-
spite of constant market changes. When a buying partner anticipates technological 
uncertainty, the concern is on how to get out of the contract so as to maximize the 
relatively better offers outside. The selling side will be concerned with how to 
maintain the buyer in a relationship, given the level of technological uncertainty. 
Buyer concerns are the motive for restructuring agreements that allow flexibility, 
while the seller concerns can lead to technological innovation.   
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Elfenbein and Lerner (2005) studied contingencies in the context of alliances in 
internet portals and their partners and found that technological uncertainty has a 
positive impact on the use of contractual contingencies. On the other hand, Crocker 
and Reynolds (1993) found that technological uncertainty renders contracts less 
complete. This finding was consistent with the summary review of contracts that was 
done by Furlotti (2007). Furthermore, Heide and John (1990) suggested that the 
technological uncertainty reduces expectations of continuity. Though the take home 
message is that the increased level of uncertainty makes it difficult to write relatively 
complete contracts (Shane, 1994), it is still feasible to increase the degree of 
specifications.  
 
Reynolds (1993) argued that the reduced effect of technological uncertainty on 
contractual completeness is due to increased costs of designing such contracts. If this 
observation is correct, then technological uncertainty generates motives for ex ante 
contractual term specificity, but the cost implication is what constrains this motive. In 
other words, when we rule out the assumption of increasing draft costs, technological 
uncertainty will have positive associations with ex-ante contractual term specificity. 
From Elfenbein and Lerner (2005) previous findings on the association between 
technological uncertainty and contingent adaptability, we also expect a positive impact 
of technological uncertainty on contingent adaptability. Thus;   
 
H4a: Technological uncertainty has a positive effect on contingent adaptability 
 
H4b: Technological uncertainty has a positive effect on ex-ante contractual 
term specificity 
 
Environmental uncertainty and asset specificity do not only have an important (Adler 
et al., 1998; David and Han, 2004), but a sophisticated role (Segal, 1999) in the choice 
of contractual governance. The technological uncertainty effect is likely to be lower 
when specific assets are involved in the relationship. Vandaele and colleagues (2007) 
found that the high level of technological uncertainty decreases the effect of asset 
specificity on both contingent adaptability and contractual term specificity. Although 
under normal market conditions, technological uncertainty leads to market choice 
(Geyskens et al., 2006), asset specificity will increase the problems involved in 
specifying terms and also reduce the parties’ ability to adapt to technological change. 
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This is what is referred to as the old effect, where the buyer faces the threat of being 
left with obsolete technology.  
 
What distinguishes technological uncertainty with other forms of uncertainty is the 
pace and nature of the changes. These features put less incentive for drafting terms that 
constrain partners, especially the side which has not made specific investments. The 
reason for this less incentive (in drafting extensive terms) is buyers’ speculation on 
better and less costly future solutions. The contingent adaptability plan is also one of 
the mechanisms partners consider in resolving future contingencies and secure specific 
assets. The nature of technological uncertainty can hardly be speculated in ex-ante. 
This makes it difficult to plan beforehand, leading to inadequate contingent 
adaptability.  
 
To argue for the role of technological uncertainty on the relationship between asset 
specificity and contingent adaptability, one need to first to get the understanding of the 
motives behind contingent adaptability. When the level of technological uncertainty is 
high, term specificity becomes an ineffective mechanism for safeguarding them, thus 
parties turn to other alternatives such as contingent adaptability plan. The effectiveness 
of contingent adaptability is at a large extent determined by the level of assets 
(Elfenbein and Lerner, 2005).  
 
When the anticipated future changes are not very dynamic, it is relatively easy to draft 
the contingency plan. Technological uncertainty can make this plan (adaptation) more 
complex and less feasible. The increased level of technological uncertainty makes it 
less likely for the buyer to commit to long term relations (Balakrishnan & Wernerfelt, 
1986; Heide and John, 1990) due to fear of being left with obsolete technology (Stump 
& Heide, 1996). We suggest that the association between contingent adaptability and 
asset specificity to be positively influenced when the level of technological uncertainty 
is not high. Thus;    
 
 
H5a: There will be a stronger positive relationship between buyer asset 
specificity and contingent adaptability when technological uncertainty is lower, 
than when it is high.  
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The presence of specific assets in the relationship calls for contractual safeguards 
(Cannon et al., 2000; Williamson, 1979). The establishment of such a safeguard is 
reflected by way terms are specified (Crocker and Masten, 1988; Goldberg and 
Erickson, 1987). The specification of terms in contractual agreements assumes a 
relatively static future condition, but technological uncertainty is very dynamic and 
hard to speculate. Further, the parties (especially the buying side) will have less 
incentive for being bound in a relationship when technological uncertainty is expected 
to increase. Lyon (1994) studied contracts within the context of engineering sub-
contractors and found out that formal contracts are less frequently used for projects 
with high technological conflicts. We thus suggest technological uncertainty to 
increase the negative association between asset specificity and term specificity. Thus;  
 
H5b: There will be a strong negative relationship between buyer asset 
specificity and ex ante contractual term specificity when technological 
uncertainty is high, than when it is low.  
 
Volume uncertainty is the inability to predict with precision the volume requirements 
in a relationship (Walker & Weber, 1984). This implies that the ‘stock-outs’ or excess 
inventory for the buyer and the production costs or excess inventory for the supplier 
can be hard to manage. Heide & John (1990) have also predicted that perceived 
volume uncertainty increases the need for business continuity, which facilitates 
cooperation and adaptation.  
 
Difficulties in predicting volume requirements will force the partners to accept 
changes. At the same time when partners increase the degree of changes in a 
relationship, it will be difficult to constrain the terms.  Contractual term specifications 
and contingent adaptability in this case act as two sides of the same coin in the sense 
that when we increase one side, the other will be affected in the opposite direction. In 
other words, there is a trade-off between contingent adaptability and term specificity 
(Hart & Moore, 2008). Rindfleisch and Heide (1997) suggest that, the higher level of 
environmental uncertainty, the higher the costs of formulating contracts. This 
observation is consistent with Pilling and colleagues (1994) who suggested that 
environmental uncertainty (such as volume) increases the ex-ante costs of specifying 
the roles of each exchange partner. We focus on the influence of volume uncertainty 
on the association between asset specificity and contingent adaptability rather than its 
direct effect (of volume uncertainty on contracts) based on the assumption that this 
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impact (of volume uncertainty on contracts) is contingent upon assets. The literature 
suggests that the environmental uncertainty (such as volume) is very relevant when 
there are assets involved (Williamson, 1998). To understand the influence of volume 
uncertainty about the relationship between asset specificity and contingent adaptability 
or ex-ante contractual term specificity, we need to revisit the argument we have raised 
concerning technological uncertainty. Technological uncertainty makes it even harder 
to predict the intensity and the pace of change, forcing partners to fear being left with 
obsolete technology. Volume uncertainty on the other hand does not raise similar 
concerns.  
 
The increased likelihood of volume uncertainty motivates the establishment of 
contingent specifications which will further increase with the level of assets involved. 
The argument concerning the effect of volume uncertainty on ex-ante term 
specification will be opposite because the increased level of volume uncertainty, 
generates challenges for specifying terms in detail. Aubert et al (2006) found that firms 
facing greater volume uncertainty seek less complete contracts. We thus expect the 
effect of asset specificity on contingent adaptability to increase with volume 
uncertainty. Further, we expect the effect of asset specificity on ex-ante contractual 
term specificity to decrease with volume uncertainty. Thus we hypothesize;  
 
H6a: There will be a strong positive relationship between buyer asset 
specificity and contingent adaptability when volume uncertainty is high, than 
when it is low.  
 
H6b: There will be a weakened relationship between buyer asset specificity and 
ex ante contractual term specificity when volume uncertainty is high, than when 
it is low.   
 
6.1.2.4 Controls  
Trust: Trust is defined as the ‘actors’ expectation of the other party’s capability, 
goodwill and self-reference in future situations involving risk and vulnerability 
(Blomqvist et al, 2005:269). There are competing views on the role of trust in inter-
firm contractual relations. These include the substitutive (Gulati, 1995; Yu, Liao, & 
Lin, 2006) and complementary views (Hart & Moore, 2008). The substitute version of 
trust is believed to result in a low degree of term specifications, while the 
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complementary view suggests that the members become more open to each other and 
provide significant information for specifying terms. Trust has been found to influence 
contractual relations (Grimsey & Lewis, 2004; Neu, 1991), thus we expect this 
influence to be on both contingent adaptability and on ex-ante contractual term 
specification.  
 
Networks: Networks are indicators of the level of tightness or embeddedness (Uzzi, 
1997) of ties among direct or indirect relational partners (Wuyts & Geyskens, 2005). 
Rowley, Behrens & Krackhardt (2000) suggested that firms with close mutual ties tend 
to develop a common understanding within their network. These networks result into 
informal enforcement mechanisms which are rationales for contractual term 
specificity. The network can also push parties to adapt due to social bonds, so we 
expect networks to have an impact on contingent adaptability and ex-ante contractual 
term specificity.   
 
Buyer dependence: Affirming the conceptual inseparability of power and dependence, 
Hawkin argued that “dependence involves circumstances where the buyer’s or 
supplier’s effectiveness is contingent on the performance of the other partner and 
where few or no alternatives exist, placing the more needy party at the mercy of the 
less needy” (2009: 49). Firms with a power advantage may not be as bound by the 
constraints of maintaining dyadic relationships because they have less incentive to 
continue them should they fail to meet expectations (Lusch & Brown, 1996). A Firm 
having power disadvantage will push for more term specificity because it will likely 
lose more in case of contractual failure. The dependent firm may have to accept 
adaptations suggested by the power advantage firm. We thus expect the buyer 
dependence to have an impact on both contingent adaptability and ex-ante contractual 
term specificity.   
 
 
6.2 Methodology  
 
6.2.1 Research design 
The study was based on a survey in collecting the data. This is one of the effective 
ways in obtaining and assessing information from a population (Zikmund et al., 2010). 
This survey was conducted in Poland, focusing on the manufacturing firms. Poland 
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was selected based on its high ranking among the key emerging markets of Europe 
(Dow Jones, 2012; S&P, 2010). Further, Poland was the only country in East and 
Central Europe to have economic growth during the 2009 recession (Oprita, 2012). 
Emerging markets have recently become an interesting and growing area for research, 
due to their growth potential in global business. Recent statistics have indicated that 
38.9% of world manufacturing goods are now coming from developing markets, 
57.6% from developed markets and 3.5% from transition markets, with both 
developing and transition markets constantly raising while developed markets 
continually falling (UNCTAD, 2012). Ernst & Young (2013) article on six global 
trends shaping the business world have also estimated that 70% of world growth over 
the next few years will come from emerging markets.   
 
6.2.2 Data collection 
The study focused on the buyer-seller relations within the context of manufacturing 
firms in collecting the data. The buying side of the dyad was used. The Information 
was obtained using a questionnaire (electronic). Further, we obtained secondary 
information to supplement for the aspects which could not be covered by this method. 
Below we provide a description of these methods.  
 
6.2.2.1 Self-administered questionnaire 
The questionnaires were delivered to the respondents in an electronic format (web). 
This method is efficient and cheap. Further the e-readiness level being higher in 
Poland (Bilbao-Osorio et al, 2013), allowed us to utilize this method. The use of web 
based survey in this study was facilitated by the use of software known as SurveyXact. 
This software has several advantages. For example, the researcher can monitor in real 
time the response trends and behavior of respondents when they fill in the 
questionnaires. The researcher can also insert restrictions in terms of which questions 
must be answered. The software was used together with telephone. The potential 
respondent was first contacted by a telephone and when agrees to participate, an email 
containing the questionnaire was sent via SurveyXact.    
 
6.2.2.2 Documentary review 
Secondary information is normally collected by a third party. It can be internal (from 
within the firms) or external (data collection agents or organizations). A variety of 
secondary data sources were used (both electronic and manual) in establishing the 
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rationale for the study context. These sources include; reports, newspapers and 
archives. The credibility of the institution or agent was given a priority (for validity 
and reliability concerns).  
 
6.2.3 Sample selection 
Sample selection is important when it comes to making inferences. The study of 
contractual relations provides an advantage to a researcher, especially the possibility 
for introducing probability based selection because the focus is on exchange. In the 
study of contractual governance, however, it is possible to introduce a high degree of 
randomness since the focus is on the exchange itself.   
 
We achieved this by instructing respondents to select either the first, second or third 
largest supplier in answering the questionnaires (Rokkan et al., 2003). It could also be 
viewed as judgmental, but respondents were the ones who had a choice on which 
exchange to use in answering the questionnaire. One can also assume that this can 
result into a bias, but this should not be considered a problem since the respondents 
and the nature of exchange (contractual exchange) used had a significant variation. 
The respondents that participated were manufacturing firms that were selected from 
the targeted population of 1800 firms.  
 
6.2.4 Data profile 
About 1,800 firms were contacted and asked to participate in the study; emails were 
sent to all of them. 400 companies partially completed the questionnaire and 201 fully 
completed it after two reminders. Thus, the final sample of respondents used for 
analysis was 201 (the rest could not be used because the amount of information 
missing was high) and the response rate was about 33%. The average number of 
employees per firm was 255, annual sales were around 16,558,089 USD (conversion 
rate: 1USD=3.1PLN). For the firms used in this study, the average supply frequency 
was five times per month and minimum length of relationship was one year.  
 
6.2.5 Measurement 
A list of the measures used in this study is given in the appendix 2. To ensure 
reliability, an exploratory followed by a confirmatory factor analysis was conducted. 
Confirmatory factor analysis of the predictor variables was conducted using AMOS 
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19. On the first stage we obtained freely estimated parameters [chi-square=524 (df = 
231, p=.000), NFI=.82, TLI=.86, CFI=.89, RMSEA=.08, PCLOSE=.000].  In the 
second stage we allowed for correlations in error terms for some factors (Kline, 2005). 
The newly estimated parameters fitted well the data [chi-square=341 (df =226, 
p=.000), NFI=.88, TLI=.96, CFI=.96, RMSEA=.05, PCLOSE=.46]. Most of the 
constructs used here have previously been developed and tested in other studies, 
including the controls, but some needed to be adjusted to fit the context. 
 
Contingent adaptability (CONT ADAPT): In measuring the concept of contingent 
adaptability, Luo (2002) used items that relate to ‘‘adaptive issues that are particularly 
vulnerable to an uncertain environment or resource availability’’ (p. 911). Mayer and 
Bercovitz (2003) measured this concept by asking the respondents to rank the extent 
that the parties resort to ‘contingency planning’. Their operationalization of the 
construct was on a three-point scale that assessed the degree to which parties develop 
explicit response rules for specific classes of events. In this study, we have adopted 
similar measures, but added arbitration procedures and renegotiation periods. These 
items were added based on the role they play in adaptation phase. After conducting a 
factor analysis, three items remained based on to the acceptable loadings.   
 
Ex-ante contractual term specificity (EXTSPC): Term specificity is concerned with 
how terms are specified (Luo, 2002). Using the context of IJV contract, Luo (2002) 
used a 5-points Likert scale in assessing the level at which terms were specific. An 
example of the terms and clauses he used were;  
 (1) how to set up the joint venture; (2) how to operate and manage the joint venture; 
(3) how to cooperate and resolve conflict between partners; and (4) how to terminate 
the joint venture. In this study, we modified these measures to fit with the study 
context. A total of six items was used in in measuring the concept of ex ante 
contractual term specificity. After performing factor analysis, four items loaded well, 
while the remaining had poor loadings.    
 
Relational norms (RELN) reflect inter-firm relations. Macneil listed about 10 key 
norms (1980) but Heide and John (1992) and later other authors (Antia and Frazier, 
2001; Jap and Genesan, 2000) used three different types of norms; flexibility, 
solidarity and information exchange. The authors provided the definitions as follows;  
Flexibility is defined as a ‘‘bilateral expectation of willingness to make 
adaptations as circumstances change’’; information exchange is defined as a 
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‘‘bilateral expectation that parties will proactively provide information useful 
to the partner’’ and solidarity is defined as a ‘‘bilateral expectation that a high 
value is placed on the relationship’’ (Heide & John 1992: 35).  
 
In this study, we used a total of eleven items covering flexibility, solidarity and 
information exchange. After conducting a factor analysis, flexibility and solidarity 
measures loaded on one factor (four items), while information exchange had a separate 
factor (four items). According to Noordewier, John, and Nevin (1990), these 
dimensions originate from single higher order norm, thus their convergence does not 
pose any challenge in the analysis. Further, context specific factors can also influence 
the way respondents perceive concerning flexibility and solidarity. The two separate 
factors were combined into equally weighted composite score (Heide & John, 1992) 
for testing the hypotheses.  
 
The foreignness of supply firm (FC) was measured by a dummy variable taking a 
value of 1 when there is a foreign partner in the relationship and 0 otherwise. Buyer 
asset specificity (BUASP) was adapted from Heide and John (1990) items which were 
also borrowed from Anderson (1985). The items reflect the degree to which the buyer 
has invested specific assets (physical, procedure, and people) involved in the 
relationship. It was measured by using five items (on a five point Likert scale) and all 
of were retained after factor analysis.   
 
The concept of environmental uncertainty was divided into two sub-concepts: volume 
uncertainty (Anderson, 1985) and technological uncertainty (Achrol, 1996). 
Technological uncertainty (TECHUNC) reflects the degree to which there are 
variations in technology or an inability to forecast technological requirements 
(Geyskens et al., 2006). The concept was measured with three items (on a five point 
Likert scale). Volume uncertainty (VOLUNC) reflects the degree to which volume 
requirements fluctuate or there is an inability to forecast volume requirements 
(Geyskens et al., 2006). The concept was measured using two items (on a five point 
Likert scale).  
 
Trust measures were adapted from Carson, Madhok, and Wu (2006). These authors 
built their items from those which were early established by Noordewier, John and 
Nevin (1990). The items that were included in Carson, Madhok and Wu (2006), 
included such things as fulfilling agreements and obligations, exhibiting fairness, 
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sharing information, and being flexible and responsive. Building on these items, the 
concept was measured by using seven items (on a five point Likert scale) reflecting the 
degree to which the partners had mutual expectations and understanding. Three of 
these items were retained after performing factor analysis. Most items were deleted 
due to low loadings.   
 
Network relations (NEWREL) focused on the direct or indirect connection (informal) 
between the firms (Holm, Eriksson, & Johanson, 1996; Mitchell, 1973; Nohria & 
Eccles, 1992). Holm and colleagues (1996) operationalized this concept by focusing 
on four items that reflected the extent which the buyer (buyer’s customers) is affected 
by its supplier or other partners it relates with. In this study, we adopted these 
measures, but further modification was applied to fit the new context. Four items were 
used (on a five point Likert scale) and three were retained after factor analysis. 
 
Buyer dependence (BUDEP) was adapted from Heide (1994). The concept measures 
the extent to which the buyer is dependent upon the supplier. The items that were used 
by Heide (1994) covered on the difficulties in replacing the supplier; competitiveness 
among suppliers for a given component; difficulties in adapting to a new supplier. In 
this study, we adopted these previous measures, but modified them to fit with the study 
context. Four items were used (on a five point Likert scale) and all were retained after 
performing a factor analysis.   
 
6.2.6 Data analysis 
In carrying out data analysis, we used SPSS 19 and AMOS 19 software packages.  
SPSS19 was used for exploratory factor analysis and regression, while AMOS 19 was 
used for confirmatory factor analysis. Cut off point for factor loadings in the 
exploratory factor analysis was .50 because most of the constructs were well-
established in theory.   
 
Multiple regression method is an effective method when analyzing the relationship 
between a single dependent (criterion) and several independent (predictor) variables. 
The method, however, is challenged by two major errors; measurement and 
specification errors. We used the summated scales in treating the measurement error, 
while the specification error was resolved by the use of variables that had a strong 
theoretical base (Hair et al., 2010). We also tested the interaction effects. In testing the 
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interactive effects, the interacting variables were mean centered and the results were 
presented by graphical plots (Aiken & West, 1991).   
 
6.2.7 Validity 
Three key categories of validity were addressed (discriminant, convergence, and 
nomological validity). To test for discriminant validity we used Fornell and Larcker’s 
(1991) rigorous criterion to test (Anderson & Gerbing, 1993). In this test the 
discriminant validity is supported when the average variance extracted (AVE) for two 
factors are greater than the square of the correlation between the two factors. The 
results presented in table 11 confirm this test (findings persisted even for the high 
correlations between relational norms and trust (r=0.59)). Factor loadings and 
construct validity were used to test for convergence or internal validity. The rule of 
thumb is that the factor loadings need to be .5 or greater and construct reliability need 
to be .7 or higher (Nunnally, 1978; Hair et al., 2010). All factors loadings and 
construct reliably (CR) fulfilled this rule of thumb (results are available in the 
appendix 2), thus our constructs had convergence validity. Nomological validity was 
tested by inspecting the inter-item correlations if they make sense from the theoretical 
point of view (Hair et al., 2010). The inspection confirmed the nomological validity.  
 
6.2.8 Reliability 
There are two key alternatives in assessing reliability (Hair et al, 2010) although there 
are several other ways. One alternative is to relate each separate item, including the 
item to total correlation. Rule of thumb is that the item-to-total correlations should 
exceed .50 and that the inter item correlations should exceed .30. Second, which is also 
widely used measure is a reliability coefficient, which assesses the consistency of the 
entire scale with correlation alpha. The generally agreed lower limit for cronbach’s 
alpha is .70 (Nunnally, 1978), although it may decrease to .60 in exploratory research 
(Hair et al., 2010). The values of cronbach’s alpha fulfilled the required rule of thumb 
(.70), implying that the study has a high degree of reliability.   
 
Another important test when it comes to reliability is a collinearity test.  
Multicollinearity decreases the degree of reliability (Hair et al., 2010). The two 
common ways of assessing the multi-collinearity problem is the tolerance and its 
inverse (the variance inflation factor). The suggested cut off point is Tolerance of .01 
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(corresponding to VIF value of 10.0). The maximum VIF for this study was 2.97, 
suggesting that the multicollinearity was not a problem.  
 
Additionally, although the questionnaires were completed by key informants, we faced 
a potential problem of common method variance (Campbell & Fiske, 1959). When 
self-reported data on two or more variables are collected from the same source at the 
same time, correlations among them may be systematically contaminated by any 
defect in that source (Parkhe, 1993). Harman’s single-factor test (1967) was based on 
the argument that, if a substantial amount of common method variance exists in data, a 
single factor will emerge from factor analysis when all of the variables are entered 
together, or a general factor that accounts for most of the variance will result.  
 
We performed a factor analysis that resulted in a unique factor solution with 
eigenvalues greater than one for each concept. Thus, it appears that this study does not 
have a serious problem of common method variance. 
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Table 11: Correlations 
 1 2 3 4 6 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
1.EXTSPC   .81            
2.CONTADAPT   .45
**
 .81           
3.RELN   .29
**
 .44
**
 na          
4.FC   .01 -.14 -.08 na         
5.BUASP   .22
**
 .15
*
 .05 .04 .73        
6.TECHNUNC   .27
**
 .31
**
 .28
**
 -.01 .23
**
 .75       
7.VOLUNC   .12 .15
*
 .32
**
 -.15
*
 .01 .41
**
 .87      
8.BUASPXTECHUNC   -.02 .03 .02 -.15
*
 .38
**
 -.06 .08 na     
9.BUASPXVOLUNC   .05 .12 -.01 -.07 .25
**
 .08 -.06 .62
**
 na    
10.TRUST   .20
**
 .22
**
 .61
**
 -.04 .03 .27
**
 .34
**
 .02 -.06 .89   
11.NEWREL   .29
**
 .28
**
 .27
**
 .05 .18
*
 .25
**
 .12 .12 .05 .16
*
 .89  
12.BUDEP   -.05 .01 .05 -.03 -.02 .00 .15
*
 .08 .01 .09 -.07 .72 
MEAN  3.04 3.16  .00  .22 1.94 3.26 3.61  .23  .00 3.83 2.66 3.46 
SD  1.09 1.03 .35 .42 1.01 .84 .81 1.07 1.05 .66 1.31 .98 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
 
Table above provides a correlation matrix for constructs used. All constructs are measured reflectively. The diagonal elements are the 
square root of the average variance extracted. 
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6.3 Results 
6.3.1 Main effects  
We followed a stepwise procedure by first entering the control variables, followed by main effect and finally the interactive 
for each model. The results are shown in table 12 below.  
 
***p<.01                      **p<.05              *p<.1    (1-tail test)    F1 =F-value of incremental R
2
     b=Unstandardized beta values  
                                          
Variables CONTINGENT ADAPTABILITY EX-ANTE CONTRACTUAL TERM SPECIFICITY 
MODEL1 MODEL2 MODEL3 MODEL1 MODEL2 MODEL3 
 β t β t β t β t β t β t 
Controls             
Constant 1.06 2.2** 1.3 2.5*** 1.1 2.2** 1.5 4.31*** 1.7 4.7*** 1.6 4.5*** 
NEWREL .23 4.1*** .13 2.4*** .5 2.86*** .12 3.0*** .07 1.7*** .08 2.1** 
BUDEP .06 .87 .06 .9 .07 .99 .05 .90 .03 .61 .03 .63 
TRUST .34 3.1*** .05 .38 .06 .50 .5 6.4*** .23 2.4*** .2 2.5** 
Main Effects             
RELN (1a, b)   .30 2.8*** .31 2.99***   27 3.6*** .29 3.9*** 
FC (H2a, b)   -.29 -1.8** -.31 -1.99**   -.17 -1.5* -.20 -1.8** 
BUASP (H3a, b)   .13 1.8** .17 2.1**   -.05 -.98 -.02 -.38 
TECHUNC(H4a, b)   .33 3.6*** .47 4.7***   .19 2.8*** .29 4.07*** 
VOLUNC   -.14 -1.5* -.27 -2.5**   .05 .74 .01 .13 
Interactive effects             
BUASP X TECHUNC (H5a, b)     -.35 -3.3***     -.26 -3.4*** 
BUASP X VOLUNC (H6a, b)     .25 2.6***     .09 1.27 
R
2 
.14*** .27*** .33*** .23*** .34*** .38*** 
Adj.R
2 
.13*** .24*** .28*** .22*** .31*** .34*** 
F-Value 11*** 8*** 7.5*** 19.5*** 11*** 10*** 
N 201 201 201 201 201 201 
Incremental R
2 
- .14*** .05*** - .11*** .04*** 
F1 - 6*** 4.5*** - 5.3*** 4.2*** 
Maximum VIF 1.04 1.67 2.97 1.04 1.67 2.97 
Incremental R2 
- .14*** .05*** - .11*** .04*** 
Maximum VIF 
1.04 1.67 2.97 1.04 1.67 2.97 
Table 12: Regression results 
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Three stage models were built for each of the two components of contractual 
completeness, contingent adaptability and ex-ante contractual term specificity. Model 1 
contained the control variables only (R
2
Adj=0.14, F (198, 3) =11, p<0.001 for contingent 
adaptability; R
2
Adj=0.22, F (198, 3) =19.5, p<0.001 for ex-ante contractual term 
specificity).   
 
Model 2 includes the main effects as well as the controls (R
2
Adj=0.24, F (192, 9) =8, 
p<0.001 for contingent adaptability; R
2
Adj=0.31, F (192, 9) =11, p<0.001 for ex-ante 
contractual term specificity). Model 3 contains interactive effects as well as all the 
variables included in Model 2 (R
2
Adj=0.28, F (189, 12) =7.5, p<0.001 for contingent 
adaptability; R
2
Adj=0.34, F (189, 12) =10, p<0.001 for ex-ante contractual term 
specificity). Incremental effects for models were also obtained.  
 
Both M2-M1 (∆R2Adj=0.14, p<0.001 for contingent adaptability and ∆R2Adj=0.05, 
p<0.001 for ex-ante contractual term specificity) and M3-M2 (∆R2Adj=0.11, p<0.001 for 
contingent adaptability and ∆R2Adj=0.04, p<0.001 for ex-ante contractual term 
specificity) are significant.   
 
H1a and b suggested that relational norms have a positive effect on contingent 
adaptability and ex-ante contractual term specificity. These hypotheses were supported 
(contingent adaptability: β=0.298, t=2.8, p<0.05; ex-ante term specificity: β=0.29, t=3.9, 
p<0.01).  
 
H2a and b suggested that the foreignness of the supplying firm has a negative effect on 
contingent adaptability and ex-ante contractual term specificity. These hypotheses were 
supported (contingent adaptability: β=-0.288, t=-1.8, p<0.05; ex-ante contractual term 
specificity: β=-0.199, t=-1.8, p<0.05).  
 
H3a and b suggested a positive effect of asset specificity on contingent adaptability and 
on ex-ante contractual term specificity, respectively. Results from table 12 indicate that 
H3a was supported (β=0.17, t=2.1, p<0.05) but H3b (β=-0.02, t=-.38, p>0.1) was not.   
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H4a and b suggested a positive effect of technological uncertainty on contingent 
adaptability and ex-ante contractual term specificity, respectively. These hypotheses were 
supported (see table 12; contingent adaptability: β=0.47, t=4.7, p<0.01; ex-ante 
contractual term specificity: β=0.29, t=4.07, p<0.01).   
 
6.3.2 Interactive effects 
 
H5a suggested a stronger positive relationship between asset specificity and contingent 
adaptability when technological uncertainty is low, than when it is high, while H5b, 
suggested for a stronger negative relationship between asset specificity and ex ante 
contractual term specificity when technological uncertainty is higher than when it is low.  
The general results of combination of asset specificity and technological uncertainty on 
contingent adaptability (β=-0.35, t=-3.3, p<0.01) and ex-ante contractual term specificity 
(β=-0.26, t=-3.4, p<0.01) can bring more light when we examine figures 14 and 15.    
 
Examination of Figure 14 supports H5a by showing that under high level of technological 
uncertainty the relationship between asset specificity and contingent adaptability is 
negatively influenced, while under low level of technological uncertainty the effect is 
reversed.  On the other hand figure 15 supports H5b by showing that technological 
uncertainty has a negative effect on the relationship between buyer asset specificity and 
ex-ante contractual term specificity.  
 
H6a and b suggested buyer asset specificity combined with volume uncertainty has a 
positive effect on contingent adaptability and a negative one on ex-ante contractual term 
specificity respectively. There is support for the effect on contingent adaptability 
(β=0.25, t=2.6, p<0.01) but not for that on ex-ante contractual term specificity (β=0.09, 
t=1.27, p>0.1). Examination of Figure 16 supports H6a as it indicates that volume 
uncertainty has positive effect on relationship between buyer asset specificity and on 
contingent adaptability.   
 
Figures below are constructed by taking a series of equations involving interactive 
effects. Each figure is preceded with a corresponding partial derivative equation. The 
general regression model that partial derivatives were obtained is also presented below.  
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CONT ADT/EXTSP =β0 + β1RELN + β2BUASP +   β3TECHUNC+   β4VOLUNC + β5FC 
+ β6BUASPXTECHUNC + β0BUASPXVOLUNC + ε 
 
Where,  
CONT ADPT = Contingent adaptability 
EXTSP= Ex-ante contractual term specificity 
RELN= Relational norms 
BUASP= Buyer asset specificity 
TECH UNC= Technological uncertainty 
VOLUNC= Volume uncertainty 
Β0 = Intercept (constant) 
ε = error term.  
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Figure 14 
Effect of Technological Uncertainty on Relationship between Buyer Asset Specificity 
and Contingent Adaptability 
 
∂CONTADAPT/∂BUASP=0.17-0.35TECHUNC 
 
 
The figure above suggests that at a low degree of technological uncertainty, the effect of 
the relationship between contingent adaptability increases, but at a high degree of 
technological uncertainty this relationship decreases.   
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Figure 15 
Effect of Technological Uncertainty on Relationship between Buyer Asset Specificity 
and Ex-ante Contractual Term Specificity 
 
∂EXTSPC/∂BUASP=-0.02-0.26TECHUNC 
 
 
 
The figure above suggests that as technological uncertainty increases, the relationship 
between buyer asset specificity and ex-ante contractual term specificity decreases.  
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Figure 16 
Effect of Volume Uncertainty on Relationship between Buyer Asset Specificity and Contingent 
Adaptability 
∂CONTADAPT/∂BUASP=-0.17+0.09VOLUNC 
 
 
The figure above suggests that as volume uncertainty increases, the relationship between 
buyer asset specificity and contingent adaptability increases. 
 
6.3.3 Control effects 
Network relations are found to have a significant positive effect (see table 12) on both 
contingent adaptability (β=0.15, t=2.86, p<0.01) and ex-ante contractual term specificity 
(β=0.08, t=2.1, p<0.05), while trust has a significant positive effect only on ex-ante 
contractual term specificity (β=0.2, t=2.5, p<0.05).  Buyer dependence did not have any 
significant effect on either contingent adaptability or ex-ante contractual term specificity.   
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6.4 Discussion   
Content and context are important dimensions in contractual relations.  Macneil noted 
that ‘‘If we wish to understand contract, and indeed if we wish to understand contract 
law, we must think about exchange and such things first, and law second’’ (1980:5).  Luo 
(2002) two dimensional view of a contract accommodates Macneil’s thinking in terms of 
the exchange and the law aspect of contracts. Law part of the contract is the specification 
of terms which are important for enforceability, while contingent adaptability covers the 
issues relating to the exchange that can hardly be enforced. Further, the question on 
which dimension to pay attention to and under what conditions has not been explored 
well in the literature. Addressing these questions is relevant for improving the efficiency 
in contractual design.  
 
Relational governance suggests the relevance of relations for both safeguarding and 
adaptations. The safeguard can occur in terms of informal enforcement mechanism or 
access to information that can be integrated in contractual term specifications. The 
information exchange aspect of a relationship can hardly be obtained from formal 
relational mechanisms because some sensitive information requires the element of trust, 
which builds up over time. Literature tend to support the complementary role of relational 
dimensions on contracts (Aubert et al., 2006; Blomqvist, Hurmelinna & Seppänen, 2005; 
Hart and Moore, 2008; Möllering, 2002; Seppänen, Blomqvist & Sundqvist, 2007), but 
we missed a discussion on the role of such relational components within the two 
dimensional aspects of a contract.  
 
This study has incremented the previous debate in the literature by suggesting that the 
complementary role of relational aspects extends to the two contractual dimensions. In 
the ex-ante term specification, the relational norms play an important role in obtaining the 
relevant information from partners in establishing better contracts. The adaptation 
element of relational governance is driven by a desire for partners to maintain the 
relationship by showing willingness to adjust to new situations. Relational norm is thus 
important for the adaptation because it enables partners to agree smoothly during 
contingencies and thus motivate them to have contingency plans as a means to govern 
their relationship.   
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Culture has an important role of on contractual governance. Previous works have 
supported for the influence of culture on the contracts (Wagner, 1995; Wuyts & 
Geyskens, 2005), but their focus was around the dimensions of culture. Schepker and 
colleagues (2013) suggested the future research on this area should look at how cultural 
distance influences the safeguard mechanism and its effectiveness. When two partners 
come from different cultural backgrounds, their cultural difference (Shenkar and Zeira, 
1992) can likely challenge the interpretations of contractual terms (Cavusgil et al., 2004).  
 
Further, the difficulties in specifying the terms can arise from the information asymmetry. 
Adaptation can be enhanced when the parties have a good relational base, a matter which 
is less likely when partners come from different backgrounds. The study has supported 
the above arguments by indicating how the presence of a foreign partner in an inter-firm 
relationship can hinder both ex-ante contractual term specificity and contingent 
adaptability.  
 
Higher level of asset specificity calls for the formal contracts (Joskow, 1988; Lui et al., 
2009), however such contracts cannot completely ensure safeguard of specific assets 
(Cannon et al., 2000; Williamson, 1979) due to limitations involved in designing and 
implementing such contracts. In other words, there is a limitation (due to bounded 
rationality) in the way which terms can be specified. When such an optimal level (of term 
specificity) is attained, the further increase in the level of assets cannot result in the 
increased level of term specification. When the level of asset specificity is high, most 
likely option to increment the safeguard is the contingency specifications (contingent 
adaptability plan). Klein (1993) suggested the inclusion of contingency provisions to 
increase the willingness of the vulnerable party to participate in the exchange.   
 
As the findings suggested, the increased level of assets will result into increased levels of 
contingent adaptability, but with no significant improvement in the ex-ante term 
specifications. Development of research around this area have pointed out that the 
increased number of clauses (such as contingency provisions) will result into contractual 
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complexity (Reuer & Arin ᷈o, 2007; Barthélemy and Quélin, 2006), but this discussion is 
beyond the scope of this paper.  
 
The environment by which the transaction takes place has an important influence on the 
governance structure. Transaction cost theory suggests that uncertainty increases the 
opportunistic behavior (Klein, Crawford, and Alchian, 1978), thus the need for increasing 
ex-ante term specifications and contingent adaptability in heightened with the increased 
level of uncertainty. Technological uncertainty in this regard is not exceptional. 
Technological uncertainty will force partners to increase the level of the ex-ante term 
specifications and the contingent adaptability plan.  
 
Environmental uncertainty plays even more critical role when asset specificity is 
involved in the transaction (David and Han, 2004). Further, the sophistication level of 
contractual governance increases when assets and uncertainty are involved (Segal, 1999).    
Consistent with Vandaele and colleagues (2007), the findings from this study suggests 
that the high level of technological uncertainty decreases the effect of asset specificity on 
both contingent adaptability and contractual term specificity. This study, however, has a 
unique contribution because it suggests that under a low level of technological 
uncertainty, the impact of asset specificity on ex-ante term specificity is positive. The 
direction, however, remains the same (negative) for contingent adaptability.   
 
There has been both symmetrical and asymmetrical effect on factors that influence these 
two dimensions of contracts. The more challenging are the asymmetrical ones. A 
combination of volume uncertainty and asset specificity can lead to increased and 
decrease in contingent adaptability and term specifications respectively. The finding 
concerned adaptability is consistent with Heide & John (1990) who predicted the positive 
role of volume uncertainty on adaptation. There was no support for the negative impact 
of volume uncertainty on the relationship between ex-ante contractual term specificity 
and asset specificity. The reason could be that there are fewer incentives for specifying 
terms when environmental uncertainty is likely to surround the transaction. This is our 
preliminary assumption, but future studies can explore this further.    
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Further, asset specificity alone increases contingent adaptability, thus implying that the 
increased levels of environmental uncertainty and asset specificity lead to extensive 
reliance on contingent adaptability. There is always a trade-off between contingent 
adaptability and term specificity (Hart & Moore, 2008), thus the increased choice toward 
contingent adaptability as a result of increased levels of volume uncertainty, does not 
significantly affect the degree of term specification. The study suggests the relational 
norms to improve both contingent adaptability and term specifications. It was generally 
assumed that the informal enforcement mechanisms favor the contingent adaptability, but 
it also provides a positive impact on term specifications. Ex-ante term specificity and 
contingent adaptability are differentiated in the contract by asset specificity and their 
interaction with environmental uncertainty (technological and volume).  
 
6.4.1Theoretical implications 
From the theoretical point of view we could assume that relational norms have a negative 
influence on ex-ante contractual term specificity based on the argument that when 
markets transform towards formal exchanges, they tend to rely on impersonal arm-length 
transactions such as contracts (Peng, 2003). The finding on the complementary role of 
relational norms on term specificity needs to be re-examined and reconciled in terms of 
what the theory says and what the empirical findings indicate. Further the role of 
institutions should be taken into account.  
 
The presence of a foreign partner in an inter-firm relationship can hinder both ex-ante 
contractual term specificity and contingent adaptability. From the theoretical argument 
we can easily agree that term specificity will be hindered by the differences in culture. 
The theoretical challenge is how foreignness hinders the contingent adaptability (as the 
results suggested). The rationale for contingent specifications is to address the unforeseen 
future events that are likely to increase in transactions that involve an international 
partner.  
 
Increased levels of assets will result in an increased level of contingent adaptability, but 
with no significant improvement in the ex-ante term specifications. The presence of 
specific assets call for contractual safeguards, but it is the design of such a safeguard that 
require more attention in the literature. The standardized activities (Aubert et al., 2006) or 
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standardized approach to term specifications can support the argument that there is a 
threshold level of term specifications that do not tend to vary significantly with the level 
of assets. This is something that requires further theoretical development.  
The theoretical argument about the influence of technology and volume uncertainty on 
the association between assets and contractual design need further refinement. When the 
level of technological uncertainty is high, there is a motive for specifying terms, but other 
factors (such as increased costs) make such specifications difficult. On the other hand, the 
increase in volume uncertainty does not seem to influence term specificity but rather the 
contingent adaptability. The inconsistent findings concerning the role of these variables 
on contracts have not been adequately addressed.      
 
Our preliminary assessment indicates that ex-ante term specificity and contingent 
adaptability are differentiated by asset specificity and their interaction with 
environmental uncertainty (technological and volume). This needs to be consolidated by 
further re-examining other theoretical factors that can drive the differences in these 
contractual dimensions.  
 
6.4.2 Managerial Implications 
Firms are made up of different contractual relations. Contractual relations are not 
unidimensional by nature as it has been assumed for a long time in the literature. 
Literature suggests that safeguard is essential, especially when specific assets are 
involved. Whereas the degrees in which contractual terms can be specified do not 
increase with the increase in assets, contingent adaptability does. This means that there is 
a threshold to which terms can be specified as a function of assets, and above that 
threshold, the only possibility to increase safeguard is through devising the contingent 
adaptability plan.  
 
Technological environment uncertainty poses a positive symmetrical effect on both term 
specification, as well as contingent adaptability. In such a situation, the mechanism that 
minimizes the impact of such an environment will pose no critical threat in any of the 
contractual dimensions.  A situation where there is a combination of asset specificity and 
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technological uncertainty, specifying terms is a challenge. Further, the establishment of 
contingent adaptability plans is also adversely affected.  
 
Whereas the contingent adaptation plan is positively influenced in a situation that 
combines volume uncertainty and specific assets, term specification is negatively 
affected. This is where managers have to make critical decisions on trying to improve the 
informal enforcement mechanism due to adverse effect on terms specifications.  Nature 
of partners involved is also an important element to consider. When there is a foreign 
partner in a relationship, term specifications and contingent adaptation are adversely 
affected. In such a situation, managers need to make an extensive and thorough 
evaluation of partners before drafting contractual agreements.      
 
The nature of environmental variations has implications on the choice between 
adaptability and contractual term specifications. If the level of technological uncertainty 
is relatively low, managers can adapt to new situations without extensive efforts, while in 
conditions with high levels of technological uncertainty, adaptation will have to be made 
with careful consideration especially when specific assets are at stake. Due to the 
observation that the contract term specificity will be negatively affected by the 
combination of asset specificity and high technological uncertainty, managers will need 
to ensure relational based governance mechanisms to deal with the situation. When the 
volume uncertainty increases, managers should expect to rely more on contingent 
adaptability than term specifications in ensuring safeguard of specific assets. Increased 
levels of specific assets should also lead to the same.  
 
These relational mechanisms will also help managers to adjust, especially when the 
volume uncertainty is expected in a business relation. When managers are in a 
relationship with foreign partners, they should devise a mechanism to deal with the 
problems of adaptation and contractual term specification. These mechanisms should, 
among other things aim at improving communication and resolve barriers as early as 
possible while emphasizing on longevity of the relationship. In case of inter-firm 
relations with foreign partners, managers should also highlight expected areas of 
difference and establish a response mechanism early before relationship commence. This 
will help in resolving most frequent problems that are not critical to the relationship.  
 
 
214 
 
6.4.3 Study Limitation 
This study is limited in the following aspects: Not all factors that have been utilized in 
finding determining the influence of the two dimensional aspect of contracts. Factors that 
are used have been selected from a limited number of theories. Future studies can extend 
by looking into other factors that can lead to better understanding on how these 
contractual dimensions differ. Further, the responses were obtained from the buying side 
of the relationship. Though there are on-going discussions concerning the relevance of 
using data from both sides of the dyadic relations, it can still be considered a limitation 
using one side. The study has only used one country and thus the generalizability can be 
limited. The use of only cross-sectional data has another methodological limitation which 
can be addressed in future studies by the use of panel data. Finally the study is limited to 
inter-firm contractual relations and no other forms of contracts between firms and 
individuals.  
 
6.4.4 Implication for future research 
Future research can examine whether the nature of industry and firms’ characteristics has 
influence on these contractual dimensions. The operationalization and nomological issues 
need to receive key attention in the area of contractual governance. Various dimensions 
of the contracts have not been well reconciled (Furlotti, 2007) and thus future research 
can improve on indicating the theoretical bases for differences (of these dimensions). The 
efforts to reconcile these dimensions need to pay specific attention on the validity and 
reliability concerns. Coordination has been pointed out to be an important component of 
the contract (Brousseau, 1995). Macher & Richman (2008) found that collaborative 
relationships have an influence only on the least stringent provisions that firms use for 
coordination purpose. Future studies need to examine the condition by which 
coordination procedures are important aspects of contracts (Furlotti, 2007) and how this 
is related to the other contractual dimensions.  
 
Managerial decisions are influenced by cultural values (Schneider and De Meyer, 1991; 
Hofstede, 1980). The contextual surrounding or the institutional environment can 
encourage or discourage inter-firm relations (North, 1990). When two partners come 
from different cultural backgrounds, their cultural difference (Shenkar and Zeira, 1992) 
can likely challenge the interpretations of contractual terms (Cavusgil et al., 2004). It 
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could be more interesting to investigate in more detail the role of institutions in 
contractual dimensions. The institution is a broad concept; the concepts can be broken 
down in some specific variables when investigating such a role.  
 
The current study has used few theoretical frameworks, but future studies can extend to a 
number of other theories such as resource dependence, social exchange and resource 
based view. Application of these other theories can also expand into interactive relations.  
We also suggest a different approach to studying these dimensions such as critical 
incidence that involve analysis of critical historical points of a relationship.   
 
6.4.5 Conclusion 
Contractual governance is an important part of the transaction. It is of little relevance to 
understand the dimensions of contracts without the knowledge of how these dimensions 
are driven. Studying contracts at the level of two dimensions is important for obtaining 
insights on what drives the degree of any given contractual relationship. The degree of 
asset specificity and its interaction with environmental uncertainty (volume uncertainty in 
particular) are the key distinctive drivers.  
 
The asymmetrical influence of these factors call for critical decision on which side to 
base attention on (term specification versus contingent adaptability). In situations such as 
increased asset specificity (that has a positive influence on contingent adaptability), the 
establishment of strong informal/social enforcement mechanism is essential. The 
situation is similar when there is a combination of specific asset and volume uncertainty. 
This situation leads to negative and positive effects on term specification and contingent 
adaptability respectively. Contingent adaptability has to be opted in such a situation due 
to difficulties in specifying terms. Heterogeneous effects on two dimensional aspects of 
contracts provide a practical challenge on which side to give emphasis. When the choice 
is about contingent adaptation, relational mechanism will have to be strengthened 
because of the symmetrical positive effect on the two contractual dimensions.  The two 
dimensional aspect of contracts is not opposing sides of contracts, but complements that 
provide practical guidance (on which aspect require strong emphasis and under what 
conditions).  
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APPENDIX 2 
CONSTRUCTS ITEMS Source LOADINGS 
ADAPTABILITY 
(CONTADAPT) 
α=0.89 
CR=0.85 
AVE=0.66 
Arbitration procedures are well 
specified in our contract 
Luo (2002), 
Aubert et al. 
(2000), 
Hendriske & 
Windsperger, 
(2010) 
0.809 
Re-negotiation periods were 
planned before the relation began 
0.885 
The contract has specified major 
principles or guidelines for 
handling unanticipated 
contingencies as they arise 
0.884 
EX-ANTE 
CONTRACTUAL 
SPECIFICATIONS 
(EXTSPC) 
α=0.87 
CR=0.88 
AVE=0.66 
Parties’ liabilities are well 
specified 
Luo (2002), 
Aubert et al. 
(2000), 
Hendriske & 
Windsperger, 
(2010) 
0.879 
Responsibilities of both parties are 
well specified 
0.786 
Information flow is well specified 0.834 
Confidentiality of information 
exchange is well specified 
0.696 
  
RELATIONAL NORMS (RELN) 
Solidarity & 
Flexibility 
α=0.92 
CR=0.94 
AVE=0.80 
We solve problems that arise in 
this relationship together 
Antia & 
Frazier 
(2001) 
Heide & 
John (1992) 
0.848 
The parties are committed to 
mutual benefits 
0.755 
We jointly share the responsibility 
for making this relationship work 
well  
0.894 
There is flexibility in response to 
changes in this relationship  
0.865 
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Information 
exchange 
α=0.907 
CR=0.93 
AVE=0.79 
It is expected that any information 
that might help the other part will 
be provided to them 
.785 
Exchange of information in this 
relationship takes place frequently 
and informally 
.742 
It is expected that the parties will 
provide strategic information if it 
can help the other party 
.907 
 It is expected that we keep each 
other informed about events or 
changes that may affect the other 
party 
.878 
BUYER ASSET 
SPECIFICITY 
(BUASP) 
α=.89 
CR=.85 
AVE=.54 
We have made significant 
investments in equipment 
dedicated to our relationship with 
this supplier 
Stump & 
Heide 
(1996) 
.799 
We have made adjustments in 
order to deal with this supplier 
.835 
Training our people to deal with 
this supplier has involved 
substantial commitments of time 
and money 
.875 
We have rescheduled our time and 
operations to deal with this 
supplier  
.882 
We have invested significant 
money and time in establishing a 
.780 
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market for the product(s) we 
purchase from this supplier 
TECHNOLOGICAL 
UNCERTAINTY 
(TECHUNC) 
α=0.78 
CR=0.79 
AVE=0.56 
The technology used in this 
product changes fast 
Buvik & 
John (2000),  
Anderson 
(1985)   
0.700 
The technology used in 
manufacturing this product is 
complex 
0.856 
There is much R&D involved in 
the development of this product 
0.861 
VOLUME 
UNCERTAINTY 
(VOLUNC) 
α=0.82 
CR=0.86 
AVE=0.75 
Demand for this product varies 
continually 
Buvik & 
John (2000),  
Anderson 
(1985)   
0.883 
The demand conditions for our 
supplier's product(s) are irregular 
0.900 
  
TRUST 
α=0.89 
CR=0.94 
AVE=0.79 
When an unexpected situation 
arises, the parties have a mutual 
understanding that a win-win 
solution will be found, even if it 
contradicts our formal agreements 
Carson, 
Madhok, & 
Wu (2006) 
0.830 
The parties hold mutual 
expectations that each will be 
flexible and responsive to requests 
from the other, even if not obliged 
to by our formal agreements 
0.879 
Both parties understand each other 
when problems arise 
0.862 
Both parties understand that the 
other will adjust to changing 
circumstances, even if not bound 
0.916 
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to by formal agreement 
NETWORK 
RELATIONS 
(NEWREL) 
α=0.70 
CR=0.92 
AVE=0.80 
Our firm has a close 
relationship with one or more 
partners of this supplier 
Holm, 
Eriksson & 
Johanson 
(1996), 
Nohria & 
Eccles 
(1992), 
Mitchell 
(1973) 
0.926 
Our firm has a collaborative 
relationship with one or more 
partners of this supplier, like a 
real team 
0.931 
Our firm's relationship with 
the partner of this supplier 
does not involve many formal 
procedures 
0.822 
BUYER 
DEPENDENCE 
(BUDEP) 
α=0.83 
CR=0.81 
AVE=0.52 
If we stopped buying from this 
supplier, he would easily 
replace our volume by 
supplying another buyer 
Heide 
(1994) 
0.851 
It would be relatively easy for 
this supplier to find another 
buyer for his products 
0.825 
Finding another buyer would 
not affect the price this 
supplier charges 
0.792 
If the relationship is 
terminated, it will not hurt this 
supplier 
0.803 
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CHAPTER SEVEN
8
                                                      
CONTRACTUAL SATISFACTION  
DRIVERS AND IMPLICATION TO THEORY 
 
 
Abstract 
 
The essence of inter-firm relations is to achieve each firm’s objectives. The achievement 
of these objectives is reflected in firms’ satisfaction. Satisfaction as a concept can be 
studied at different levels. Contractual satisfaction is one of such levels. Most studies on 
inter-firm satisfaction have looked at the general level of satisfaction, which is complex 
to account for its drivers. This study aims at studying contractual satisfaction by 
bringing into perspective some of its key drivers.   
The main finding suggests that, while contractual term specificity, contingent 
adaptability, reputation and trust have a positive influence on contractual satisfaction 
opportunism has a negative one.  
 
Key Words: 
Contractual satisfaction; reputation; trust; opportunism; contractual terms specificity; 
contingent adaptability 
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7.0 Introduction  
Assume a situation where two companies; B (buyer) and S (Seller) engage in a 
contractual relationship. In this contractual relationship, company S supplies product X to 
company B. After a series of misunderstandings which were later found to be related to a 
contract, company S was in a pressure to look for a new buyer, but the manager wanted 
to learn why company B was not satisfied with contractual dealings in the relationship. 
Practical case is the London 2012 Olympic contractual failure between G4S (Group for 
securicor) and the British government. The buying side in this case the British 
government was dissatisfied with the contractual relation due to G4S failure to fulfill the 
contractual requirements. The requirement included among other things, the provision of 
adequate security staffing, which was not realized. In their review of the reasons for the 
failure, G4S admitted that the nature (of a task) and the complexity of the contract were 
among attributes for the failure
9
. In this situation both British government and G4S could 
benefit if each one understood the reason for the failure. G4S could benefit more in future 
dealings if they learned a lesson because it suffered a huge negative impact. Among other 
things, G4S reputation, financial income and even the company rating were heavily 
affected. When partners are not satisfied (as the example indicates), there is a negative 
outcome in terms of relationship continuity and financial losses. This case leads us to a 
relevance of understanding contractual satisfaction and its drivers. From the example 
above, it is clear that satisfaction on a contract is important for performance, profitability 
and longevity of a relationship.  
 
Satisfaction is among the key outcomes of a contract (Schepker et al, 2014). Most models 
on relationship satisfaction tend to ignore contracts as an important dimension to be 
evaluated in inter-firm relations. For example, Crosby (1987) identified three key 
attributes of overall relationship satisfaction to be; core service, contact person and the 
institution (firm). A term unfair contractual arrangement was introduced in the literature 
of transaction cost by Klein (1980) and later developed in the study by Poppo & Zhou 
(2013) is closely linked to the concept of contractual satisfaction. Though we understand 
fairness is one of the attributes for satisfaction (see Huseman, Hatfield and Miles (1987) 
and Tse & Wilton (1988) on equity theory), it does not capture all facets of the concept.  
                                                          
9
 G4S  plc (2012), http://www.g4s.com/~/media/Files/Corporate%20Files/Olymp%20Rev%20Ann%20-
%2028%209%2012.ashx, accessed on 17
th
 March 2014.  
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The way a contract is specified has previously been noted to have an impact on a 
relationship. For example, Macaulay (1963) pointed that rely on complex contracts or 
partial or complete equity ownership to manage an exchange relationship may signal a 
lack of trust to exchange partners. Similar observations were made by Ghoshal and 
Moran (1996). There is an increased awareness among consumers to look beyond the 
final products. Firms are pressurized not just to keep the quality of products, but also the 
fair deals in their supply chain.  
Some investors react by pulling out their shares when there are unfair contractual deals 
(example Norway pulled its shares from Barrick Gold mining in 2009 for similar 
grounds
10). Satisfaction in contractual relations is thus a major topic in today’s business. 
The sensitivity of this subject is thus worth paying attention to. According to World Fair 
Trade Organization (WFTO) (2014), the EU public procurement directive voted for 
deliberate choice of fair trade products. This new law, according to WFTO confirms the 
direction set by the court of Justice of the European Union in the North Holland case 
ruling, which for the first time clarified that public contracts can award additional points 
to products ‘‘of fair trade origin’’.  
 
These movements are also taking place in emerging markets. Mining companies in 
Tanzania (mostly multinationals) have been heavily accused for unfair contractual 
relations. Similar accusations have been raised in the agriculture sector (example, cocoa 
in Ivory Coast), the gas and petroleum (in Nigeria). South Africa, for example, has 
established a consumer protection Act (Timothy & Posthumus, 2010) which aim at 
establishing a balance between the supplier and buyer in situations where one party has 
more experience and knowledge that can result into unfair contracts.  
 
Even though we understand that contracts are an important element in most of inter-firm 
relations, there are hardly established conceptual and empirical investigations on how 
satisfactions in contracts are evaluated. In this study, we focus entirely on contractual 
satisfaction as an important attribute in the evaluation of inter-firm relationship.  
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This study introduces a concept of contractual satisfaction in line with the interaction 
level of relationship satisfaction (Crosby and Stevens, 1987). Contractual satisfaction 
refers to a positive feeling resulted from fulfilling normative and agreed expectations in a 
contractual relationship. In other words, contractual satisfaction is a transaction specific 
and post-evaluation of the experience with a partner in a contractual relationship. As 
opposed to the general relationship satisfaction contractual satisfaction dedicates at 
evaluating the aspects that are directly linked to a contract.  
 
 
Studies from consumer (Cardozo, 1965, Churchill and Surprenant, 1982; Oliver, 1977, 
1980; Tse & Wilton, 1988; Westbrook, 1981; Yi, 1991), and channels or business 
relations (Anderson & Narus, 1990; Andaleeb, 1996; Genesan, 1994; Geyskens & 
Steenkamp, 2000; Ruekert and Churchill, 1984) tend to use the aggregate level of 
satisfaction, but contractual satisfaction is a transaction-specific and post-evaluation of 
the experience with the partner in a contractual relationship. As opposed to overall 
satisfaction (Anderson,  & Sullivan, 1993; Spreng et al., 1996) which evaluates 
experience across all services in a relationship (Jonsson & Zinelding, 2003), contractual 
satisfaction provide a practical feedback to decision makers because what is evaluated 
can be traced. When partners are not satisfied with their contractual relationship it is a 
clear sign that the longevity of the cooperation is at threat. Contracts have both standards 
and normative expectations. Standards are those specifications set ex-ante, while 
normative are those aspects which partners perceive as moral obligations even though 
they are not written down. Contractual satisfaction on that matter covers evaluation of 
both the agreed and normative expectations.  
 
The unique contribution of this paper is on introducing a conceptual model for 
contractual satisfaction as well as providing an empirical assessment of its key drivers. 
To achieve this we used transaction cost theory, relational governance based view and 
satisfaction frameworks. Transaction cost theory and relational governance based view 
provide bases for the independent variables while satisfaction frameworks are for the 
dependent variable. The presentation of this paper will be in the following sequence. We 
will start with literature review of the key theories/frameworks, followed by a conceptual 
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model and hypothesis development section. We then provide research methods, followed 
by the presentation of results, discussion and practical implications.  
 
7.1 Satisfaction and Contractual Satisfaction 
Satisfaction has widely been studied in consumer research (Cardozo, 1965, Churchill and 
Surprenant, 1982; Oliver, 1977, 1980; Tse & Wilton, 1988; Westbrook, 1981; Yi, 1991), 
but the concept has also drawn attention in industrial marketing (Anderson & Narus, 
1990; Andaleeb, 1996; Genesan, 1994; Geyskens & Steenkamp, 2000; Ruekert and 
Churchill, 1984). In consumer research, satisfaction has been defined in various terms. 
These include; ‘‘consumer’s response to the evaluation of the perceived discrepancy 
between prior expectations and actual performance of the product as perceived after its 
consumption’’ (Oliver and Swan, 1989: 204); a judgment that a product or service 
provided a pleasurable level of consumption’’ (Oliver, 1997: 13); ‘‘a feeling developed 
from an evaluation of the user experience’’ (Cadotte, Woodruff and Jenkins 1987: 305); a 
global evaluative judgment about product usage/consumption (Westbrook  1987: 260).  
 
In industrial business relations/channel literature, satisfaction has also been defined in 
various perspectives. These include; An overall positive effect that reflects the focal 
organization's (a buyer's) overall contentment regarding its relationship with another 
party (Andaleeb, 1996:80); “a positive affective state resulting from the appraisal of all 
aspects of a firm’s working relationship with another firm” (Anderson and Narus, 
1984:45). Satisfaction has also been defined in terms of power balance.  For example, 
Benton and Maloni (2005) defined it as the ‘‘feeling of equity with the relationship, no 
matter what power imbalance exists’’ (p. 5). Geyskens & Steenkamp (2000) 
distinguished between economic and social satisfaction. They defined economic 
satisfaction as a channel member’s evaluation of the economic outcomes that flow from 
the relationship with its partner such as sales volume, margins, and discounts, while  
social satisfaction was defined as a ‘‘channel member’s evaluation of the psychosocial 
aspects of its relationship, in that interaction with the exchange partner are fulfilling, 
gratifying, and facile (p. 13).  
 
The concept of satisfaction has been studied using several frameworks. Most noted ones 
are; expectancy (performance) disconfirmation (Churchill and Surprentant, 1982; Oliver, 
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1980), norms (Woodruff, Cadotte, and Jenkins, 1983), attribution (Folkes, 1984; Richins, 
1983), equity /inequity (Oliver and Swan, 1989). Following is the presentation of these 
frameworks.   
 
Confirmation/disconfirmation (C/D) paradigm: Full C/D paradigm is composed of four 
constructs; expectation, performance, disconfirmation and satisfaction. The expectation 
provides bases for comparison or establishes standards against which performance can be 
evaluated. In other words, expectation plays a role of an adaptation (Oliver, 1980). These 
expectations can arise from prior experiences (Woodruff et al., 1983).  Performance on 
the other hand is a standard by which disconfirmation can be evaluated. Disconfirmation 
which arises from the deviations between expected and actual performance is an 
intervening variable in the model.   
 
The size of the deviation is what determines the level of satisfaction/dissatisfaction. The 
paradigm was developed from an interpretation made by Oliver (1980) on Heslon’s 
(1969) adaptation level theory. Adaptation theory suggests that one perceives stimuli 
relative to an adopted standard. In connection to the adaptation theory, Oliver (1980) 
argued that performance (of a product) can be viewed as an adaptation. Key dimensions 
from confirmation/disconfirmation paradigm are; expectation and performance. Due to 
validity and scales problems, most studies do not follow the complete model (Teas, 1993; 
Babakus and Boller, 1992) but instead use performance or the confirmation of ex- 
pectations (Mittal, Ross, and Baldasare, 1998).  
 
Equity/inequity theory: Equity theory has also been used in assessing consumer 
satisfaction (Tse & Wilton, 1988). Equity theory can be traced to Adam’s (1963) work on 
inequity.  Huseman, Hatfield and Miles (1987) incremented this theory by taking into 
consideration the differences that exist between individuals (benovalent, equity sensitive 
and entitle). The theory suggests that individuals determine the equity of their 
relationships with others in assessing the ratio of what they receive from an exchange 
(outcomes) to what they bring into the exchange (inputs). An equitable relationship exists 
when the individual perceives that the participants in the exchange are receiving equal 
relative outcomes of the relationship (i.e., they are receiving a fair return for the efforts or 
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resources that they put into the exchange). When individuals perceive that there is an 
inequity in the exchange, they will be motivated to reduce the inequity.  
 
Norms: Woodruff et al (1983:296) argued that ‘‘satisfaction results from the degree to 
which performance matches with the norm’’. Norms are guarded by a consumer’s 
experience and differ extensively with expectations (Woodruf, 1983). The authors 
identified different forms of norms such as; brand-based norm (occur when single brand 
controls a consumer’s experience); and product based-norm (occurs when the consumer 
has experience with many brands of a given type or class of the product). Performance 
norm will likely develop from a product based norm, because the experience is pooled 
across similar brands. Miller (1976) identified four kinds of performance comparison 
(expected, deserved, ideal and minimum tolerable) but are considered to imply 
‘‘normative standards of performance ’’ (Woodruff et al., 1983:296). The cultural norm 
is also important in the evaluation of performance (Morris, 1976).  
 
Attribution: Consumers’ response to product failure is partly a function of perceived 
causes for the failure (Folkes, 1984). In describing the theory, Folkes (1984) used the 
example of laundry detergent; ‘‘suppose a consumer uses a new laundry detergent and 
then discovers the laundry is not clean. According to attribution theory, the consumer will 
search for a reason why this occurred and may arrive at any of several explanations’’ 
(Folkes, 1984:  398). The view of people, according to attribution theory is that they are 
‘‘rational information processors whose actions are influenced by their causal inferences 
(Folkes, 1984:398). The author identified three main causal dimensions of attribution to 
be ‘‘stability, locus, and controllability’’ (Fokes, 1984: 399). Stability refers to whether 
causes are perceived as relatively permanent and unchanging or as temporary and 
fluctuating. Locus refers to whether the cause of failure has something to do with the 
consumer or is located somewhere in the production or distribution of the product. 
Controllability refers to whether the outcomes of the failure are related to buyer efforts or 
the firm (volitional and non-volitional). 
 
Other models or frameworks: Dominant group in this category are those models from a 
channel or business relations. Key feature in these models is that they do not follow a 
dominant pattern like those from consumer research. The theoretical constructs used in 
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these models are extensive. They cover the constructs from various theories/perspectives 
such as; transaction cost, relational governance, institutional and others. Examples of 
these models include; antecedents and consequence model (Hausman, 2001); Loyalty 
(Caceres & Paparodimis, 2007), multidimensional aspects of satisfaction (Caceres & 
Paparodimis, 2007); trust and norms impact on satisfaction (Doucette, 1996); satisfaction 
and commitment (as outcome variables);  human and capital specific investment, 
promises and influence strategies (Ghijsen et al., 2010); service quality, relationship 
involvement, service encounter, service value (Lin, 2007); trust, commitment and 
communication model (del Bosque Rodrı´guez et al., 2006).   
 
Contractual satisfaction and other satisfactions:  Most studies in both consumer and 
industrial/channel relations have focused on the overall satisfaction as opposed to 
transaction specific satisfaction (Anderson & Sullivan, 1993; Spreng et al., 1996). In 
table 13 we provide a literature review of satisfaction in industrial/channel relations. The 
review has also confirmed our assessment that most of studies have focused on overall 
satisfaction. Whereas the overall satisfaction reflects the evaluation of all experiences 
across all services in relationship (Jonsson & Zinelding, 2003), transaction specific 
focuses on specific experience for a particular service level. Overall satisfaction provides 
an aggregated account of all attributes, thus it is difficult to represent an in-depth 
knowledge of satisfaction/dissatisfaction at a transaction specific (attribute) level. Though 
contractual satisfaction is a subset of overall satisfaction, it is a transaction specific 
evaluation. Relationship satisfaction is also an overall satisfaction evaluation because it 
provides an aggregated assessment (evaluation) of all attributes in a relationship. 
Contractual satisfaction is thus a subset of an inter-firm relationship satisfaction, but its 
evaluation is entirely based on aspects that pertain to a contract. 
 
At a management level, it is very helpful to obtain very specific feedback on dimensions 
to be improved. As opposed to overall satisfaction (Anderson, & Sullivan, 1993; Spreng 
et al., 1996) which evaluates experiences across all services in a relationship (Jonsson & 
Zinelding, 2003), contractual satisfaction provides a practical feedback to decision 
makers because what is evaluated can be traced. In an attempt to study specific elements 
of satisfaction, Spreng and colleagues (1996) introduced the concept of information 
satisfaction.  The author defined the concept as a ‘‘subjective satisfaction judgement of 
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the information used in choosing a product’’ (pg. 18). The concept of relationship 
satisfaction sometimes ignores contractual dimension which is an essential part of inter-
firm relations (see Crosby and Stevens, 1987). Another challenge in the relationship 
satisfaction is that the measures that are evaluated extend beyond the relationship.  
 
This study introduces a concept of contractual satisfaction in line with the interaction 
level of relationship satisfaction (Crosby and Stevens, 1987). In inter-firm relations, a 
contractual evaluation is a specific level of evaluation. Contractual evaluation refers to a 
partner’s response to how the other partner fulfills normative and agreed standards. In 
other words, contractual satisfaction is a transaction specific and post-evaluation of the 
experience with a partner in a contractual relationship. As opposed to the general 
relationship satisfaction contractual satisfaction dedicates at evaluating the aspects that 
are directly linked to a contract.  
 
 
7.2 Empirical Reviews 
We present some key findings, mostly from channel/industrial business relations 
(because this is the area of focus in this study). Mohr and Spekman (1994) found that 
coordination, commitment, trust, communication quality, information sharing, 
participation, and joint problem solving have a positive effect on satisfaction. Jonson & 
Zinelding (2003) study on achieving high satisfaction in supplier-dealer working 
relationships and found out that communication, adaptation, reputation, non-coercive 
power, cooperation, relationship bonds, dependency and relationship benefits have a 
positive impact on satisfaction while coercive power had a negative impact (on 
satisfaction). The authors also found that, the variables that differ most significantly 
between high and low satisfaction are; reputation, cooperation and relationship benefits 
(expected benefits from the relationship).  
 
Anderson & Narus (1984), had two key constructs in their model; CL and CLalt. The two 
constructs were adapted from social exchange theory. CL represented a distributor’s 
cognitive assessment of the outcomes obtained from a given working relationship, while 
CLalt represented the perceived dependence of the distributor upon the manufacturer 
(Anderson & Narus, 1984:66). The authors found that both CL and CLalt had a significant 
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impact on satisfaction. Whereas CL had a positive influence, CLalt had a negative one 
(though indirectly through manufacturer’s control). 
 
Caceres & Paparoidamis (2007) found that service quality dimensions had a significant 
effect on relationship satisfaction. They also found that technical quality (advertising) had 
a greater effect on relationship satisfaction than functional quality (commercial service, 
communication, delivery service and administrative service). Their study found also that 
the relationship satisfaction has a significant effect on trust. Doucette (1996) conducted a 
study on the influence of relational norms (solidarity, role integrity, information 
exchange) and trust on customer satisfaction in inter-firm exchange relationships. They 
found out that trust had a positive influence on satisfaction. Further, information 
exchange had both direct and indirect positive effects on customer satisfaction.   
 
Dwyer (1980) study of channel member satisfaction found out that, power had a 
significant positive influence on channel member satisfaction. He also found that 
satisfaction stems from the perceived cooperativeness of the partners in the channel. 
Ghijsen and colleagues (2010) study on supplier satisfaction and commitment found out 
that supplier specific assets (capital and human) have a positive effect on supplier 
satisfaction. This is one of the few studies in channel literature that linked transaction 
cost variable in predicting satisfaction. 
 
Grønhaug & Gilly (1991) study on the transaction cost approach to consumer 
dissatisfaction pointed out that dissatisfaction can be conceived as a realized transaction 
risk related to transnational ex post performance or an expression of ex post regret. The 
authors presented findings showing that dissatisfaction experience can be ‘‘related to 
market institutional arrangements outside the responsibility of the individual seller’’ (p. 
180). They also found out that ‘‘many problems relate to realized risks are not covered in 
consumers’ contracts’’ (p. 175). 
 
Patterson (1993) study on expectation and product performance found a perceived 
product performance to be most powerful determinant of a customer satisfaction. 
Ping (2003) study on the antecedents of satisfaction in a marketing channel found out that 
investment (in the relationship) was one of the key antecedents of satisfaction. 
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Razzaque (2003) study on effects of dependence and trust on channel satisfaction, 
commitment and cooperation found out that trust had a significant impact on satisfaction.   
del Bosque Rodrı´guez and colleagues (2006) study on the determinants of economic and 
social satisfaction in the manufacturer - distributor relationship found a strong impact on 
communication, trust, and commitment to satisfaction. The table 13 below provides a 
summarized review of studies on satisfaction (mostly within channel/industrial relations) 
between years 1980-2010. 
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 Literature Review On Previous Studies In Channel/Business-To -Business Satisfaction 
Source Level of 
analysis 
Key Predictor 
variables 
Context Definition of Satisfaction Findings 
Ghijsen, 
Semeijn and 
Ernston 
(2010) 
Overall 
supplier 
satisfaction 
Specific assets, 
influence 
strategies, 
dependence, 
promise 
Germany 
automotive industry 
Define supplier satisfaction as ‘‘the 
feeling of equity with the relationship no 
matter what power imbalances exists’’ 
(Benton and (Maloni 2005, p.19)  
 Influence strategies and capital 
specific assets had a significant 
negative and positive impact on 
satisfaction respectively, while 
promises, human specific assets 
had no impact on satisfaction.  
del Bosque 
Rodrı´guez et 
al (2006) 
Economic and 
non-
economic 
dimensions of 
satisfaction 
Communication, 
trust, 
commitment  
Food sector 
distributors in Spain 
Economic satisfaction is the evaluation 
performed by a channel member of the 
economic results derived from his 
relationship with his partner, such as 
turnover, margins and discounts 
(Geyskens& Steenkamp, 2000, p. 667) 
 
Thus, non-economic satisfaction refers 
to the evaluation of interactive 
experiences (Scheer & Stern, 1992) and 
it has been linked with exchanges that 
reflect the good psychological behavior 
of the members (Gassenheimer & 
Ramsey, 1994, p. 667) 
Credibility, trust (credibility and 
benevolence), and commitment 
have a positive impact on non-
economic satisfaction, while 
communication and commitment 
has a positive effect on economic 
satisfaction. Further, there is a 
positive relationship between 
economic and non- economic 
satisfaction.  
Benton and 
Maloni 
(2005). 
Overall 
satisfaction 
Power, 
performance 
Automobile 
industry in USA 
Supplier satisfaction is defined as the 
feeling of equity with the relationship no 
matter what power imbalance exists 
(p.5). 
 
Power-affected buyer-supplier 
relationship had a significant 
impact on supplier satisfaction.  
Razzaque & 
Boon (2003) 
Overall Trust and 
dependence 
Experimental design A positive affective state resulting from 
the appraisal of all aspects of a firm’s 
working relationship with another (Gaski 
and Nevin, 1985, p.27) 
 
 
Trust and dependence have 
significant positive impact on 
satisfaction. The interaction 
between trust and dependence 
has a positive impact on 
satisfaction.  
Table 13 
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Jonsson & 
Zineldin 
(2003) 
Overall 
relationship 
satisfaction 
Communication, 
adaptation, 
reputation, 
coercive power, 
non-coercive 
power, 
cooperation, 
relationship 
bonds, 
dependency 
and relationship 
benefits 
Swedish lumber 
dealers and their 
suppliers (single 
company versus 
many suppliers) 
Customers (buyers’) cognitive and 
affective evaluation based on personal 
experience across all service episodes 
within a relationship or an emotional 
response to the difference between 
what customers expect and what they 
ultimately receive. 
When not considering the level of 
trust and commitment, all 
predictor variables had a positive 
impact on relationship satisfaction 
with the exception of coercive 
power which had a negative 
impact. However to full 
understand the impact of these 
relational variables, the effect of 
trust and commitment should be 
controlled. 
Ping (2003) Overall 
satisfaction 
Alternative 
attractiveness, 
relationship 
investment and 
voice 
Hardware retailers A result of comparison to alternatives 
(Thibaut & Kelley, 1959), as well as 
relationship reward, cost, and fairness 
(Johnson, 1982, p.238).  
 
Alternative attractiveness, 
relationship investment and voice 
were the most important 
antecedents of satisfaction 
Sanzo (2003) Overall 
satisfaction 
Trust, conflict, 
perceived value 
Spanish industrial 
firms 
It therefore includes an evaluation of the 
economic and non-economic aspects of 
the relationship. In this way, economic 
satisfaction can be understood as a 
positive affective response that one of 
the participants has, with respect to the 
economic rewards, derived from the 
relationship in which they are 
immersed—margins, sales volume. 
Noneconomic satisfaction implies a 
positive affective response towards 
relationship’s psychological aspects, in 
such a way that a satisfied participant 
enjoys working with the partner (p.329) 
Trust and perceived value have a 
positive impact on satisfaction, 
while conflict has a negative one.  
Backhaus & 
Bauer (2001) 
Attribute 
satisfaction 
and overall 
Critical incidents Industrial clients 
with transportation 
services of a major 
Attitude satisfaction refers to evaluation 
concerning a particular attribute in 
exchange, while overall satisfaction is 
The data suggest that negative 
incidents loom more significantly 
than positive incidents. The 
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satisfaction German logistics 
company 
aggregates of several attributes degree of nonlinear satisfaction 
formation increases significantly, 
with the strongest changes being 
measured for companies with 
positive incidents. Negative 
incidents strengthen the effect of 
low attribute satisfaction on 
overall satisfaction. Therefore, a 
negative incident appears to be 
more critical if the satisfaction 
level was already low. 
Geyskens & 
Steenkamp 
(2000) 
Economic and 
Social 
satisfaction 
Coercive and 
non-coercive 
power.  
Alcohol industry 
(barkeepers and 
brewery) 
Distinguished between economic and 
social satisfaction. Economic satisfaction 
is defined as a channel member’s 
evaluation of the economic outcomes 
that flow from the relationship with its 
partner such as sales volume, margins, 
and discounts. Social satisfaction is 
defined as a channel member’s 
evaluation of the psychosocial aspects 
of its relationship, in that interaction 
with the exchange partner are fulfilling, 
gratifying, and facile (p.13) 
 
Contingent/non contingent use of 
no-coercive power has a positive 
impact on economic and social 
satisfaction. Contingent use of 
coercive power has a negative 
impact on social satisfaction. No-
contingent use of coercive power 
has negative impact on economic 
and social satisfaction 
Wong (2000) Overall 
satisfaction 
Co-operative 
culture, 
commitment, 
constructive 
controversy 
Not specified Used definitions from; Cadotte et al 
(1987) that is an affective state that is 
the emotional reaction to a product or 
service experience. (P. 428) 
Cooperative culture, commitment 
and constructive controversy are 
three variables affecting supplier 
satisfaction 
Geyskens, 
Steenkamp & 
Kumar (1999) 
Overall 
satisfaction 
(economic 
and social) 
Various 
antecedents 
related to 
satisfaction.  
Literature review 
from past studies.  
Economic satisfaction is a positive 
response to the economic rewards that 
flow from the relationship with its 
partner, such as sales volume and 
margins. Non-economic satisfaction is a 
Economic and non-economic 
satisfaction are distinct constructs 
with differential relationships to 
various antecedents and 
consequences. Further satisfaction 
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positive affective response to non-
economic, psychological aspects of its 
relationship (p. 224). 
is conceptually and empirically 
separable from the related 
constructs of trust and 
commitment.  
Mayo, 
Richardson 
and Simpson 
(1998) 
Overall 
satisfaction 
Power and 
influence 
strategies 
Wholesale beer 
distributors 
Used the definition from Schul, little and 
Pride (1985) that satisfaction is an 
affective response of individual channel 
members toward the salient aspects of 
the channel organization (p. 18).  
The use of power sources is a 
better predictor of satisfaction 
than the use of the influence 
strategy (Coercive power or 
influence has a negative impact, 
while non-coercive 
power/influence has a positive 
impact).  
Selnes (1998) Overall 
satisfaction 
Communication, 
commitment, 
conflict 
handling 
Food producers in 
Norway. Product 
line as cafeteria and 
restaurants 
No definition Communication, commitment and 
conflict handling had a positive 
impact on satisfaction 
Ghosh et al 
(1997) 
Overall 
satisfaction 
Expectation, 
relationship 
style, 
distribution size 
U.S.A industrial 
distributors 
No definition Among the expectation 
dimension, only price benefit 
influence satisfaction. The impact 
of expectation and outcomes on 
relationship satisfaction are 
moderated by relationship style 
and distributor size.  
Andaleeb 
(1996) 
Overall 
satisfaction 
Trust and 
dependence 
Business executives An overall positive affect and reflects the 
focal organization's (a buyer's) overall 
contentment regarding its relationship 
with another party (p.80) 
Trust and dependence have 
significant impact on satisfaction 
Gassenheimer  
Calantone & 
Scully (1995) 
Overall 
satisfaction in 
the dealer’s 
supply 
selection 
process 
Norms, asset 
specificity, 
relationship 
quality 
Office 
systems/furniture 
industry 
Maintained Anderson and Narus 
(1984:45) definition that satisfaction is 
“a positive affective state resulting from 
the appraisal of all aspects of a firm’s 
working relationship with another firm”  
Satisfaction does not directly 
predict the increased share of 
purchases from the dealers.  
Gassenheimer Overall Power and Office system and Maintained Anderson and Narus (1984, Mutual dependence and power 
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& Ramsey 
(1994) 
satisfaction 
(of a dealer) 
dependence furniture industry p. 66) view that satisfaction is "a positive 
affective state resulting from the 
appraisal of all aspects of a firm's 
working relationship with another firm" 
 
 
 
dependence imbalances makes a 
difference in reseller satisfaction, 
but the impact hinges upon 
whether the supplier is the 
primary, secondary, or tertiary 
supplier in terms of annual 
purchases by the reseller.  
Genesan 
(1994) 
Overall 
satisfaction 
(with 
previous 
outcomes) 
N: B- This was a 
reverse model, 
where 
satisfaction 
predicted trust 
and long-term 
orientation.  
Retail buyers and 
vendors supplying 
them 
A positive affective state based on the 
outcomes obtained from the relationship 
(p. 4). 
Satisfaction has a positive impact 
on trust (credibility and 
benevolence) and long-term 
orientation 
Ping (1993) Overall 
satisfaction 
Voice, loyalty, 
neglect, exit, 
opportunism 
Hardware retailers 
in USA 
No definition Voice has a positive impact on 
satisfaction, while exit and neglect 
had a negative one.  
Lewis  and 
Lambert 
(1991) 
Overall 
satisfaction 
Performance, 
reinvestment, 
dependence, 
credit 
Single fast food 
system 
No definition Amount of credit (or blame) has a 
positive impact on satisfaction. 
Satisfaction with one’s partner 
across a variety of dimensions 
would directly influence 
satisfaction with the overall 
performance. There is a direct 
relationship between satisfaction 
with overall role performance 
Anderson & 
Narus (1990) 
Overall 
satisfaction 
Cooperation, 
conflict, relative 
dependence 
(influence over 
and by partner 
firm), outcomes 
given 
comparison 
Manufacturer and 
distributor firms 
Cited Anderson and Narus (1984, p. 66) 
that satisfaction is  ‘’a  positive affective 
state resulting from the appraisal of all 
aspects of the firm’s working 
relationship with another firm’’  
Trust and outcome given 
comparison levels have a direct 
positive impact on satisfaction, 
while conflict has a negative 
influence. Further dependence, 
communication and cooperation 
had an indirect positive impact.  
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levels 
Michie 
&Sibley, 
(1985) 
Overall 
satisfaction 
Coercive and 
non-coercive 
power  
Franchisees of a 
large firm 
No definition Franchisee satisfaction is 
explained by Coercive and non-
coercive power sources  
Schul,  Little 
Jr., Pride 
(1985) 
Overall 
satisfaction 
Channel climate 
dimensions 
(Autonomy, 
consideration, 
initiating 
structure and 
reward 
orientation) 
Franchisee and 
Franchisor relations 
in the real estate 
brokerage industry 
Affective attitudes and feelings 
concerning the domain of characteristics 
describing the internal environment of 
the channel organization and the 
relationship between the channel 
member and other institutions in the 
channel arrangement.  
Initiating structure, consideration, 
autonomy and reward orientation 
are positively related with 
satisfaction.  
Anderson & 
Narus (1984) 
Overall 
satisfaction.  
Comparison 
level, 
manufacturer 
control,  
Electronic 
distributors  
A positive affective state resulting from 
the appraisal of all aspects of a firm's 
working relationship with another firm. 
Comparison level had a positive 
impact on satisfaction while 
manufacturer control has a 
negative effect 
Ruekert and 
Churchill 
(1984) 
Overall 
satisfaction 
Channel 
satisfaction 
construct was 
divided into 
different 
measures 
(single and 
multi- item 
measures) 
Wholesalers and 
retailers 
Channel member satisfaction comprises 
the domain of all characteristics of the 
relationship between a channel member 
(the focal organization) and another 
institution in the channel (the target 
organization) which the focal 
organization finds rewarding, profitable, 
instrumental, and satisfying or 
frustrating, problematic, inhibiting, or 
unsatisfying (p. 227) 
Multi-item measures (which ask 
for differently, how satisfied the 
channel member is in the specific 
aspects of the relationship) and 
multi-item measure which asks for 
respondents’ cognition or belief 
about the working of the 
relationship have strong internal 
consistency, are highly correlated 
and behave as expected with 
other behavioral constructs. 
Bagozzi 
(1980) 
Job 
satisfaction  
Motivation, 
performance, 
verbal 
intelligence 
Industrial sales 
persons and 
secondary 
information from 
company records 
No definition Job satisfaction was found to vary 
with performance. Further 
individual differences (such as 
self-esteem) functioned as 
important antecedents.  
Performance/satisfaction relation 
was shown to depend, in part, 
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upon the degree to which 
individual evaluate outcomes 
associated with the job. The 
greater the value placed on job 
outcomes, the higher the level of 
satisfaction with attainment of 
subsequent rewards.  
Dwyer (1980) Overall 
channel 
members 
satisfaction 
Power bases, 
cooperativeness 
and perceived 
self-control 
Laboratory 
simulation 
No definition Satisfaction stems from perceived 
self-control over decision areas 
and perceived cooperativeness of 
the partners in the channel.  
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7.3 Conceptual Model and Hypotheses Development   
 
Contractual satisfaction is determined by both the structural and relational characteristics 
surrounding a transaction. Transaction cost theory suggests that specific assets generate a 
potential for opportunistic (self-seeking) behavior (Williamson, 1985). The presence of 
specific assets in a relationship calls for a formal contractual governance (Lui et al, 2009) 
although such a safeguard mechanism cannot completely ensure protection (Williamson, 
1975). 
 
 Contracts have been identified to have two key dimensions; term specificity and 
contingent adaptability. These two dimensions of contracts are expected to influence the 
level of contractual satisfaction. When parties have specified their agreements, their 
performance is evaluated by mutually agreed standards rather than normative 
expectations. When a contract is evaluated on a well-established standard, it will likely 
lead to satisfaction. Further, the willingness to adapt increases the level of partner 
satisfaction (Johonson & Zineldin, 2003).  
 
The behavioral assumption of transaction cost that human agents are opportunistic by 
nature (Williamson, 1975, 1991) is associated with problems with monitoring 
performance of exchange partners (Williamson, 1979).  Satisfaction will also be 
influenced by the behavioral aspects such as opportunism. For example, Grønhaug & 
Gilly (1991) found out that opportunism can result into dissatisfaction. 
 
Complexities or difficulties in in formulating contracts (Lee & Cavusgil, 2006), and 
unforeseeable future contingencies (Poppo & Zenger, 2002), makes it important to 
combine both relational and formal governance mechanisms in structuring better 
safeguard mechanisms.  Relational contracting theory (Macneil, 1980) resolves some of 
the limitations encountered by formal contractual governance in safeguarding transaction 
assets. Macneil (1980) view contracts as relations. Relational exchanges evolve over time 
and thus are not considered discrete (Dwyer, 1987) transactions. A discrete transaction is 
a non-relational exchange (Macneil, 1980) that is characterized by a ‘‘limited 
communication and narrow content’’ (Dwyer, 1987:12). Relational governance 
incorporates a large component of the informal (Geyskens et al, 2006) or relational norms 
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(Macneil, 1980).  Relational norms establish mutual expectations (Cannon et al., 2000) 
that give rise to more specific norms such as trust (Gulati, 1995), and reputation 
(Worden, 2003). Macneil (1980) identified about ten relational norms, but the most 
researched ones are; flexibility, solidarity and information exchange (Heide and John, 
1992; Jap and Genesan, 2000).  
 
Confidence and contentment in inter-firm contractual relations increases with trust 
(Razzaque and Boon, 2003). Reputation is a relational dimension that is independent of 
an inter-firm relationship (can exist even before the commencement of a relationship). 
Even though this exists outside a relationship, Grønhaug and Gilly (1991) found that the 
dissatisfaction in contracts is also influenced by external attributes (that are outside the 
contracts). Further, we suggest reputation to also influence the structural composition of 
contracts (contingent adaptability and contractual term specificity).  The conceptual 
model presented by the figure 17 below summarizes the above arguments. Detailed 
examination of the hypotheses is presented after this model.  
 
Figure 17: Conceptual Model 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Contractual 
Satisfaction 
Trust 
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7.3.1 Direct effects on contractual satisfaction 
7.3.1.1 Trust and contractual satisfaction  
Trust is one of the core constructs in inter-firm relations and is linked to almost all 
relational constructs. Sako and Helper (1998: 30) viewed trust as a “state of mind, a 
belief, or an expectation held by one trading partner about another that the other will 
behave in a mutually acceptable manner”. Andaleeb (1996) defined trust as a 
‘‘willingness of a party to rely on the behaviors of others, especially when these 
behaviors have outcome implications for the party bestowing trust’’ (p. 79).  
 
Apart from playing a key role in relationship development, trust decreases a behavioral 
uncertainty problem in inter-firm relations (Blomqvist, Hurmelinna, & Seppänen, 2005; 
Morgan & Shelby, 1994; Vandaele, Rangarajan, Gemmel, & Lievens, 2007). Consumers 
‘‘prefer to transact with service providers they can trust and with whom they have shared 
understanding about implied, and unspecified obligations that govern their relationship’’ 
(Singh & Sirdeshmukh, 2000:155). Whereas some studies have argued trust to be an 
antecedent of satisfaction (Andaleeb, 1996; Anderson & Narus, 1990; Geyskens et al., 
1999) others have argued for the opposite (satisfaction impacts trust) (Ganesan, 1994; 
Selnes, 1998). Despite of the differences, Sanzo et al (2003) suggested that trust 
stimulates satisfaction.  Presence of trust between the parties makes parties confident and 
contented about the relationship (Razzaque and Boon, 2003).  
 
In addition, trust enables partners to have a sense of feeling that their expectations will be 
fulfilled. This view is supported by Andaleeb (1996) who suggests that ‘‘when the focal 
party trusts the source, it will feel secure by way of an implicit belief’’ (p. 80).   
 
In situations where trust dominates, the divergences can be accommodated because the 
other partner believes that all are done with good will. Contracts by default are 
incomplete (Williamson, 1979) and thus, to a large degree, the process and outcome of 
contractual relationship are inherently dependent upon partners’ behavioral intentions. 
Trust in this case, plays an important function in ensuring that partners feel secure in spite 
of surrounding risks facing the relationship. Further, the positive association between 
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trust and satisfaction has also been supported in the literature (Andaleeb, 1996; Razzaque 
& Boon, 2003; Sanzo, 2003; Caceres & Paparodimis, 2007), thus we hypothesize;    
 
H1: Trust has a positive effect on contractual satisfaction. 
 
7.3.1.2 Reputation and Contractual satisfaction  
As one of the influential constructs in generating and retaining customers (Dasgupta, 
1988; Storbacka, Strandvik, & Gronroos, 1994), reputation is an important foundation 
upon which a firm identity stands (Worden, 2003). Researchers have viewed reputation 
from either an economics (Weigelt & Camerer, 1988), or institutional perspectives 
(Deephouse, 2000; Fombrun & Shanley, 1990). Consistent with these two perspectives, 
reputation in inter-firm relations can be defined as the degree to which either partner 
believes the focal firm to be reliable (Doney & Cannon, 1997; Ganesan, 1994). 
Information relating to reputation can be obtained through communication with a third 
party or directly through prior experiences with a partner (Jonsson & Zinelding, 2003). In 
relation to a third-part, reputation can be transferred easily between organizations 
(Ganesan, 1994).  
 
Resulting from the social legitimization process (de Castro, López, & Sáez, 2006), 
reputation provides social sanctions (Carson, Madhok, & Wu, 2006) and flexibility (Al-
Najjar, 1995). Reputation is also a valuable asset a firm possesses and is essential in 
retaining customers (Dasgupta, 1988; Storbacka et al, 1994). The nature and value 
contained in reputation forces a holder to maintain it for current and future transactions.  
Researchers have found a link between reputation and performance (Podolny, 1993; 
Fombrun, 1996; Roberts & Dowling, 1997). Trust, customer identification and 
commitment are bridges between reputation and behavioral intentions (Keh & Xie, 
2009).  
 
Woodruff and colleagues (1983: 298) suggested also that ‘‘brand attitude influences 
expectations’’. Most of these constructs which relate to reputation have a significant 
influence on satisfaction as we have indicated in the empirical review (table 13). Jonsson 
& Zineldin (2003) found a positive relationship between reputation and satisfaction.  
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Our assumption is based on the reasoning that contractual satisfaction will to a large 
degree depend on perceptions of the partner than the contracts themselves because by 
nature they are incomplete. We thus hypothesize:  
 
H2: Reputation has a positive effect on contractual satisfaction. 
 
7.3.1.3 Opportunism and contractual satisfaction 
Opportunism is associated with the conventional assumption that economic agents are 
guided by considerations of self-interest (Williamson, 1975). Opportunism is the key 
challenge when there are specific assets involved in a relationship (Leiblein & Miller, 
2003; Stump & Heide, 1996). It should be distinguished from both ‘‘stewardship 
behavior and instrumental behavior” (Williamson, 1975, p. 27). Whereas stewardship 
behavior is related to trust, instrumental behavior is neutral (Williamson, 1975). 
Opportunism has also been linked to information asymmetry and, in turn, information 
asymmetry has been linked to behavioral uncertainty (Wathne & Heide, 2004).  
 
Though Myerson (2008) pointed on the incentive based mechanisms to deal with the 
information asymmetry problem, it is still hard to get rid of the problem because the 
information is private and hard to verify (Williamson, 1985a). Mistrust is likely to occur 
when the buyer has an opportunistic perception regarding the supplier. Such mistrusts or 
feelings that the partner is acting opportunistically, can likely result into dissatisfaction 
(Grønhaug & Gilly, 1991). The authors found out that about 26.3 percent of 
dissatisfaction was associated with opportunism. Thus we hypothesize:   
 
H4: Opportunism has a negative effect on contractual satisfaction. 
 
7.3.1.4 Contractual term specificity, contingent adaptability and contractual 
satisfaction 
It is said that contracts are incomplete (Williamson, 1979, 1985b) due to exogenous 
(Grossman & Hart, 1986; Hart & Moore, 1990) or endogenous problems (Bolton & 
Faure-Grimaud, 2010; Hart & Moore, 2008; Tirole, 2009), but the degree of 
completeness will vary across transactions. Contractual completeness has been defined 
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by the degree to which terms are specified in the contractual relations (Brown, Potoski, & 
Van Slyke, 2007; Saussier, 2000) or as a “ratio between specific rights and residual 
rights, where specific rights refer to a detailed specification of a decision action in the ex- 
ante period and residual rights refer to the planning of decision procedures which will 
enable decision making about specific actions in the ex post period” (Hendrikse & 
Windsperger, 2010, p. 4).   
 
Luo (2002) suggested that contractual completeness is a dichotomous, comprising 
contingent adaptability and term specificity. Satisfaction in inter-firm channel relations 
can reflect the degree to which terms are specified (term specificity) as well as contingent 
adaptability (Neu, 1991). Contingent adaptability refers to the ability of partners in 
responding to unexpected events (contingencies) in a relationship. In other words, when 
economic or relational objectives are aligned with expectations, they will be reflected in 
satisfaction (Anderson, & Narus, 1984). Based on the argument from social exchange 
theory, that when behavior and expectations converge, the result is satisfaction 
(Gassenheimer et al., 1995), we expect the degree of contractual completeness to have a 
positive effect on contractual satisfaction.   
 
Contractual term specificity sets standards by which contractual performance or 
experience can be evaluated. This is more objective way by which satisfaction is built on. 
Terms specificity can be an important determinant of contractual satisfaction because it 
provides guidance for partners in the relationship. The literature in business 
relations/channels has not made clearly this important link (between term specificity and 
satisfaction). When partners have mutual agreed standards, the performance is no longer 
driven by normative expectations but rather by established terms, thus we hypothesize;   
 
H4 Contractual term specificity has a positive effect on contractual satisfaction. 
 
When parties can accommodate divergence in the agreement, the difference between 
expected and actual outcomes is minimal. Adaptation is important in developing 
collaborative relations (Axelsson & Easton, 1992). Johonson & Zineldin (2003) pointed 
out that ‘‘it is the willingness to adapt that demonstrates the supplier’s commitment to the 
development of the relationship and dealer satisfaction’’ (p.227). When it is possible to 
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accommodate contingencies in contractual relations, the partners’ level of satisfaction 
will be high because the unforeseen events have constraints on contractual performance. 
In a situation where the exchange partners are not willing to make adaptations, this could 
also lead to dissatisfaction. Thus;  
 
H5 Contingent adaptability has a positive effect on contractual satisfaction. 
 
7.3.2 Indirect effects on contractual satisfaction 
 
7.3.2.1 Reputation, contingent adaptability, contractual term specificity, 
contractual satisfaction  
 
Reputation is a key factor in developing collaborative relations (Axelsson & Easton, 
1992).  Firms’ identity and its ability to retain and generate customers are well noted to 
be influenced by its reputation (Dasgupta, 1988; Worden, 2003). Reputation has a 
potential influence on both contractual specification and contingent adaptability because 
the nature of a partner (in terms of character) is critical for the formulation and 
implementation of contractual agreements. Banerjee & Duflo (2000) argued that 
reputation matters because of contractual incompleteness. The author also pointed out 
that reputation can come from several sources such as; previous contractual relations 
(where the contractual partner acted reliable), age of relationship and the behavior of the 
firm in terms of abiding to policy and business requirements such as certification. 
 
Partners are likely to be flexible when dealing with reputable firms. This implies that 
reputation is important element in ensuring both adaptability and contractual term 
specificity. In figure 17, we have indicated that contractual term specificity and 
contingent adaptability to mediate a relationship between reputation and contractual 
satisfaction. Access to information concerning reputable partners is relatively easy 
because such information is transferable across businesses (from third party or other 
reliable sources) (Genesan, 1994). Proper and reliable information is critical when it 
comes to specifying of contractual terms. Contracts functions as a signal (Banerjee & 
Duflo, 2000). Reputable firms will display this signal in conducting their contractual 
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transaction by highlighting in detail essential areas and even provide reliable information 
to their partners. This type of signal is not likely to be found in non-reputable firms. 
Banerjee & Duflo (2000, p. 8) pointed out that ‘‘an optimal contract is either a fixed-
price or a time and material contract’’, ‘‘for any fixed level of client reputation, the more 
reputed the firm, the more likely it is that it is a time and material contract’’ (optimal 
contract). Reputable firms will also like to maintain their status by helping in structuring 
relatively better contractual specifications with their partners. We thus hypothesize;   
 
H6: Reputation has a positive effect on contractual term specificity 
 
Reputable partners can also be willing to adapt to changes so as to maintain their status 
which is a valuable asset. Banerjee & Duflo (2000) suggested that, reputation impacts the 
outcomes of ex-post contractual negotiations. Arkerlof (1970) observed that the parties 
can likely be in a position of not observing all the relevant dimensions at the point of sale. 
This in turn leads to relying on reputation. In practical situations, neither the seller’s 
effort nor the probability of high performance is observed at the time of sale (MacLeod, 
2007:597). In such type of a situation reputation plays an important decisive role when 
unexpected events occur. Adaptability is a normal process in the contractual relations.  
‘‘If a seller agrees to supply a good of a specified quality, as a matter of law, this 
does not imply that the seller must supply the good or else face inordinate 
penalties. It is required that the seller makes adjustments to the price to 
compensate the buyer for his or her loss’’ (MacLeon, 2007: 612).  
In extreme conditions when there are inevitable situations that could likely result in 
failure, reputation can play a very positive and significant role. McLeon (2007) noted that 
‘‘when the likelihood of failure is significant, then it is efficient for a seller’s reputation 
to be associated with this lack of remedial payment, rather than with the defect in the 
good per se’’ (p. 612). In other words, reputation defends a firm in critical situations, and 
hence the willingness of the partners to adapt to the changes will be positively influenced. 
During the Mediterranean-traders period (around eleventh-century), problem related to 
contracts was resolved by arranged agency relations (Greif, 1989: 589). Membership in 
this coalition required a member to have among other things, the good behavior in the 
past. Members understood on that respect that there was no incentive for behaving 
opportunistic (Greif, 1989). This scenario is similar to what happens during contingencies 
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in contractual relations. The reputable firms understand that there is no incentive for 
improper behavior.The consequence of such behavior will tarnish not only the 
possibilities for long-term contractual relations with the partner at hand, but all members 
that relate to that partner. This is similar to the coalition membership during the 
Mediterranean traders. We thus hypothesize;  
 
H7: Reputation has a positive effect on contingent adaptability 
 
7.4. Research Method 
7.4.1 Research design 
The study was based on a survey in collecting the data. A survey tends to be large in size, 
especially when the focus is on empirical analysis. According to Robson, the survey 
enables a researcher to collect ‘‘a standardized information from a specific population, or 
some sample from one, usually but not necessarily by means of a questionnaire or 
interview’’ (1996: 49). This survey was conducted in Poland, focusing on the 
manufacturing firms. The survey design is effective in obtaining data (Zikmund et al, 
2010). Manufacturing firms were relevant to this topic because they are likely to engage 
in contractual relations with their suppliers. 
 
7.4.2 Data collection 
The study focused on supplier-buyer relations of manufacturing firms in Poland, with 
data being collected from the buying side of the relationships. Most studies tend to use 
the one side of the dyad, but there are still ongoing discussions concerning the use of one 
or the two sides.  
  
Firms that participated in this study were required to make their preferred list of three 
suppliers (first, second or third largest) whom to choose for answering the questionnaire 
(Rokkan et al., 2003).  This form of choice was used to increase the variation in the 
sample. Data were gathered from primary and secondary sources. Primary source used 
was self-administered questionnaires, while the secondary data included offline and 
online (electron) sources. In the section below we present these sources.   
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7.4.2.1 Self-administered questionnaire 
The questionnaires were delivered to the respondents via SurveyXact software.  
SurveyXact is a web based research tool for gathering data.  The targeted respondents 
were first contacted via a telephone and an email containing a SurveyXact link was later 
sent when a targeted respondent agreed to participate. This mechanism was convenient, 
cheap and flexible way of gathering large amount of data.  
 
7.4.2.2 Documentary review 
We used a variety of sources (both offline and online (electronic)) in obtaining secondary 
data. Secondary data were essential for establishing the rationale for the used context as 
well as providing guidance concerning the selection of targeted sample.  
 
7.4.3 Sample selection 
The targeted sample was purposive; however the final data units (contractual exchanges) 
were randomly selected. The mechanism (for introducing randomness in selecting the 
response units) is feasible in the study of contracts because the focus is on the exchange.  
Respondents were instructed to select either the first, second or third largest supplier in 
answering the questionnaires. We do not assume that this can result into a bias, because 
both the respondents and types of exchange used in responding to questionnaires differed 
extensively.   
 
7.4.4 Data profile 
About 1800 firms were contacted and asked to participate in the study. Of these, 400 
companies partially completed and 201 fully completed the questionnaire – a response 
rate of about 33%. The final sample used in the analysis was thus 201 respondents. The 
average number of employees of the firms was 255, annual sales were USD16, 558,089 
on average (conversion rate: 1USD=3.1PLN). Average supply frequency was five times 
per month and the minimum length of relationship was one year. The study involved 
domestic companies owned by local citizens, subsidiaries of international companies, 
joint-venture with international partners, and foreign companies at a proportion of 56.5%, 
11.7%, 8.7% and 23% respectively.   
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7.4.5 Data analysis 
In carrying out data analysis, we used SPSS 19 and SmartPLS 2.0 (M3) software 
packages.  SPSS19 was used for exploratory factor analysis and SmartPLS were used for 
confirmatory factor analysis and path estimations in the structural modeling. Advantage 
of SmartPLS over other structural analysis tools is that it does not lead to estimation 
problems or improper or non-convergent results (Hensler, Ringle and Sinkovics, 2009). 
Cut off point for factor loadings in the exploratory factor analysis was .50 because most 
constructs were established in theory.  
 
7.4.6 Measurement 
A list of the measures used and specific measurement aspects can be viewed in the 
appendix 3. For all multi-item measures, an exploratory followed by confirmatory factor 
analysis was carried out using SPSS 19 and SmartPLS 2.0 (M3) Beta respectively. Most 
of the concepts have been used in previous studies; however, some concepts had to be 
adjusted so as to fit the new context.   
 
Contractual satisfaction (CONTRSAT): Most authors have used multiple items in 
measuring this concept (Brown, Lusch, & Smith, 1991; Geyskens & Steenkamp, 2000; 
Ruekert & Churchill, 1984; Schul, Little, & Pride, 1985). Some satisfaction measures 
capture cognitive, while others capture the affective dimensions (Eggert  & Ulaga, 2002).  
Razzaque & Boon (2003) measured satisfaction by using items from three levels; 
performance and the achievement of goals; propensity to make a positive 
recommendation after satisfying encounter; other aspects of the relationship. Relatively 
similar measures were used by Jonsson & Zineldin (2003). Consistent with the satisfying 
perspective of contracts (Bolton & Faure-Grimaud, 2010) and above measures, this study 
applied a conceptual reasoning from the mentioned literatures but new items were 
developed to fit the study context. We used six items reflecting the degree to which 
partners were satisfied with contractual arrangements (in 5 points Likert scale).  After 
performing the factor analysis, four of these were retained. The items deleted were 
having low factor loading (below the acceptable range). 
 
Trust was adapted from Carson et al. (2006).  The measures used to reflect the 
degree to which partners had mutual expectations and understanding. After performing a 
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factor analysis, three factors loaded well. The items that were dropped, related to, how 
conflicts and the adaptation were handled. This suggests that the concept of trust is within 
the perspectives of mutual expectations and understanding.   
 
Reputation (REPT) is one of the well-established measures from the media (for 
example fortune 500 and fortune 1000 companies). Measures from fortune covers items 
relating to product, financial performance, the ability to attract and keep talented workers, 
social responsibility (Fortune, 2000). Unidimensional measures have been previously 
used in measuring this construct (Goldberg & Hartwick, 1990), but multidimensional 
measures are commonly used. In this study, we have adopted measures from Fombrum 
and Shanley (1990). Seven items were used to reflect the degree to which the buyer 
perceived the partner to have a good reputation. After performing a factor analysis, all the 
factors loaded were within the acceptable range.  
 
Buyer-perceived opportunism (OPPORT) reflects the self-seeking behavior of 
partners (Williamson, 1975). This study adapted items from Rokkan, Heide, and Wathne 
(2003). The authors used measures relating to the context of outsourcing contracts. The 
measures reflected the non-cooperative and cheating behavior of the supplier. Their 
measures were consistent with the previous measures that were developed by John 
(1984), but incremented the element of non-cooperative behavior. We used six items in 
measuring the concept. After performing factor analysis, one item was removed due to 
low loadings.  
 
Contractual term specificity (TSPC) and contingent adaptability (ADAPT) are 
based on Luo’s (2002) dual view of contractual completeness. In measuring contractual 
term specificity, the author used 5 points Likert scale in assessing the degree to which a 
contract specifies relevant terms and clauses. In this study, we used a total of six items (5-
points Likert scale) in measuring this concept. After performing a factor analysis, four 
items loaded well, while the remaining had poor loadings. The factor loadings were in the 
acceptable range.  
 
In measuring the concept of contingent adaptability, Luo (2002) used the items 
that relates to; ‘‘(a) adaptive issues that are particularly vulnerable to an uncertain 
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environment or resource availability; (b) the contract has specified major principles or 
guidelines for handling unanticipated contingencies as they arise; and (c) the contract 
have provided alternative solutions for responding to various contingencies that are likely 
to arise’’ (p. 911). In this study, we have adopted similar measures, but added on 
arbitration procedures and renegotiation periods. These items were added based on the 
role they play in adaptation phase. A total of three items was used in measuring this 
concept. After performing a factor analysis, all factors loaded within the acceptable 
range.   
 
7.4.7 Validity and reliability 
We tested for discriminant, convergence, and nomological validity. In testing 
discriminant validity we used Fornell and Larcker’s (1991) criterion to test (Anderson & 
Gerbing, 1993). The test supports discriminant validity when the average variance 
extracted (AVE) for two factors are greater than the square of the correlation between the 
two factors. The discriminant validity was supported (see results in tables 14).  
 
Factor loadings and construct validity were used to test for convergence or internal 
validity. All factors loadings and construct reliability (CR) in appendix 3 fulfilled this 
rule of thumb which requires construct validity and reliability to be greater than .5 and 
.70 respectively (Nunnally, 1978; Hair et al, 2010).We tested for nomological validity by 
inspecting the inter-item correlations between items if they had a theoretical sense (Hair 
et al, 2010). The inspection confirmed the nomological validity.  
 
We tested for reliability using two mechanisms (Hair et al, 2010); First, we tested for the 
item- to- total correlations (should exceed .50 by rule of thumb) and inter item 
correlations (should exceed .30). Second, we tested for reliability coefficient. The 
generally accepted lower limit for cronbach’s alpha is .70 (Nunnally, 1978), although it 
may be down to .60 in exploratory research (Hair et al, 2010). The values of cronbach’s 
alpha fulfilled the required rule of thumb (.70), meaning that the study has a high degree 
of reliability.   
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Table 14 
Correlation matrix 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
1 CONTRSAT  .89      
2 TRUST  .49
**
  .89     
3 REPT  .61
**
 .52
**
  .82    
4 OPPORT -.31
**
 -.183
**
 -.34
**
  .85   
5 TSPC  .58
**
  .38
**
  .59
**
  -.231
**
  .81  
6 ADAPT  .539
**
 .25
**
  .46
**
  -.097  .55
**
  .81 
MEAN 3.81 3.17 3.65 3.75 1.96 3.8 
SD 0.8 1.06 0.84 0.7 0.89 0.65 
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
N= 201.  
The diagonal elements in bold are the square roots of the average variance extracted for constructs measured reflectively 
with multiple. Using Fornell and Larcker’s (1991) rigorous criterion to test for discriminant validity (Anderson & Gerbing, 
1993), the average variance extracted for the reflective constructs are greater than the off-diagonal elements.) 
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7.5. Results 
We applied PLS structural equation modeling (SEM) to estimate our theoretical model 
using SmartPLS software (Ringle, Wende, Will, 2005).  The advantage of using PLS is 
that it does not lead to estimation problems or improper or non-convergent results 
(Hensler, Ringle and Sinkovics, 2009). For researches that aim at predictions, simulation 
studies that compare PLS with covariance-based SEM confirm that PLS path modeling is 
particularly suitable as a means to avoid improper solution (Reinartz, Haenlein, and 
Hensler, 2009). Model below (table 15) provides results on path coefficients and their 
corresponding t-values.  
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Table 15 
Structural parameter estimates 
Antecedents  Outcome Mediator Outcome Antecedents  
Mediators 
β t-value 
Trust Contractual 
satisfaction (H1) 
  0.20** 2.1 
ReputationContractual 
satisfaction (H2) 
  0.22** 1.8 
Opportunism-
Contractual satisfaction 
(H3) 
  -0.12** -1.7 
 Contractual term 
specificity 
Contractual 
satisfaction (H4) 
 0.25** 1.9 
 Contingent 
adaptability-
Contractual 
satisfaction (H5) 
 0.23** 2.1 
 
  Reputation-
Contingent 
adaptability (H6) 
0.46*** 5 
  Reputation- 
Contractual term 
specificity (H7) 
0.60*** 6.9 
                          ***Significant at P<.01                   **Significant at P<.05 
 
7.5.1 Hypotheses testing and structural model assessment 
We used a nonparametric bootstrapping procedure (5000 samples; 200 cases; no sign 
change) to evaluate the significance of path coefficients (Henseler, Ringle, and Sinkovics, 
2009). SmartPLS uses bootstrapping because it does not presume that the data are 
normally distributed (Hair, Ringle & Sarstedt, 2011). The Non parametric bootstrapping 
‘‘involves a repeated random sampling with replacement from the original sample to 
create a bootstrap sample’’ (Hair et al., 2011: 148). The minimum allowed (rule of 
thumb) bootstrap sample is 5000 (Hair et al., 2011). The computation procedure allows a 
researcher to change the number of samples (from the original cases). The structural 
model consisted of three endogenous constructs. Assessing the influence of exogenous 
constructs, R
2
 was important.  R
2
 for satisfaction, contingent adaptability and contractual 
term specificity are 0.57, 0.21 and 0.36 respectively. This means that the given model has 
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explained satisfaction by 57%, while indirect effects explained contingent adaptability 
and contractual term specificity by 21% and 36% respectively. All the explained 
variances are satisfactory (Chin, 1998). The moderate R
2
 is acceptable for the 
endogenous constructs with one or two exogenous constructs (Henseler, Ringle and 
Sinkovics, 2009). The Stone Geisser criterion Q
2
 values are obtained from running 
blindfolding procedures and range above the threshold level of zero, indicating the 
model’s predictive relevance (Henseler, Ringle and Sinkovics, 2009). We use results 
from table 15 to present results of hypotheses.  
 
All the hypotheses H1-H7 were significantly supported;  H1 suggested that trust has a 
positive effect on contractual satisfaction (β=0.20, t=2.1, p<0.05); H2 suggested that 
reputation has a positive effect on contractual satisfaction (β=0.22, t=1.8, p<0.05); H3 
suggested that opportunism has a negative impact on contractual satisfaction (β=-0.12, 
t=-1.7, p<0.05); H4 that suggested contractual term specificity has a positive effect on 
contractual satisfaction (β=0.25, t=1.9, p<0.05); H5 suggested that contingent 
adaptability has a positive effect on contractual satisfaction (β=0.23, t=2.1, p<0.05); H6 
suggested that reputation has a positive effect on contingent adaptability (β=0.46, t=5, 
p<0.01). H7 suggested that reputation has a positive effect on contractual term specificity 
(β=0.60, t=6.9 p<0.01).  
 
7.6. Discussion   
The composition of contracts (contractual specifications) and the supporting informal 
structures (relational norms) are issues that have been extensively discussed in the 
contractual governance literature, however an interesting part that has not been well 
captured is the parties’ psychological response on such contractual structures. The 
contractual composition deals with how contracts are structured in terms of terms 
specifications and contingent adaptability. The relational dimensions cover aspects such 
as trust and reputation, but opposite to these are behavioral assumptions like 
opportunism. This study has investigated these key dimensions and their influence on 
contractual satisfaction.  
 
Trust and reputation are essential for ensuring that partners feel secure when the 
relationship is vulnerable. The finding on the role of trust on satisfaction is consistent 
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with previous findings (Andaleeb, 1996; Razzaque & Boon, 2003; Sanzo, 2003; 
Rodrı´guez, Agudo, Gutie´rrez, 2006; Caceres & Paparodimis, 2007). Trust stimulates 
satisfaction (Sanzo et al., 2003) and makes parties to be confident in a relationship 
(Razzaque and Boon, 2003). The confidence and a sense of security that is built by trust, 
tends to favor the evolution of contractual relations, even when there are unexplained 
discrepancies. On the other hand, reputation influences expectations. For example 
Woodruf (1983) suggested that ‘‘brand attitude influences expectations’’ (p. 298). A 
finding on the positive impact of reputation on contractual satisfaction is consistent with 
previous findings (Jonsson & Zineldin, 2003). Reputable firms tend to protect their 
identity because it is a valuable asset. In doing, so they tend to build healthy relations 
with their partners.  
 
Opportunism is a critical problem when it comes to contractual arrangements. The 
problem of perceived opportunism becomes complex when the information is private and 
hard to verify (Williamson, 1985). The incentive based mechanisms (Myerson, 2008) are 
not sufficient to deal with the problem of perceived opportunism. Unexplained 
discrepancies (difference between expected and actual outcomes) are likely to be a source 
of perceived opportunism. The finding on the negative impact of opportunism on 
satisfaction is also consistent with Grønhaug & Gilly (1991). This suggests that partners 
need to feel secure in contractual dealings so as to be satisfied.  
 
Contractual term specificity establishes standards for evaluating contractual performance 
or experiences. This minimizes the normative evaluations which will likely result in 
dissatisfaction. Industrial/channel relations literature has not provided this link (term 
specificity and contractual satisfaction) but this study has indicated the relevance of 
establishing clear terms. Dissatisfaction can at a large extent come from the areas outside 
contractual aspects (Grønhaug & Gilly, 1991). This is a clear indication that the wider the 
unspecified aspects, the more likely the chances for opportunism and ultimately 
dissatisfaction.  
 
Further, the development of collaborative relations depends to a large extent on 
adaptation (Axelsson & Easton, 1992). The findings on the positive impact of contractual 
adaptability on contractual satisfaction are consistent with Johanson & Zinelding (2003) 
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view that willingness to adapt is an indicator of supplier’s commitment and satisfaction. 
Contingent adaptability to a large extent plays the role of minimizing both normative 
expectations and contractual deficiencies. This builds a better relationship climate of trust 
and understanding between partners. Such ingredients are essential for contractual 
satisfaction.   
 
Term specificity and contingent adaptability are also influenced by partners’ reputation. 
The degree of term specificity increases when there is adequate information on partners 
in the transaction (using the complementary assumption of relational norms). Information 
on reputable firms is easily accessed and transferred across businesses (Genesan, 1994). 
In other words, better contracts are likely to be found in more reputable firms (Banerjee 
& Duflo, 2000). The problem of information asymmetry increases when dealing with less 
reputable partners.   
 
The positive impact of reputation on contractual term specificity is consistent with these 
perspectives. When unexpected situations occur, partners’ reputation has an essential role 
in resolving such a situation (McLeon, 2007). This was a noted practice even during the 
Mediterranean traders period (Greif, 1989), where partners joined coalitions on the bases 
of good behavior in the past. When unexpected and unexplained situation arises, the 
reputation increases the likelihood for adaptation. This is because partners will perceive 
that the discrepancies are an outcome of the environmental factors and not a result of 
opportunism.  
 
The general observation from this study is that both the structural and relational 
dimensions have an important contribution to contractual satisfaction. Understanding the 
drivers that influence contractual satisfaction is important because it shifts the attention 
from how inter-firm contractual governance can be organized to how best it can 
maximize parties’ normative intentions (expectations). The endogenous choice 
concerning the contractual optimality does not trade off the relational dynamics that 
surround a transaction. The interplay between structural and relational dimensions is 
essential for ensuring not only strong safeguard, but also satisfying contractual relations. 
Such satisfactory contractual relations are important for longevity and cooperation among 
partners. A key message from this study is that contractual satisfaction is not just a 
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function of elements that are within a contract but also those which are outside the 
contract.   
 
7.6.1 Theoretical implications 
Contractual satisfaction is a specific level evaluation of inter-firm contractual exchange. 
At this level, both normative and agreed standards form the bases for evaluating 
satisfaction. Concepts that have been developed in the hypotheses focus on explaining 
how contractual satisfaction is influenced. Nature (dimensions) of a transaction and of the 
parties involved is of key relevance in explaining such influence. Behavioral elements 
such as opportunism have been found to have a negative effect on contractual 
satisfaction. This observation is consistent with & Gilly (1991) argument that 
opportunism and satisfaction are negatively related. This also indicates the extent to 
which perceived opportunism can have a serious negative outcome in inter-firm relations. 
In-spite of good performance, the presence of perceived opportunism in an inter-firm 
relationship can lead to disconfirmation of expectations, implying that the atmosphere of 
trust is fundamental for any inter-firm contractual relationship to function well.   
 
Some of relational dimensions used are ex-ante and ex-post in nature. For example 
reputation of a partner can be ex-ante assessed while trust is a dimension that develops in 
a course of the relationship. Reputation is important dimension because it is an asset for 
the firm that possesses it. Reputable firms will try to ensure that they remain in that way 
in all their dealings. This attitude forces them to fulfill their transaction responsibilities 
which are ex-post. One of such responsibilities is on fulfilling contractual agreements.  
A trust which is predominantly ex-post relational dimension is important in influencing 
contractual satisfaction.  
 
Function of trust on contractual satisfaction is to lubricate the perception concerning 
partners’ performance. This minimizes the gap between expected and actual outcome. In 
case of discrepancy between expected and actual, trust helps in bringing a positive 
thought on this. Nature of contractual design (in terms of dimensions) has an important 
influence on inter-firm satisfaction. Key components of contracts according to Luo 
(2002) are term specificity and contingent adaptability. Contractual term specifications 
are those agreed standards which govern the exchange. These formulate assessment 
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criteria for evaluating exchange relations. These agreed standards can likely lead to 
satisfaction in case they are well structured and partners follow them. In situations where 
no agreed standards are in place, expectations differ because of unavailable objective 
assessment.  
 
 Adaptability on the other hand helps partners’ response to unforeseen circumstances. 
This can likely contribute to satisfaction because it signals a commitment to the 
relationship and minimizes the discrepancy between the expected and actual outcomes. 
Reputation has a key effect on both contractual term specificity and contingent 
adaptability. Reputable partners will likely be willing to take a consideration of changing 
circumstances. The ability to respond to changing conditions, will in turn lead to 
contractual satisfaction. Structuring contractual terms with reputable partners can likely 
be less challenging because it is easy to access their information from third parties or 
other reliable sources. Extensive information search and verification is likely to be 
minimal when drafting contractual terms with reputable partners. It is also likely that 
reputable partners respect the contractual terms during the execution period, which in 
turn leads to contractual satisfaction.   
  
7.6.2 Practical implications  
At this point, it is helpful to remember the example, in the introduction i.e. London 2012 
Olympic contractual failure between G4S (Group for securicor) and the British 
government. The current study has indicated that reputation has a positive influence on 
contractual satisfaction. The effect of G4S loss in reputation extends into other existing 
contractual relations that the firm has. The manager needs to ensure that their contractual 
relations with existing partners are well secured because failure can lead to dissatisfaction 
in other contractual relations.  Being able to design, contractual terms are as relevant as 
adjusting to uncertainties. Dissatisfaction that leads to termination of the contractual 
relationship in the mentioned example was largely a product of failure to adapt rather 
than to specify terms. Behavioral interventions that can lead to reduced levels of 
perceived opportunism are also relevant in ensuring that partners are not dissatisfied by 
factors that are not core to contractual performance.  
 
 
 
268 
 
Contractual satisfaction has practical significance for managers because it is a specific 
level of assessing contractual relations. Exchange features (such as how contracts are 
specified) and the relational dimensions are significant in influencing contractual 
satisfaction. In designing contracts, the role of term specificity and of adaptability should 
receive proper attention so as to facilitate contractual satisfaction. When choosing 
partners, ex-ante aspects such as reputation can be used as assessment criteria because 
they contribute towards contractual satisfaction.  
 
Reputable partners strive to maintain their reputation status and on that respect, they 
fulfill their contractual obligations. Behavioral aspects such as opportunism have 
opposing effects on contractual satisfaction. Building up satisfactory contractual relations 
should, among other things push for a trusting relationship.  
 
7.6.3 Limitations 
The study has only looked at contractual satisfaction and not the overall satisfaction.  
Studying specific and overall satisfaction levels can provide a broad explanation of the 
studied phenomenon. The concept of satisfaction is broadly studied in both consumer and 
industrial marketing. We have focused on the area of industrial marketing perspectives 
and not general areas of satisfaction. The sets of theories that we used in exploring this 
subject are limited. Other theories like dependence and institutional perspectives can be 
of relevance in the future. Using a single country adds another limitation when it comes 
to generalizability of findings.  
 
The study is also limited in terms of methodological approach. Data that have been used 
for this study are cross-sectional. Use of longitudinal data can improve the understanding 
of the subject. Factors that influence satisfaction are ex-ante and ex-post in nature. This 
means that the use of data that represent different points of time can provide a rich source 
of information on satisfactions.  
 
Finally, this study is limited by investigating only inter-firm contractual relations and no 
other forms of contracts such as between firms and individuals. The perception of 
individual buyers when it comes to evaluation of purchase can vary significantly 
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compared to the industrial (firms) buyers. Our results are thus relevant to the transactions 
that involve firms rather than individuals.  
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APPENDIX 3 
 
CONSTRUCT ITEM SOURCE LOADING 
CONTRACTUAL 
SATISFACTION 
(CONTRSAT) 
α=.93 
CR =.94 
AVE=.81 
 
We feel that this contract provides the 
direction needed for this relationship 
 .842 
We feel that this contract can be 
enforced when problems arise 
.930 
We feel that this contract provides no 
room for cheating 
.936 
We do not feel that this contract 
needs to be changed 
.905 
TRUST 
α=.89 
CR=.91 
AVE=.79 
When an unexpected situation arises, 
the parties have a mutual 
understanding that a win-win solution 
will be found, even if it contradicts 
our formal agreements 
Carson et al. 
(2006) 
.830 
The parties hold mutual expectations 
that each will be flexible and 
responsive to requests from the other, 
even if not obliged to do so by our 
formal agreements 
.879 
Both parties understand each other 
when problems arise 
.862 
REPUTATION 
(REPT) 
α=.92 
CR=.92 
AVE=.68 
Quality of supplier's management is 
high 
 .840 
Quality of products and services of 
this supplier is high 
.762 
This supplier is performing well 
financially  
.798 
This supplier has the ability to attract, 
develop and keep talented people 
.814 
This supplier is socially and .846 
 
 
282 
 
environmentally responsible 
This supplier behaves ethically and is 
reliable 
.807 
This supplier is well respected in 
society 
.839 
BUYER-PERCEIVED 
OPPORTUNISM 
(OPPORT) 
α=.88 
CR=.92 
AVE=.73 
This supplier sometimes promises to 
do things and then fails to do them 
later 
Rokkan et 
al. (2003) 
.752 
This supplier rarely acts in 
accordance with our contract(s) 
.844 
This supplier sometimes tries to 
breach informal agreements we have 
made to maximize his own benefits 
.862 
This supplier sometimes uses 
unexpected events to his advantage 
.845 
This supplier rarely acts in 
accordance with our expectations 
.842 
CONTRACTUAL 
TERMS 
SPECIFICATIONS 
(TSPC) 
α=.87 
CR=.92 
AVE=.73 
Parties liabilities are well specified Luo (2002), 
Aubert et al. 
(2000), 
Hendrikse & 
Windsperger 
(2010) 
.879 
The responsibilities of the parties are 
well specified 
.786 
Information flow is well specified .834 
The confidentiality of information 
exchange is well specified 
.696 
ADAPTABILITY 
(ADAPT) 
α=.89 
CR=.93 
AVE=.81 
Arbitration procedures are well 
specified in our contract 
Luo (2002), 
Aubert  al. 
(2000) 
Hendrikse & 
Windsperger 
(2010) 
.809 
Renegotiation periods were planned 
before the relationship began 
.885 
The contract specifies major 
principles or guidelines for handling 
unanticipated contingencies as they 
arise 
.884 
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CHAPTER EIGHT
11
                                                     
CONTRACTUAL SATISFACTION  
THE POLISH AND TANZANIAN PERSPECTIVES 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Purpose: Inter-firm satisfaction has been studied at the aggregate level, which has limited 
use in terms of understanding specific dimensions. Contractual satisfaction relates to the 
specific level of evaluating inter-firm contractual relationships. This study contributes 
towards understanding contractual satisfaction and the contextual nature of the concept. 
To achieve the later, two heterogeneous emerging markets were used (Poland and 
Tanzania).  
Methodology: The study was conducted in Poland and Tanzania, focusing on 
manufacturing firms. The sample included 201 Polish firms and 240 Tanzanian firms. 
Findings: The major findings suggest that ex ante contractual efforts and ex post 
contractual specifications have a significant positive effect on contractual satisfaction, 
with a stronger effect in Poland. Behavioral uncertainty has a significant moderating 
effect on these two constructs in Tanzania but not in Poland, while the moderating effect 
of trust is found to be significantly positive in Poland but negative in Tanzania.  
Research Implications: The nature of markets and institutions has an influence on 
existing inter-firm contractual relationships  
Practical Implications: Contractual satisfaction is not homogeneous across markets; 
managers should pay attention to specific contextual factors such as institutions and the 
stage they are at in their transformation.  
Originality: The study looks specifically at contractual satisfaction and extends the 
contractual governance literature by considering heterogeneous emerging markets.
 
 
Keywords: 
Contractual satisfaction; ex ante contractual efforts; ex post contractual specifications; 
history; emerging markets   
                                                          
11
 Emmanuel Chao & Otto Andersen (2013), updated version of paper published in the Journal of business to 
business marketing, Vol. 20 (3), 155-173 
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8.0 Introduction 
Most studies on satisfaction are based on consumers. Satisfaction can be studied at the 
aggregated level or by looking at a specific dimension. In business-to-business relations, 
there is a range of dimensions by which satisfaction can be evaluated. Evaluating 
satisfaction via specific dimensions provides deeper and more practical insights, which 
may be relevant for strategic decisions. Contractual satisfaction refers to an ex post 
evaluation of inter-firm contractual relations.  
 
Normative expectations are a characteristic feature in most contractual relations. 
Studying contractual satisfaction will provide us with important drivers of these 
expectations. It is also important to study contractual satisfaction because most 
contractual relations are at the satisficing rather than the optimum level (Bolton & Faure-
Grimaud, 2010). This is due to the complex and dynamic environment in which they exist 
(Choi, Lee, & Kim, 1999). The complexity will vary in different institutional settings, 
forcing the parties to adjust with the context. 
 
Most studies have considered the aggregate level of satisfaction in business-to-business 
relations. This study makes two key contributions: one, relating to the concept of 
contractual satisfaction and its drivers and the other to the contextual interplay of the 
concept. Introducing contractual satisfaction into the study of inter-firm contractual 
relations represents a step toward explaining contractual governance choices and their 
expected outcomes. With respect to contextual influence, the study chooses two 
heterogeneous emerging markets. Apart from improving our theoretical understanding, 
emerging markets has recently become an interesting and growing area for research, due 
to their growth potential in global business. Two countries drawn from two different 
regions were selected for this study. The countries have unique features that will be of 
interest to both practitioners and researchers. This study is organized as follows; first we 
a concept of satisfaction and contractual satisfaction. We then provide a conceptual 
framework and hypothesis, followed by research method. The final section consists of the 
presentation of findings, discussion and conclusion.   
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8.1 Satisfaction and Contractual Satisfaction  
 
Industrial and relationship marketing literature on satisfaction have drawn much of the 
literature from consumer research. Consumer research on satisfaction (Cardozo, 1965, 
Churchill and Suprenant, 1982; Oliver, 1977, 1980; Tse & Wilton, 1988; Westbrook 
1981; Yi, 1991) views satisfaction in terms of response evaluation (Oliver and Swan, 
1989), judgement (Oliver, 1997) or feeling (Cadotte, Woodruff and Jenkins, 1987) 
resulted from consumption of a product or service. When such an 
evaluation/judgement/feeling exceeds the consumer’s prior expectations, the outcome is 
satisfaction; otherwise it is dissatisfaction (when prior expectations are below the actual 
outcome). This view of satisfaction is commonly referred to as a confirmation / 
disconfirmation paradigm (Churchill and Surprentant, 1982; Oliver, 1980). Westbrook 
(1987) specifically pointed out that satisfaction is a ‘‘global evaluative judgment about 
product usage/consumption’’ (p. 260).  
 
The industrial/business relations literature looks satisfaction at the organizational level as 
opposed to individual consumers. The view of satisfaction in the literature of 
industrial/business relations literature is the overall contentment (Andaleeb, 1996), 
positive affective state (Anderson and Narus, 1984), equity feeling (Benton and Maloni, 
2005) resulted from the evaluation of different elements in the relationship. Economic 
and social satisfaction has also been pointed out to be the main dimensions of satisfaction 
(Geyskens & Steenkamp, 2000). Economic satisfaction is ‘‘outcomes that flow from the 
relationship between partners, while social satisfaction is ‘‘evaluation of the 
psychological aspects of the relationship’’ (Geyskens & Steenkamp, 2000: 13).  
 
General versus Specific Satisfaction: In connection to the satisfaction views above, it is 
important to point out on the levels. Two common levels of studying satisfaction are: 
overall/global and transaction specific. Overall satisfaction covers evaluation across all 
experiences and services in a relationship (Jonsson & Zinelding, 2003). On the other 
hand transaction specific limits itself on a specific experience or service. There are few 
examples of studies that have looked at specific satisfaction levels. Most studies in both 
consumer (Cadotte, Woodruff and Jenkins, 1987; Churchill and Surprenant, 1982; Oliver, 
1997; Westbrook, 1980) and industrial/relationship marketing literature (Benton and 
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Maloni, 2005; Gassenheimer, Calantone & Scully, 1995; Geyskens, Steenkamp & 
Kumar, 1999; Ghijsen, Semeijn and Ernston, 2010; Jonsson & Zineldin, 2003; Ping, 
2003) have looked at general or global satisfaction. In assessing overall satisfaction, the 
feedback received has limited use due to inability to trace the specific attributes.   
 
At a management level, it is very helpful to obtain very specific dimensions that can be 
improved. Crosby and Stevens (1987) identified three levels of relationship satisfaction. 
These include; (1) interactions with personnel, (2) core service, (3) the organization. In an 
attempt to study specific elements of satisfaction, Spreng et al (1996) also introduced the 
concept of information satisfaction which they defined as a ‘‘subjective judgement of the 
information used in choosing a product’’ (pg. 18).  
 
Contractual satisfaction: This study introduces a concept of contractual satisfaction in 
line with the interaction level of relationship satisfaction (Crosby and Stevens, 1987). In 
inter-firm relations a contractual evaluation can be one of such specific level of 
evaluation. Contractual satisfaction refers to a positive feeling resulted from the fulfilled 
normative and agreed expectations in a relationship. In other words, contractual 
satisfaction is a transaction-specific and post-evaluation of the experience with a partner 
in a contractual relationship. As opposed to overall satisfaction (Anderson, & Sullivan, 
1993; Spreng et al., 1996) which evaluates experience across all services in the 
relationship (Jonsson & Zinelding, 2003), contractual satisfaction provides a practical 
feedback to decision makers because what is evaluated can be traced. Overall satisfaction 
is an aggregate of the specific attributes, making it is inadequate to portray an in-depth 
understanding of satisfaction/dissatisfaction at an attribute level. Contractual satisfaction 
is a transaction specific evaluation, thus it is a subset of overall satisfaction. Relationship 
satisfaction is also an aggregated (overall) evaluation that has also been studied in 
business relations literature.  Contractual satisfaction is thus a subset of an inter-firm 
relationship satisfaction, but its evaluation is entirely based on aspects that pertain to a 
contract. Contractual satisfaction worth studying, because it provides an in-depth 
understanding of satisfaction originating (linked) to a contract than relationship 
satisfaction.    
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8.1.1 Frameworks for studying satisfaction:  
Confirmation/disconfirmation paradigm: Satisfaction in consumer research has a strong 
tendency for applying well-established frameworks. The commonly used framework is 
the Confirmation/disconfirmation (C/D) paradigm. Oliver (1980) developed the paradigm 
as an outcome of interpreting the adaptation level theory by Helson (1969). This theory 
suggests that the perception of stimulus is relative to an adopted standard. The framework 
revolves around four constructs (expectation, performance, disconfirmation and 
satisfaction) but the key dimensions are expectation (provides bases for comparison or 
establishes standards against which performance can be evaluated) and performance (a 
standard by which disconfirmation can be evaluated). In this model, disconfirmation is an 
intervening variable. The performance or the confirmation of expectations side of the 
model is the one which is followed in most studies (Mittal, Ross, and Baldasare, 1998). 
The reason for this trend is the validity and scale problems (some items measuring 
expectation are also used in measuring performance). In general terms, satisfaction is 
determined by the consumers’ confirmation or disconfirmation of the expectations. In 
case of discrepancy between the expectation and actual experience, it will lead into 
disconfirmation (positive or negative). The positive confirmation is what result in 
satisfaction (the actual outcome exceeded the expectation). On the other hand the 
negative confirmation results in dissatisfaction (the actual outcome is below the 
expectation).    
   
Equity theory has also been used in assessing consumer satisfaction (Tse & Wilton, 
1988). Developed from Adams (1963), equity theory is different from the confirmation / 
disconfirmation paradigm that we have discussed above. This theory is relevant in 
assessing the exchange relations rather than one time or discontinuous involvement in 
consumption of services. Further, the theory is more relevant in the inter-firm relations, 
but with a limited capacity because the focus is on the equity or equal foot in the 
exchange relations rather than the quality of outcomes. Equity in this theory is 
determined by the ratio to which individual receive from an exchange (outcomes) to what 
they bring into the exchange (inputs). The individual differences in the perception of 
equity were brought into the theory by Huseman, Hatfield and Miles (1987). Individuals 
can change the equity level by adapting with their own inputs (Walster et al., 1973). 
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Norms have also been used in studying satisfaction (Woodruff et al, 1983). There are 
several types of norms. These include, for example brand-based and product-based norms 
(Woodruff et al, 1983), cultural norms (Morris, 1976). Norms differ with the 
expectations, and are guarded by consumer experience (Woodruff et al, 1983). The 
degree to which norms match with performance is a key determinant for satisfaction 
(Woodruff et al, 1983). Norms are very important in studying inter-firm relations because 
the perceptions of partners are the outcome of the experience of existing and past 
relations.  
 
 Attribution: The reasons to which user accounts for the failure has been used in 
examining satisfaction (Folkes, 1984). The attribution theory suggests the action of 
people (who are rational information processors) to be influenced by their causal 
inferences (Folkes, 1984). The reason for the product failure (Folkes, 1984) or any 
negative outcome is a function of the perception attached by the consumer concerning the 
cause for such discrepancy. This is also relevant in studying satisfaction because when 
consumers believe that the product malfunction is a result of their own ignorance; the 
response will be different compared to when such a belief is attached to the seller.   
 
Others models/frameworks: Models or frameworks that are used in industrial/channel 
relations extend beyond the ones that are dominantly used in consumer research. The 
models in the field of industrial/channel relations tend to include a range of theories and 
constructs. Theories involved are transaction cost and relational governance (Andaleeb, 
1996; Gassenheimer, Calantone & Scully, 1995; Jonsson & Zineldin, 2003; Razzaque & 
Boon, 2003) as well as institutional perspectives. Constructs that are mostly used in 
predicting satisfaction are trust (Andaleeb, 1996; Razzaque & Boon, 2003; Sanzo, 2003), 
power /dependence (Andaleeb, 1996; Benton and Maloni, 2005; Gassenheimer & 
Ramsey, 1994; Geyskens & Steenkamp, 2000; Ghijsen, Semeijn and Ernston, 2010; 
Jonsson & Zineldin,  2003; Razzaque & Boon, 2003), cooperation (Anderson & Narus, 
1990; Dwyer, 1980; Jonsson & Zineldin, 2003), communication (Jonsson & Zineldin, 
2003; Selnes, 1998), specific assets (Gassenheimer , Calantone & Scully, 1995; Ghijsen, 
Semeijn and Ernston, 2010), reputation (Jonsson & Zineldin, 2003), commitment (Selnes, 
1998), adaptation (Jonsson & Zineldin,  2003),  and norms (Gassenheimer, Calantone & 
Scully, 1995). Most of the highlighted constructs were found to influence satisfaction.  
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8.3 Conceptual Framework and Hypothesis 
Complexity of industrial transactions makes it difficult for objective evaluation of all 
aspects in the exchange, thus the specific evaluation of satisfaction with the contractual 
arrangement makes this feasible. Inter-firm contractual relations are both transaction and 
relationship oriented. Transaction cost theory focuses on assigning specific governance 
mode on the basis of low (economical) transaction costs (Heide, 1994; Williamson, 
1985a). Under the assumption of bounded rationality, key attributes of the transaction cost 
are asset specificity, uncertainty and frequency (Williamson, 1985a). Four of the central 
costs of transactions are searching, contracting, monitoring and enforcing costs (Hennart, 
1993; North, 1990; Williamson, 1985a). 
 
The most problematic of these dimensions is specific assets that generate a potential for 
opportunistic (self-seeking) behavior (Williamson, 1985a). The presence of specific assets 
in a relationship calls for formal contractual governance (Lui et al, 2009) although such a 
safeguard mechanism cannot completely ensure protection of assets (Williamson, 1975). 
Ex-ante efforts (costs) and structural composition are important elements in establishing 
contractual governance. Ex-ante efforts which reflect the partner and exchange features 
(Foss & Foss, 2010) together with ex-post contractual specification which addresses the 
contractual limitations (Chung, 1991) are important in determining the contractual 
satisfaction.  
 
Ex-ante efforts (costs) are those prior costs that are incurred in establishing the 
contractual governance. They include such aspects as searching and drafting costs. Ex-
post specifications (contingent adaptability) on the other hand, complements for the 
incomplete nature of contracts. Contractual governance literature suggests that contracts 
are not complete due to difficulties in specifying unforeseen future events (Williamson, 
1975). Part of the remedy for this limitation is the establishment of the contingent 
adaptability plan (ex-post contractual specification). Contingent adaptability is the same 
as ex-post contractual specification. In this paper we choose to use the term ex-post 
contractual specifications. Ex-post contractual specifications provide a guideline on how 
partners can deal with future contingencies. These specifications are considered to 
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positively influence contractual satisfaction because of their potential in lowering 
partners’ perceived future uncertainty.  
  
Behavioral uncertainty aspects of transaction cost are also important in the evaluation of 
contractual satisfaction. The behavioral assumption of transaction cost that human agents 
are opportunistic by nature (Williamson, 1975, 1991) is associated with problems with 
monitoring performance of exchange partners (Williamson, 1979).  Performance 
expectations form the bases for how partners evaluate their contractual satisfaction. 
Behavioral uncertainty can likely generate ill expectations which are associated with 
dissatisfaction (Grønhaug & Gilly, 1991). When the behavioral uncertainty increases, the 
perception concerning performance is negatively affected, thus contractual satisfaction 
will also be affected in the same direction.   
 
Closely related to the argument concerning behavioral uncertainty is trust.  
The rationalism which is based on mutual expectations (Cannon, Achrol &Gundlach, 
2000) has been viewed as a higher-order norm (Noordewier, 1990) that gives rise to other 
specific relational aspects. Trust as a dominant construct in most relational based 
literature is one of the relational-based norms (Argyres, 2007). The limitations of 
contractual governance make relational governance a significant in safeguarding specific 
assets (Poppo & Zenger, 2002). Trust provides health contractual relationship because 
partners tend to feel secure, thus their evaluation concerning contractual satisfaction will 
be positively favored. This observation is consistent with the literature on satisfaction 
(del Bosque Rodrı´guez, et al, 2006; Jonsson & Zinelding, 2003; Razzaque, 2003).   
 
Interaction relations of the above dimensions have important implications to contractual 
satisfaction. For example, behavioral uncertainty can lower the effect of ex-ante efforts 
on contractual satisfaction. Behavioral uncertainty can hardly be fully resolved by 
increasing ex-ante efforts. The implication is that, when the problem of behavioral 
uncertainty exists, the effect of ex-ante efforts on contractual satisfaction will decrease. 
On the other hand trust can increase the effect of ex-post specifications on contractual 
satisfaction. Both trust and ex-post specifications act in a same direction. While trust 
forms a relational complementary effect, ex-post specifications form an alternative 
mechanism to deal with future uncertainties. The combined effect will thus lead to 
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increased effect of ex-post specifications on contractual satisfaction, when there is trust in 
a relationship. It is also worth noting that trust is essential for successful adaptation.  
 
The role of institutions is important in shaping contractual satisfaction. Institutions can be 
defined as “regulative, normative, and cognitive structures and activities that provide 
stability and meaning to social behavior” (Scott, 1995: 33). Efficiency (North, 1990; 
Williamson, 1985b) and legitimacy (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Scott, 1995) are 
commonly known institutional poles.  
 
Recent statistics indicate that the proportion of the world’s manufacturing goods coming 
from emerging markets is increasing, while that from mature markets is falling 
(UNCTAD, 2012). This is an indicator of the growing role of emerging markets in the 
global economy. The shift of global business toward emerging markets calls for scholarly 
attention in integrating data from these markets to theoretical analysis. The hidden 
assumptions when conducting research in mature markets have been pointed out (Meyer 
& Peng, 2005), but the challenge remains as to how specific contextual aspects can be 
integrated into the theoretical development. One mechanism for achieving this is a 
comparison of findings from different contextual environments.   
 
For this comparison to work properly, the countries or regions that are compared need to 
have sufficient differences. One current limitation of the contextual comparisons made in 
most studies on business-to-business relations is the use of firms that originate from 
closely related regions. In this study, the countries selected come from regions that 
present distinctive features. Poland (from Central and Eastern Europe) and Tanzania 
(from Sub-Saharan Africa) are distinctive in many aspects.  
 
Eastern and Central Europe, for example, has been considered an attractive debt market 
since the Eurozone crisis (Oprita, 2012a), while Sub-Saharan Africa on the other hand 
has been named the region with the second highest economic prospects in the world for 
the years 2011-20 (Economist, 2011). The countries selected have also specific 
differences that make them interesting to study. With respect to economic performance, 
Poland was the only country in East and Central Europe to have post economic growth 
during the 2009 recession (Oprita, 2012a). On the other hand, Tanzania is ranked as one 
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of the fastest growing economies in Africa (Economist, 2011). It is also ranked among 
the top 15 countries in Africa in terms of FDI; these 15 countries have attracted 82% of 
new FDI projects in Africa since 2003 (Ernest & Young, 2012). In relation to culture, 
Poland and Tanzania are relatively similar in terms of power distance and long-term 
orientation, but differ in terms of individualism, masculinity and uncertainty avoidance 
(Hofstede, 2012), with Poland ranking higher in all three dimensions. 
 
Most studies involving relational dimensions tend to be more institutionally-based than 
those that involve technical aspects (Kiggundu, Jorgensen, and Hafsi, 1983). We expect 
the constructs that influence contractual satisfaction to vary across the two markets. For 
example, in some cases the dimensions like behavioral uncertainty can significantly vary 
due to cultural differences.   
 
Hofstede’s (1980) uncertainty avoidance aspect of culture can significantly influence 
firms’ perception of behavioral uncertainty. In advanced emerging markets, there are 
better mechanisms to deal with the problem of performance measurement than in less 
advanced emerging markets. Thus we can experience less effect of behavioral uncertainty 
on contractual satisfaction in advanced emerging markets and strong effect in less 
advanced ones. Other variables such as ex-ante costs, ex-post specifications and trust are 
expected to vary by their effects’ strength due to institutional contexts of the specific 
markets. This also applies to the interactive effects.  
 
The conceptual model presented in figure 18 below suggests that while trust, ex-post 
contractual specifications and ex ante costs have a positive impact on contractual 
satisfaction, behavioral uncertainty has a negative one. The model also suggests an 
interaction effect. Behavioral uncertainty is expected to decrease the effect of ex-post 
specifications on contractual satisfaction while trust will increase the effect of ex-ante 
costs on contractual satisfaction. The institutional context is also expected to influence 
the variations of the relations across the two markets. The control variables (size, 
Foreigness of supplier and network relations) were introduced in the model based on their 
theoretical relevance. We have controlled for size because the evaluation (such as 
satisfaction) is related to the size of the given firm (Backhaus & Bauer, 2001). Networks 
relations were used based on a positive link between network relations and satisfaction 
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(Ganesan, 1994). The foreignness of supplier was used due to its influence on trust in 
inter-firm relations (Shane, 1992). The detailed link between the specific constructs and 
contractual satisfaction is provided in the hypothesis section.   
 
 
Figure 18: Conceptual Model 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
8.3.1 Main effects on contractual satisfaction  
8.3.1.1 Behavioral uncertainty 
Behavioral uncertainty is likely to increase measurement costs (Rindfleisch, 1997). Due 
to the fact that most transactions refer to future performance, inadequate expectations 
regarding the behavior of partners can result in dissatisfaction (Grønhaug & Gilly, 1991).   
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With regard to the question of whether it is expectations or behavior that matters more, 
Gassenheimer, Calantone, and Scully (1995) indicated that the convergence between the 
two is what results in satisfaction. When the exchange partners make plans in relation to 
each other “that is the source of ex ante uncertainty and ex post surprises” (Williamson 
1985a: 57-58). Such uncertainty is likely to reduce satisfaction, and in addition it is likely 
to increase the measurement costs, which also may reduce contractual satisfaction.   
  
H1: Behavioral uncertainty will have a negative effect on contractual satisfaction. 
 
8.3.1.2 Ex-ante contractual efforts (costs) 
Ex ante contractual efforts are those that firms incur prior to a relationship in an attempt 
to establish contractual relations. They are often incurred in the process of obtaining 
guidance for the inter-firm relationship (Anderlini & Felli, 1999). This can include 
searching and contractual drafting (Hennart, 1993; North, 1990; Williamson, 1985a). The 
costs will increase with greater environmental complexity, especially in emerging 
markets (Choi et al., 1999). This increase in costs will lower the benefits of having 
“optimal contracts” (Segal, 1999) in some contexts. Ex ante contractual efforts can reflect 
both the nature of the transaction and of the parties involved (Foss & Foss, 2010). The 
main reason why firms incur ex ante contractual efforts is to ensure a certain satisficing 
level that is comfortable for carrying out a contractual relationship. Firms that provide 
some sunk costs for ensuring better contractual relations are more likely to be satisfied. 
Thus; 
 
H2: Ex ante contractual efforts will have a positive effect on contractual satisfaction. 
 
8.3.1.3 Ex-post contractual specifications (contingent adaptability) 
Ex post contractual specifications (contingent adaptability) are defined as guidelines 
provided in the contractual arrangement to deal with unexpected events. As opposed to ex 
ante contractual efforts, which are sunk costs that limit contractual failures, ex post 
contractual specifications are set within the contractual framework. A key role played by 
ex post contractual specification is the governance of contingent aspects so as to reduce 
the chances of a contractual failure.  
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In the real world, contracts operate under changing conditions which force parties to 
leave open options for future renegotiations (Williamson, 1975). Renegotiations are 
likely to vary across borders (Luo, 2005) due to institutional differences (Choi et al., 
1999). Grossman and Hart (1986) also noted the efficiency of ex post specifications 
under the assumption of infeasible ex ante written contracts. Initial agreements are 
generally “ex post inefficient” (Chung, 1991) and future dimensions of the transaction 
“may not be foreseeable at this initial stage” (Segal, 1999). This means that parties can 
likely gain from properly restructuring their agreements to include or specifying ex post 
options.  Due to a “lack of knowledge and resources in formulating complete contracts” 
(Grønhaug & Gilly, 1991: 169), ex post specifications can act as a substitute for complete 
contracts (Chung, 1991) and parties can gain by agreeing to restructure arrangements. Ex 
post specifications can thereby generate perceived satisfaction.  
 
H3: Ex post specifications will have a positive effect on contractual satisfaction. 
 
8.3.1.4 Trust 
Trust is defined as the ‘actors’ expectation of the other party’s capability, goodwill and 
self-reference in future situations involving risk and vulnerability (Blomqvist et al, 
2005:269). It is thought to play a power-balancing role (Arrighetti & Bachmann, 1996) in 
the development of long-term relationships. Different perspectives have been put forward 
in relation to trust, but the key ones suggest that trust is a “cognitive expectation, or 
affective sentiment, a risk-taking behavior or a willingness to engage in such behavior” 
(Smith & Barclay, 1997: 5). Because trust presents a psychological feeling about, or the 
perceived value of a relationship (Arrow, 1974), it is likely that partners will feel more 
secure and satisfied when trust exists in a relationship. In business-to-business relations, 
trust has also been found to have a positive association with satisfaction (Jonsson & 
Zinelding, 2003). Thus; 
 
 H4: Trust has a positive effect on contractual satisfaction  
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8.3.2 Interactive effects on contractual satisfaction 
 
8.3.2.1 Behavioral uncertainty and ex ante contractual efforts  
Apart from increased ex ante contractual efforts, perceived behavioral uncertainty also 
leads to lower contractual satisfaction due to perceptions of insecurity. This means that 
the effect of ex ante contractual efforts on contractual satisfaction can be reduced as a 
result of an escalating behavioral uncertainty. 
 
The reason for this is the increased divergence between expected and actual relational 
outcomes that is associated with an increase in behavioral uncertainty. Generally 
speaking, satisfaction will be close to ideal when partners’ expectations are close to the 
actual outcomes, a situation that is more likely when there is less behavioral uncertainty. 
Increasing ex ante contractual efforts under a situation of behavioral uncertainty can lead 
to dissatisfaction because the partners’ mind is turned towards disconfirmation. Thus, 
 
H5: Behavioral uncertainty has a stronger negative effect on contractual 
satisfaction when ex ante contractual efforts are higher than when ex ante 
contractual efforts are low. 
 
8.3.2.2 Trust and ex post specifications 
Since trust tends to act as an alternative control mechanism (Bradach & Eccles, 1989), its 
presence will have a significant impact on inter-firm relations (Andaleeb, 1996), in terms 
of influencing the partners’ perceptions of the contract (Arrow, 1974). This implies that 
the impact of ex post specifications on contractual satisfaction will also be greater when 
there is a high level of trust. Trust is an important ingredient, especially when dealing 
with future unexpected events. Ex post specifications deal with events that occur in the 
contractual execution period. For these arrangements to result in contractual satisfaction, 
atmosphere where the partners believe the adjustments are being made in good faith and 
for the benefit of all parties involved is essential. Under conditions of trust, ex post 
specifications will increase contractual satisfaction due to a feeling that the other partner 
is not taking advantage of the situation.  In other words, trust provides an internal 
assurance that the expectations will be met. In a situation where such expectations are not 
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met, the discrepancy is taken as an outcome of actions done in good faith. Such a sense of 
assurance is well connected to satisfaction. Thus;   
 
H6: Under high levels of trust, the effect of ex post specifications on contractual 
satisfaction will be strengthened.  
 
8.3.3 Controls 
8.3.3.1 Size 
The size of the firm has implications for the evaluation of satisfaction. Foa & Foa (1974) 
found that large firms are less likely to become dissatisfied when there is a discrepancy 
between the expected and actual results in comparison to small firms. Backhaus & Bauer 
(2001) noted the similar role of size in the evaluation of inter-firm transactions. Thus, we 
expect the firm’s size to have an influence on its contractual satisfaction.  
 
8.3.3.2 Foreignness of supplier 
Based on the role trust plays in satisfaction and the fact that the trust level is likely to 
vary in international relations (Shane, 1992); we expect foreignness of supplier to have an 
influence on contractual satisfaction.   
 
8.3.3.3 Networks 
Networks refer to the situation where “two or more organizations” (Thorelli, 1986: 37) 
are involved in a relationship. Researchers have recognized the importance of satisfaction 
in business relations, indicating that relations have an impact on satisfaction (Dwyer et 
al., 1987; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). There is a positive link between network relations 
and satisfaction (Ganesan, 1994), so we expect networks to have the same type of effect 
on contractual satisfaction.  
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8.4 Research Methods 
 
8.4.1 Research design 
This study used a cross-sectional survey in obtaining data from Tanzania and Poland, 
focusing on the manufacturing firms. This design was essential for collecting 
standardized information (Robson, 1996: 49) in a fast and efficient way (Zikmund et al, 
2010). Further, the study was designed for empirical analysis, thus the total sample size 
was relatively large in each country.   
 
8.4.2 Data collection method 
Data collection involves the process of obtaining the information or responses from 
targeted sample frame. This process can be varied (McQueen & Knussen, 2002) due to 
differences in the institutional settings. We used two countries with a focus on 
manufacturing firms in obtaining the information (the rationale for this context can be 
found in the introduction section), and thus the presentation of data collection processes 
will take into account the institutional aspects.   
 
In both countries (Tanzania and Poland) data were collected from the buying side of the 
dyadic relationships.  Data collection involved both primary (interviews and self-
administered questionnaires) and secondary sources (archives, reports, newspaper etc.). 
In the section below, we provide a detailed examination of these sources.  
 
8.4.2.1 Self-administered questionnaire 
Self-administered questionnaires were delivered through two common ways; electronic 
and paper based. In Poland we used electronic based distribution, while in Tanzania we 
used a paper based through personal delivery. The good global e-readiness ranking in 
Poland (Bilbao-Osorio et al, 2013) was a key factor that favored the use web based 
survey on delivering the questionnaires there. The web based survey in Poland was 
facilitated by SurveyXact data collection software. The software has several advantages, 
including monitoring the real time response and constraining the questions that are 
mandatory. In Tanzania, a paper based distribution was preferred due to low e-readiness 
rankings.  Further the institutional contexts (culture) in Tanzania prefer personal 
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communication than the in-person one, especially when dealing with sensitive 
information. The presence of the interviewer in the personal delivery can increase both 
the participation rate and the representativeness of the sample (Zikmund et al, 2010). In 
both countries, the telephone was also used in contacting potential respondent before 
delivering the questionnaires. This mechanism was important for lowering the non-
response rate. In addition, the reminders were sent in Poland (two times), while in 
Tanzania, follow-ups were made personally.   
 
8.4.2.2 Personal-interview 
Personal interview was conducted in Tanzania using anonymous firm, so as to gain a 
better insight on the nature of the problem. The assumption for not including Poland in 
this preliminary interview was the availability of prior researches which were performed 
in a related context. An interview is a purposeful conversation (Robson, 1996), thus the 
key aspects that were focused on the interview was those that reflected the concept of the 
study. The interview was semi-structured, so as to allow the respondent flexibility in 
raising other issues along the main questions. The interview lasted for about one hour.  
 
8.4.2.3 Documentary review 
The use of secondary data was important for developing a contextual argument for the 
heterogeneity of the economies. The secondary sources included both online and offline 
data ranging from reports, newspapers, archives and similar sources.  Reputation of data 
agencies was given a key priority. The choice of reputable sources was motivated by 
reliability and validity concerns. Most of secondary data agencies included reputable 
organizations such as the World Bank, United Nations, World Economic Forum, The 
Economist, Transparency International and national portals of respective nations.  
 
8.4.3 Sample selection 
The sample was mainly obtained from the population of manufacturing firms in Tanzania 
and Poland. In Poland a sample frame of 1800 firms was targeted (From directory of 
Poland companies, 2011), while Tanzania the targeted sample frame was about 750 firms 
(Listed companies in Tanzania Revenue Authority, 2011). The choice of sample units 
was purposive but we introduced a random selection of transaction (exchange) units 
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which respondents based on their responses. When a focus is on exchange, it is possible 
to induce the randomness in the selection of a particular exchange that can be evaluated.  
 
This was done by instructing respondents to choose between first, second or largest 
supplier before answering the questionnaires. This implies that each exchange had equal 
chances of being selected by the respondent. Such a mechanism is feasible in studies 
related to contracts because the focus is on the exchange. The general concern for this 
form of choice is bias (Bryman, 2004), which in most cases is assumed to result from the 
researcher. The bias was not a critical problem with this form of selection because 
responses originated from various sample units and each is assumed to be independent.  
 
8.4.4 Data profile 
Table 16 below provides a summary of data profile for the both countries. The profile 
information covers; sample size, response rate, average number of employees, average 
annual sales, average purchase frequency, length of the relationship and nature of 
partners involved.  
 
Table 16: Data Profiles 
Item Tanzania  Poland 
Sample size 240 201 
Response rate 31.25% 33% 
Average number of employees 1,020 255 
Average annual sales (USD) 7,270,004 16, 558, 089 
Average purchase frequency (per month) 6 5 
Minimum length of relationship (year) 1 1 
Number of subsidiaries of international 
companies 
5.4% 11% 
Number of joint ventures with international 
partners 
8.4% 8.7% 
Number of domestic companies owned by 
local citizens 
57.1% 56.5% 
Number of foreign suppliers 29.2% 23% 
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8.4.5 Measurements 
 
A list of the measures employed in this study is provided in the appendix 4, including 
information on loadings, Cronbach’s alpha, composite reliability and average variance 
extracted for both countries.  
 
To ensure reliability, an exploratory followed by a confirmatory factor analysis were 
conducted. For confirmatory factor analysis of predictor variables we used AMOS 19 to 
estimate the structural model. In each country we obtained two models; the freely 
estimated and constrained model. The freely estimated model for Poland [chi-square= 
306 (df= 125, p=.000), NFI=.89, TLI=.91, CFI=.93, RMSEA=.085, PCLOSE=.000] and 
Tanzania [chi-square= 613 (df= 250, p=.000), NFI=.89, TLI=.91, CFI=.93, RMSEA=.06, 
PCLOSE=.003] performed poorly, while the constrained model for Poland [chi-square= 
185(df= 122, p=.000), NFI=.93, TLI=.97, CFI=.98, RMSEA=.05, PCLOSE=.44] and 
Tanzania [chi-square= 371 (df= 244, p=.000), NFI=.93, TLI=.97, CFI=.98, 
RMSEA=.036, PCLOSE=.999] fitted well the data. In both constrained models we 
allowed for correlation of error terms in some factors (Kline, 2005). Most of the 
constructs used had been developed and tested in previous studies, including the controls 
(size of firm, the foreignness of the supplying firm and networks). However, some 
constructs were adjusted to fit the new context.  
 
Contractual satisfaction (CONTRSAT) was reflectively measured with a 
multidimensional construct (Brown, Lusch, & Smith, 1991; Geyskens & Steenkamp, 
2000; Ruekert & Churchill, 1984; Schul, Little, & Pride, 1985). This is consistent with 
the satisficing perspective of contracts (Bolton & Faure-Grimaud, 2010) but new items 
were developed to fit the present context. Six items were used to measure the concept and 
four of them were retained. The items that were dropped had low loadings in the initial 
factor analysis. The confirmatory factor analysis indicated that the two items were not 
good measures for the concept. The validity of performance-based satisfaction 
measurement has been shown to work particularly well in situations where customers 
have extensive experience with the object being evaluated (Yi, 1993; Patterson,1993). 
This applies especially in business-to-business relationships.  
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Behavioral uncertainty (BU) reflects the degree of difficulty associated with assessing the 
performance of a transaction partner (Rindfleisch, 1997). The measures used in 
measuring this concept were adopted from Buvik & Andersen (2002). This study used 
five items in measuring the concept. After performing a factor analysis, four items were 
retained and one was deleted due to low factor loading. The range of factor loading was 
from 0.86 to 0.89 in Tanzania and 0.75-0.79 in Poland.  
 
Ex ante contractual efforts (ECE) reflect both the financial and non-financial expenses 
incurred by the buyer prior to the commencement of the relationship with the supplier. 
The measures used in this study are consistent with Segal (1999) view on ex-ante efforts, 
but new measures were added to fit the study context. Five items were used in measuring 
the concept. After performing a factor analysis, all the items were retained. The range of 
factor loadings was from 0.71 to 0.84 in Tanzania and 0.77-0.91 in Poland.  
 
 
Ex post contractual specifications (EPS) reflect the degree to which specifications are 
made to deal with future problems or contingencies in the contractual relationship. Such 
specifications are made ex ante. This study developed new measures for this construct 
consistent with Segal (1999). Four items were used to measure this concept. After 
performing a factor analysis, three were retained and one was deleted due to low factor 
loading. The range of factor loadings was from 0.85 to 0.88 in Tanzania and 0.95-0.97 in 
Poland.  
 
Trust measures were adapted from Carson, Madhok, and Wu (2006). The concept was 
measured using seven items reflecting the degree to which the partners have mutual 
expectations and understanding. After performing factor analysis, three items were 
retained and four were deleted due to low factor loadings. The range of factor loadings 
was from 0.87 to 0.90 in Tanzania and 0.88-0.93 in Poland.  
 
Size of firm was measured by the number of employees. 
The foreignness of supply firm (FC) was measured with a dummy variable set to 1 if the 
supply firm was foreign and 0 otherwise.  
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Network relations (NEWREL) focus on the connection between firms (Holm et al., 1996; 
Mitchell, 1973; Nohria & Eccles, 1992). Four items were used to measure this concept. 
After performing a factor analysis three items were retained and one was deleted due to 
low factor loading. The range of factor loadings was from 0.83 to 0.91 in Tanzania and 
0.67-0.93 in Poland.  
 
8.4.6 Data analysis 
Data analysis was mainly quantitative. Two data analysis software (SPSS 19 and AMOS 
19) was used in entering and the analysis of data. Data were first entered into SPSS19 
and cleaned for outliers, missing variables, and non-normality problems. Preliminary data 
analysis was conducted. At first an exploratory factor analysis was conducted via 
SPSS19. Most concepts have been established in previous research, thus we selected the 
factors that had scores of .50 or above. After the initial results from the exploratory tests, 
we conducted a confirmatory factor analysis test using AMOS19. The final constructs 
were those which the findings are built on. The task of testing the specific relations 
involved different techniques, such as ordinary least square regression, structural 
equation modeling and ANOVA.  
 
Multiple regression analysis can be faced with Measurement and specification errors.  
We resolved both errors by using the summated scales and variables that have a strong 
theoretical base respectively (Hair et al., 2010). ANOVA was used to compare the 
differences in the variables’ impact across the two countries.  For comparison purpose, 
the data were standardized using means for the two countries (Aiken & West, 1991). We 
also supplemented this test with the effect size computation and chow tests (Matsumoto 
et al., 2001). These tests provided the relevant information which was not captured in 
ANOVA. We also tested for the interaction effects. The variables involved in interaction 
tests were mean centered and the results were plotted in graphs (Aiken & West, 1991).  
 
8.4.7 Validity 
Validity is a key issue that needs to be addressed in social sciences research because it 
deals with the degree to which a measure is accurately represented (Hair et al, 2010). The 
commonly tests include; discriminant, convergent, and nomological validity.  
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We assessed discriminant validity using Fornell and Larcker’s (1991) rigorous test 
(Anderson & Gerbing, 1993). The test supports for discriminant validity when the 
average variance extracted (AVE) for two factors are greater than the square of the 
correlation between the two factors). The results presented in tables 17 and 18 confirm 
this test.  Factor loadings and construct validity were used to test for convergent validity. 
The rule of thumb suggests the factor loadings of .5 or greater and construct reliability of 
.7 or higher (Nunnally, 1978; Hair et al., 2010). All factors loadings and construct 
reliability (CR) fulfilled these rules of thumb (results are available in the appendix 4), 
thus confirming the convergent validity.  We inspected the inter-item correlations if they 
make sense, as a procedure for testing nomological validity (Hair et al., 2010) and the 
results confirmed for nomological validity (the inter-item correlations had a theoretical 
sense).  
 
8.4.8 Reliability 
In addition to validity test, reliability test is conducted to ensure that the observed 
variable to a large degree measures the ‘‘true’’ value and is ‘‘error’’ free (Hair et al., 
2010:8). The two key alternatives for testing reliability according to Hair and colleagues 
(2010), these include; (1) to relate each separate item, including the item to total 
correlation. Rules of is that the item-to-total correlations should exceed .50 and that the 
inter item correlations exceed .30; (2) is reliability coefficient, which assesses the 
consistency of the entire scale with correlation alpha, being most widely used measure. 
The generally agreed lower limit for cronbach’s alpha is .70, although it may decrease to 
.60 in exploratory research. This study fulfilled the above mentioned ruled of thumb, thus 
confirming the reliability (see appendix 4).    
 
Further, we conducted a collinearity check. When multicollinearity exists in the empirical 
studies, the interpretations become less reliable (Hair et al, 2010). The problem can be 
assessed by tolerance and its inverse (the variance inflation factor). According to Hair 
and colleagues (2010), the cutoff point is Tolerance of .01 (corresponding to VIF value of 
10.0). The maximum VIF for this study was 1.6 and 2.29 for polish and Tanzanian model 
respectively (table 19). This indicates the study did not suffer from a multicollinearity 
problem.  
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Table 17: Tanzania Correlations 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
1.CONTRSAT   0.60           
2.BU   -.35
**
 0.67          
3.ECE   .34
**
 -.20
**
 0.61         
4.EPS   .22
**
 -.09 .30
**
 0.63        
5.TRUST   .14
*
 .27
**
 .17
**
 .20
**
 0.60       
6.ECEXBU   -.19
**
 .04 .13
*
 -.10 .13
*
 na      
7.EPSXBU   -.18
**
 .17
**
 -.10 .04 .16
*
 .47
**
 na     
8.EPSXTRUST   -.44
**
 .17
**
 -.29
**
 -.12 .19
**
 .12 .19
**
 na    
9.SIZE   -.23
**
 -.07 -.18
**
 -.24
**
 -.10 .16
*
 .19
**
  .35
**
 na   
10.FC   .05 -.25
**
 -.04 -.08 .07 .07 .02 .07 .14
*
 na  
11.NEWREL   .08 .16
*
 -.03 .09 -.44
**
 -.13
*
 .02 -.28
**
 -.06 -.24
**
 .80 
MEAN  
3.96 2.32 4.01 3.94 3.54 -.14 -.08  .17 1965.40  .29 2.73 
SD  
 .82 1.02  .70  .84 1.00  .70  .83  .80 14906.71  .46 1.13 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
N=201. Diagonal elements in bold are the average variance extracted for constructs measured reflectively with multiple items, while the off diagonal elements 
are the square of correlations 
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Table 18: Poland Correlations 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
1.CONTRSAT   0.70           
2.BU   -.13 0.65          
3.ECE   .16
**
 -.09 0.61         
4.EPS   .29
**
 -.11 .35
**
 0.87        
5.TRUST   .24
**
 -.02 .20
**
 .22
**
 0.60       
6.ECEXBU   .13 -.09 .05 .16
*
 .01 na      
7.EPSXBU   .10 .00 .15
*
 .02 -.01 .50
**
 na     
8EPSXTRUST   .05 -.01 .00 .24
**
 -.09 .27
**
 .04 na    
9.SIZE   -.03 .03 .01 -.06 -.10 -.01 -.02 .06 na   
10.FC   -.11 .03 .01 -.14 -.04 .02 -.05 .04 .15
*
 na  
11.NWREL   .28
**
 -.11 .29
**
 .28
**
 .16
*
 .15
*
 .12 .02 .03 .05 .80 
MEAN  3.65 2.85 3.04 3.16 3.83 -.09 -.10  .15 255.43  .22 2.66 
SD  .84  .91 1.09 1.03  .66 1.23 1.23  .86 1444.83  .42 1.31 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
N=201. Diagonal elements in bold are the average variance extracted for constructs measured reflectively with multiple items, while the off diagonal elements 
are the square of correlations 
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8.5 Results 
The results shown in table 19 below were obtained by entering variables in the regression models in a stepwise procedure, 
starting with the control variables, then including the independent variables, and finally including the interaction terms. Data 
were pooled when comparing constructs for the two countries, but the regression equations used separate data for each 
country. 
Table 19: Regression Results 
 POLAND TANZANIA 
INDEPENDENT 
VARIABLES 
MODEL1 MODEL2 MODEL3 MODEL1 MODEL2  MODEL3 
β t β t β t β t β t β t 
Controls             
FC -.12 -1.68* -.04 -.80 -.04 -.71 .10 1.5* .04 .85 .03 .58 
SIZE -.02 -.03 .035 .67 .04 .73 -.24 -3.8*** -.12 -2.40** .03 .66 
NEWREL .29 4.25*** .07 1.30 .06 1.10 .09 1.4* .23 3.90 .13 2.5** 
Main effects             
BU (H1)   -.06 -1.23 -.06 -1.21   -.36 -6.5*** -.33 -6.37** 
ECE (H2)   .13 2.15** .12 1.91**   .32 5.3*** .23 3.67*** 
EPS (H3)   .40 6.64*** .41 6.3***   .22 3.5*** .18 2.91** 
TRUST (H4)   .37 6.90*** .37 6.81***   .22 3.63*** .24 4.48*** 
Interactive effects             
ECE x BU (H5)     -.02 -.37     -.15 -3.33*** 
EPS x TRUST(H6)     .090 1.8**     -.24 -4.62*** 
R
2 .09*** .47*** .54*** .07*** .51*** .61*** 
 Adj.R
2 
.081*** .4*** .51*** .06*** .49*** .59*** 
F-value 6.85*** 26.5 21.8*** 5.71*** 33.81*** 35.45*** 
Incremental R
2 
- .508*** .04*** - .44*** .10*** 
F1 - 37.5*** 6.03*** - 51*** 20*** 
Maximum VIF 1.03 1.36 1.6 1.10 1.78 2.29 
                       N= 201                        ***p<0.01                      **p<0.05              *p<0.1        F1 =F-value of incremental R
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The reason for not pooling the data for the regressions was to maintain a rich source of 
information throughout the analysis. Each country has specific contextual factors which 
affect the measurements. This approach has an advantage not only for those who will be 
interested in our main results, but also for those who are interested in measurement issues 
across countries. In the analysis of the interactive effects, all the variables were mean-
centered (Aiken & West, 1991). Three regression models were used.       
 
Model 1 (Poland: R
2
Adj=0.09, F (198, 3) =6.85, p<0.001; Tanzania: R
2
Adj=0.06, F (237, 
3) =5.71, p<0.001) included the control variables only. Model 2 (Poland: R
2
Adj=0.40, F 
(194, 7) =26.5, p<0.001; Tanzania: R
2
Adj=0.49, F (233, 7) =33.81, p<0.001) included the 
main effects. Model 3 (Poland: R
2
Adj=0.51, F (191, 10) =21.8, p<0.001; Tanzania: 
R
2
Adj=0.61, F (230, 10) =35.45, p<0.001) included the interactive variables, the controls 
and the main effects. The incremental R
2
Adj of M2-M1 (Poland: ∆R2Adj=0.508, 
p<0.001; Tanzania: ∆R2Adj=0.44, p<0.001) and of M3-M2 (Poland: ∆R2Adj=0.04, 
p<0.001; Tanzania: ∆R2Adj=0.10, p<0.001) were significant. 
 
Model 3 is used to report the results of hypotheses. In addition to an independent sample 
t-test, a Chow test was also performed to confirm whether there was a significant 
difference between the regression equations for the two countries. The results of the 
Chow test indicated an overall as well as specific variable differences between the two 
countries that are significant (p<0.001). To test for multicollinearity, VIF values were 
calculated and were in the range of 1.1-2.29, suggesting that the study does not suffer 
from multicollinearity problems.   
 
8.5.1 Main effects 
H1 suggested that behavioral uncertainty has a negative effect on contractual satisfaction. 
This hypothesis was supported (table 19) in Tanzania (β=-0.33, t=-6.37, p<0.01) but not 
in Poland (β=-0.06, t=-1.21, p>0.1). Further inspection (table 20 and figure 19) reveals 
that the effect size of behavioral uncertainty is significantly higher in Poland (M=2.85, 
SD=0.914) than in Tanzania (M=2.3, SD=2.3), t (437) =5.7, p<0.001, d=0.5). 
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H2 suggested that ex ante contractual efforts have a positive effect on contractual 
satisfaction. This hypothesis was supported (table 19) in Poland (β=0.12, t=1.91, p<0.05) 
and in Tanzania (β=0.23, t=3.67, p<0.01). Assessing the differences in the observed 
results, table 20 (and figure 19) indicate that the impact of ex ante contractual effort was 
higher in Tanzania (M=4.01, SD=0.700) than in Poland (M=3.04, SD=1.09), t (327) = 
11.2, p<0.001, d=1.05).  
 
H3 suggested that ex post contractual specifications have a positive effect on contractual 
satisfaction. This hypothesis was supported (table 19) in Poland (β=0. 41, t=6.3, p<0.01) 
and in Tanzania (β=0.18, t=2.91, p<0.05). Further inspection (table 20 and figure 19) 
reveals that, although ex post contractual specifications in Tanzania were higher 
(M=3.94, SD=1.003) than in Poland (M=3.16, SD=.84), t (437) = 2.5, p<0.001), the 
effect was significantly stronger in Poland.   
 
H4 suggested that trust has a positive effect on contractual satisfaction. This hypothesis 
was supported (table 19) in Poland (β=0. 37, t=6.81, p<0.01) and in Tanzania (β=0.24, 
t=4.48, p<0.05). Further inspection (table 20 and figure 19) reveals relatively higher trust 
levels among firms in Poland (M=3.83, SD=0.66) than in Tanzania (M=3.54, SD=1.00), t 
(416) = 3.6, p<0.001, d=0.34).  
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Table 20 
Assessing Effect Size by Country Using an Independent Sample T-Test 
VARIABLE COUNTRY M* SD t df d r  P 
ECE PL 3.04 1.09 -11.2 327 1.05 .5 <.001 
TZ 4.01 .700 
BU PL 2.85 .914 5.7 437 .5 .3 <.001 
TZ 2.3 1.02 
NEWREL PL 2.66 1.3 -.65 439 .06 .03 >.05 
TZ 2.73 1.13 
EPS PL 3.16 1.03 2.5 437 .83 .4 <.001 
TZ 3.94 .84 
TRUST PL 3.83 .66 3.6 416 .34 .2 <.001 
TZ 3.54 1.00 
FC PL .22 .42 -1.62 439 -.16 -.08 p>.05 
TZ .29 .46 
SIZE PL 255.43 1444.83 -1.62 439 -.16 -.08 p>.05 
TZ 1965.40 14906.71 
* Mean value used was based on original values, PL=Poland, TZ= Tanzania, d=Cohen 
d, r=effect size 
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Figure 19 
Comparison of Main Effects 
 
Note: Values above and below bars are the significance levels; negative values 
indicate a negative effect and positive values a positive effect.  
 
8.5.2 Interactive effect 
To test for the interaction effect, all the variables were mean centered.  
H5 suggested that, behavioral uncertainty has a stronger negative effect on contractual 
satisfaction when ex ante contractual efforts are higher than when ex ante contractual 
efforts are low. Results from table 19 indicates that this hypothesis was supported in 
Tanzania (β=-0.15, t=-3.33, p<0.001) but not in Poland (β=0.02, t=0. 37, p>0.05).  
Figures 20 and 21 provide a graphical presentation for Poland and Tanzania respectively.  
 
H6 suggested that the interaction between ex post specifications and trust has a positive 
effect on contractual satisfaction. This hypothesis is supported (table 19) in Poland 
(β=0.09, t=1.8, p<0.05) but not in Tanzania (β=-0.24, t=-4.62, p<0.01). In Tanzania, the 
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values are significant but the effect is in the opposite direction to that expected. Figure 22 
suggests that, in Poland, ex post contractual specifications have a positive effect on 
contractual satisfaction and the effect is greater when trust is high. For Tanzania, figure 
23 suggests that ex post contractual specifications have a negative effect on contractual 
satisfaction, with that effect being greater when trust is high.  
 
Figure 20 
Effects of Behavioral Uncertainty and Ex ante contractual efforts on Contractual 
Satisfaction (Poland) 
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Figure 21 
Effects of Behavioral Uncertainty and Ex ante contractual efforts on Contractual 
Satisfaction (Tanzania) 
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Figure 22 
Effects of Trust and Ex Post Specifications on Contractual Satisfaction (Poland) 
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Figure 23 
Effects of Trust and Ex Post Specifications on Contractual Satisfaction (Tanzania) 
 
 
8.5. 3 Controls 
Size and the foreignness of supply firm did not have significant influence on contractual 
satisfaction in both countries, while network relations was found to have a significant 
positive effect on contractual satisfaction in Tanzania (β=0.13, t=2.5, p<0.05) but not in 
Poland (β =0.06, t=1.10, p>0.1) (table 19, model 3).  
 
8.6 Discussion 
This study has focused on contractual satisfaction and thus the discussion below provides 
a link between the dimensions that influence contractual satisfaction and the role of the 
institutional context. Further, the analysis and the subsequent discussion provide a 
theoretical structured response to contractual governance choices. Behavioral uncertainty 
is a critical variable in inter-firm relations because it is linked to performance evaluation 
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is partly a function of culture. The Hofstede’s index (2012) shows a large difference in 
uncertainty avoidance between Tanzania and Poland.  
In an uncertainty avoidance culture, the level of uncertainty is normally perceived to be 
higher than it is in low uncertainty avoidance cultures. This was consistent with the 
relatively low level of perceived behavioral uncertainty in Tanzania (which has low 
uncertainty avoidance) compared to Poland (with higher uncertainty avoidance). 
Behavioral uncertainty had a negative impact on contractual satisfaction in Tanzania but 
not in Poland. This suggests the influence of behavioral uncertainty on contractual 
satisfaction is context dependent. The increased level uncertainty is uncomfortable for 
consumer (partners). Grønhaug and Gilly (1991) found out in their study that 26% of 
dissatisfaction problems were behavioral related. They also found that about 82% of 
dissatisfaction comes from institutional arrangements. The higher uncertainty avoidance 
firm tends to be selective, thus ending up with better and well searched contractual 
relations. On the other hand, the low uncertainty avoidance firm will tend to spend little 
efforts in coming up with well-structured contractual relations, leading to dissatisfaction.  
Ex post contractual specifications are expected to make a positive contribution to 
contractual satisfaction. Adaptations that partner will undergo in the relationship are 
normally specified in the contracts (Jonsson & Zineldin, 2003). Adaptation whether 
formally specified or informally, provides a signal of the willingness to cooperate 
(Ganesan, 1994). Adaptation can also influence the willingness to customize (Doney & 
Cannon, 1997). There was a higher level of ex post contractual specifications in Tanzania 
than in Poland (in terms of mean differences). This can partly be explained by the 
institutional differences of the low-versus high context culture in the two countries. In a 
high-context culture, an explicit meaning is very important in the message, while in low-
context culture, things are specified in much detail (Larsen et al., 2002). High context 
cultural societies include; Asia, Middle East, Africa and South America, while North 
America and Europe are considered low-context cultures (see Larsen et al., 2002). 
Tanzania and Poland can be considered as high and low-context cultures respectively. In a 
high context culture, the contracts are less detailed (Larsen et al., 2002) and parties rely 
more on verbal and non-verbal communication.  
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In situations with weaker formal institutions, a larger role tends to be played by informal 
ones. This role can be reflected in the contractual designs where most aspects of the 
contracts are ex-post negotiable. With respect to satisfaction, the findings suggested that a 
high level of ex post specifications leads to higher levels of contractual satisfaction. In 
Tanzania, where the ex post specifications were higher; contractual satisfaction was 
higher than in Poland. A possible explanation could be that when markets move towards a 
market economy, transactions tend to be impersonal and results into constraints in ex-post 
term specifications.  
 
Closely related to ex-post contractual specifications is ex-ante contractual effort. High ex 
ante contractual efforts are prevalent in more formalized market economies (Dwyer et al., 
1987). In situations where a purely market form has been chosen, ex post contractual 
specifications will have a negative effect on contractual satisfaction. There has not been 
systematic evidence on how transaction cost impacts on satisfaction. Grønhaug & Gilly 
(1991) looked at consumer satisfaction from the transaction cost perspective. Trust has an 
important role when it comes to inter-firm contractual relations. The positive impact of 
trust on satisfaction is consistent with the past studies (Andaleeb, 1996; Anderson and 
Narus, 1990; Caceres & Paparodimis, 2007; Razzaque & Boon, 2003; Sanzo, 2003). 
Contracts aim at lowering the potential risks and vulnerability in a relationship. Such 
contractual expectancy when covered by trusting relationship, the result is satisfaction. 
Thus, contracts formulate bases for expectations. Depending on the partners perception 
along the relationship this expectation can be a success or failure. When complemented 
with trust, the failure from these perceptions is minimized.   
 
The results on the effects of an interaction between ex post contractual specifications and 
trust indicated that the presence of trust in Poland leads to a significant positive impact of 
ex post contractual specifications on contractual satisfaction, the effect being stronger as 
the trust level rises. This effect was not supported in Tanzania. For Tanzania (where there 
was a significant negative effect), the effect of ex post contractual specifications was 
contingent upon other relational dimensions. Ex post contractual specifications might 
signal a lack of trust and result in dissatisfaction, but this was not the case in Poland. As 
markets become more formal, contractual dimensions have mixed effects on the existing 
channel relations.   
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The findings on the direct impact of trust on satisfaction is well supported in the literature 
(Doucette, 1996; Mohr and Spekman (1994) but the interaction with ex-post contractual 
specifications is what of interest. The discussion on high versus low context culture can 
be useful in explaining the differences in the interaction effects between the two 
countries. In a low context culture (such as Poland) ex-post specifications give a good 
combination with trust because, the partner will feel more secure with an increased level 
of details. On the other hand, in a high context culture (such as Tanzania), ex-post 
specifications do not make a good combination with trust because the increased level of 
details in handling the anticipated outcomes can symbolize a lack of trust. This finding 
generally suggests that in a low context culture, trust and ex-post contractual 
specifications leads into contractual satisfaction whether in separate or in combination. 
On the other hand, in a high context culture, ex-post specifications and trust lead to 
contractual satisfaction when operating as separate dimensions and not in combination.  
  
8.6.1 Managerial implications 
Whether in relation to products and services or to information, satisfaction is a key driver 
of cooperation and continuity in inter-firm relations. Understanding its drivers is of 
relevance in setting up proper governance that will ensure that both specific assets and 
fragile relational dimensions are safeguarded. Perceived contractual satisfaction is not 
assumed to be the same across markets. This is due to specific institutional arrangements 
relating to where a particular market stands in the transformation process. While most 
firms focus on safeguarding, firms that focus on both safeguards and relational aspects 
will gain more contractual satisfaction.  
 
Behavioral uncertainty can turn the benefits of relational dimensions into disadvantages. 
Managers therefore need to focus on resolving the problem of perceived uncertainty by 
being more open, as this will allow them to enjoy the benefits of the relational aspects of 
inter-firm contractual relations. Finally, ex post contractual specifications will generally 
be more beneficial in terms of contractual satisfaction among parties that trust each other. 
However, this is not necessarily the case for all economies. In less advanced emerging 
markets, behavioral uncertainty has a significant negative impact on contractual 
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satisfaction and, when there is a high level of trust between the partners, greater ex post 
contractual specifications will likely result in lower contractual satisfaction.  
 
Ex post contractual specifications leads to contractual satisfaction in a situation 
dominated with trust.  In relatively less advanced emerging economies, it seems that one 
can rely on relations and ex-post specifications, especially in situations when behavioral 
uncertainty is considered higher.  
    
8.6.2 Limitation of the study 
The study has used institutional context without detailed analysis of specific institutional 
dimensions and their connection to contractual satisfaction. Future studies can extend to 
such analysis by looking, for example the role of culture in contractual satisfaction. The 
current study has only examined the contractual satisfaction.  The comparison of different 
satisfaction levels can provide a broad theoretical insight. The nature of satisfaction 
evaluated involved firms that have formal contractual relations, which can limit the 
generalizability to every inter-firm relationship.  Further, cross-sectional data have been 
used for analyzing the results. The use of panel data can give more information which 
cannot be captured in a cross-sectional setting. The number of countries and firms used 
are also limited (few countries are used and the focus is on manufacturing firms). Future 
studies can extend the analysis at the level of the country. This will make it possible to 
involve specific institutional dimensions in the analysis.   
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Appendix 4 
CONSTRUCTS ITEMS SOURCES TZ 
LOADINGS 
PL 
LOADINGS 
CONTRACTUAL 
SATISFACTION 
αTZ=0.85 
CRTZ=0.85 
AVETZ=0.60 
 
αPL=0.93 
CRPL=0.94 
AVEPL=0.79 
 
We feel that this contract provides the 
direction needed for this relationship 
 .812 .842 
We feel that this contract could be enforced 
should a problem arise 
.874 .930 
We feel that this contract does not provide 
room for cheating 
.817 .936 
We do not feel that this contract needs to 
be changed 
.826 .905 
BEHAVIORAL 
UNCERTAINTY 
αTZ= 0.90 
CRTZ=0.89 
AVETZ=67 
 
αPL=0.77 
CRPL=0.88 
AVEPL=0.65 
We are uncertain about how our supplier 
organizes the resources they use to produce 
the product(s) we buy from them 
Buvik & Andersen 
(2002) 
.873 .773 
Our knowledge about our supplier’s 
production process is limited 
.885 .794 
We have little knowledge of the terms of 
trade the supplier offers to other buyers 
.883 .755 
It is difficult to interpret how this supplier 
perceives the present relationship with our 
firm 
.863 .753 
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EX ANTE 
CONTRACTUAL 
EFFORTS 
αTZ=0.84 
CRTZ=0.80 
AVETZ=0.61 
 
αPL=0.91 
CRPL=0.90 
AVEPL=0.61 
We consulted lawyers and consultants in 
drafting contractual terms with this supplier 
Segal (1999) 
 
.712 .771 
We put great care and time into 
establishing contractual terms with this 
supplier 
.783 .82 
We ensured that each of the terms in the 
contract with this supplier was well 
specified 
.838 .909 
We ensured that the contract would be 
enforceable 
 .748 .910 
We ensured that the contract covered all 
dimensions of the relationship with this 
supplier 
.824 .899 
EX POST 
SPECIFICATIONS 
αTZ=0.83 
CRTZ=0.83 
AVETZ=0.63 
 
αPL=0.96 
CRPL=0.95 
AVEPL=0.87 
The contract specifies alternative solutions 
to various contingencies that are likely to 
arise 
 .875 .950 
The contract specifies major guidelines on 
how to handle unanticipated contingencies 
.857 .966 
The contract specifies the roles of the 
parties in dealing with contingencies 
.852 .967 
TRUST 
αTZ=0.86 
The parties hold mutual expectations that 
each will be flexible and responsive to 
Carson, Madhok, & 
Wu (2006) 
.875 .890 
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CRTZ=0.80 
AVETZ=0.60 
 
αPL=89 
CRPL=0.80 
AVEPL=0.60 
requests from the other, even if not obliged 
to by our formal agreements 
Both parties understand each other when 
problems arise 
.885 .888 
Both parties understand that each will 
adjust to changing circumstances, even if 
not bound to change by formal agreement 
.898 .929 
NETWORK 
RELATIONS 
αTZ=0.86 
CRTZ=0.92 
AVETZ=0.80 
 
αPL=0.70 
CRPL=0.92 
AVEPL=0.80 
Our firm has worked intensively with one 
or more partners of this supplier 
Holm, Eriksson, & 
Johanson (1996), 
Nohria & Eccles 
(1992), Mitchell 
(1973) 
.913 .669 
Our firm has a close relationship with one 
or more partners of this supplier 
.910 .930 
Our firm has a collaborative relationship 
with one or more partners of this supplier – 
like a real team 
.833 .918 
αTZ, αPL =alpha in the Tanzanian and Polish data, CRTZ ,CRPL =composite reliability (Tanzanian/Polish data), AVETZ , 
AVEPL =average variance extracted (Tanzanian/Polish 
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CHAPTER NINE                                                   
CONTRIBUTION, FUTURE RESEARCH AND LIMITATION
12
 
 
9.0 Contribution 
The influence of the institution in shaping transactions has been emphasized by 
Williamson (1991). ‘‘Although microeconomic organization is formidably complex and 
has long resisted systematic analysis, that has been changing as new modes of analysis 
have become available, as recognition of the importance of institutions to economic 
performance has grown, and as the limits of earlier modes of analysis have become 
evident’’ (Williamson, 1991: 269). Perhaps a major limitation in most studies in the 
contractual governance is the setting that is used in obtaining the analytical results. 
Though it is clear that the contracting is determined by the nature of transaction and 
corresponding institutional environment (Luo, 2005; Oxley, 1999), much was not 
adequately addressed in terms of in integrating the institutions in the contractual 
literature.  
Most studies tend to use single context or homogeneous countries. One of the alternatives 
to address the situation is to apply heterogeneous institutional data (Oxley, 1999). Shenka 
& Mary Ann von (1994) pointed out that the macro-level theories such as institutions 
have proved to be relevant when studying organizations operating in different 
environments.  A channel dyad is a social system (Stern and Reve, 1980), thus the ways 
by which firms respond to contractual hazards differ across countries (Williamson, 1991; 
Joskow, 1988; Poppo and Zenger, 2002).  These differences can be influenced by the 
institutional processes (Grewal & Dharwadkar, 2002).  Though it is clear that the 
contracting is determined by the nature of transaction and corresponding institutional 
environment (Luo, 2005; Oxley, 1999), much has missed in terms of integrating the 
dynamics of institutions in the contractual literature.  
At a managerial level, most of the decisions that are undertaken are to a large extent a by-
product of cultural values (Schneider and De Meyer, 1991; Hofstede, 1980). The 
contextual surrounding or the institutional environment can encourage or discourage 
inter-firm relations (North, 1990). This study has an important feature because it looks at 
micro level theories and makes inferences at a macro level. 
 
                                                          
12
 The references that are used in this section are available at the end of chapter three 
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Contractual governance literature has moved from incomplete perspective (where we 
have less to do about it), towards the discussion of optimal and complex structures. It is 
not sufficient to understand that the parties can reach an optimal or complex contractual 
arrangement (not necessarily ‘complete’) but the more relevance is the understanding of 
the factors that influence such a choice. Further, there is a need to subject these factors in 
the institutional laboratory to come up with a broader predictive potential. The findings 
from this study increments the theory of contracting by addressing both the exogenous 
(Grossman & Hart, 1986; Hart & Moore, 1990) and endogenous (Bolton & Faure-
Grimaud, 2010; Hart & Moore 2008; Tirole, 1999, 2009) perspectives of contracts.  
Another area where there has been much debate when it comes to contractual governance 
is the complementary (Aubert et al., 2006; Blomqvist, Hurmelinna & Seppänen, 2005; 
Hart and Moore, 2008; Klein, 1996; Möllering, 2002; Seppänen, Blomqvist & Sundqvist, 
2007) versus the substitutive roles (Gulati 1995; Oxley 1997; Yu, Liao, Lin, 2006). 
Literature on contractual governance has extensively supported the complementary role 
of relational dimensions. Although this kind of debate approached an end, the 
institutional perspective has not been well explored. The basic argument has been that 
due to cultural and institutional differences, the relational dimensions could substitute the 
contractual governance especially in emerging markets.  
This study has incremented this debate by suggesting that the complementary role of 
relational dimensions extends to the two contractual dimensions (from Luo, 2002). 
Relational norms play an important role in obtaining the relevant information from 
partners that assist in establishing better contracts. The adaptation element of relational 
governance is driven by a desire for partners to maintain the relationship by showing 
willingness to adjust to new situations. Relational norms are thus important for the 
adaptation because it enable partner to agree smoothly when contingencies arise.  
Further, the difficulties in specifying the terms can arise from the information asymmetry. 
Adaptation can be enhanced when the parties have a good relational base, a matter which 
is less likely when partners come from different backgrounds. Schepker and colleagues 
(2014) suggested the future research on this area should look at how cultural distance 
influences the safeguard mechanism and its effectiveness. When two partners come from 
different cultural backgrounds, their cultural difference (Shenkar and Zeira, 1992) can 
likely challenge the interpretations of contractual terms (Cavusgil et al., 2004). The study 
has incremented these arguments by indicating how the presence of a foreign partner in 
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an inter-firm relationship can hinder both ex-ante contractual term specificity and 
contingent adaptability.     
The studies that took place in China and Eastern Europe (Xin & Pearce, 1996; Roth & 
Kostova, 2003; Peng & Zhou, 2005) have indicated the support on the institutional role in 
the contractual governance. What the findings from this study suggests is that, when 
institutions are aligned towards the market, the values for complementary role are 
stronger, but when the institutions move toward non-market, those values are weaker 
(substitutive effect).  
The completeness structure of a contract is a choice between tightening (ex-ante term 
specificity) and relaxing (contingent adaptability) the contractual terms. Arithmetic 
computation of such choices is not a straight forward as economic theories assume, thus 
providing an empirical examination behind these dimensions (term specificity and 
contingent adaptability) is important. In addition, the theoretical distinction concerning 
these dimensions has not been well established.  
 
Consistent with Vandaele and colleagues (2007), the findings from this study suggests 
that the high level of technological uncertainty decreases the effect of asset specificity on 
both contingent adaptability and contractual term specificity. There is always a trade-off 
between contingent adaptability and term specificity (Hart & Moore, 2008), thus the 
increased choice toward contingent adaptability as a result of increased levels of volume 
uncertainty, does not significantly affect the degree of the term specification. We 
contribute to the literature of contracting by providing the theoretical and empirical 
argument concerning the differences and drivers behind these contractual dimensions.  
 
The psychological side of the contractual governance is important in studying contracts. 
Study on fairness in the contractual relations by Poppo and Zhuo (2013) indicates the 
relevance of the subject not only on performance but on ethical grounds. Actors in the 
exchange relationship are not machines; they are human by nature. The psychological 
element is reflected by how the parties respond (feel) concerning their contractual 
governance structure. We contribute to the literature of contracting by exploring the 
drivers behind contractual satisfaction. It is important to look at the satisfaction side 
because when partners are not satisfied, the survival of the relationship is at risk.  
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The confidence and a sense of security that is built by trust, tends to favor the evolution 
of contractual relations, even when there are unexplained discrepancies. On the other 
hand, reputation influences expectations. Reputable firms tend to protect their identity 
because it is a valuable asset. In doing, so they tend to build healthy relations with their 
partners. Contractual term specificity establishes standards for evaluating contractual 
performance or experiences. This minimizes the normative evaluations which will likely 
result in dissatisfaction. Industrial/channel relations literature has not provided this link 
(term specificity and contractual satisfaction) but this study has indicated the relevance of 
establishing clear terms. Grønhaug & Gilly (1991) have previously pointed out that 
dissatisfaction can at a large extent come from the areas outside contractual aspects. This 
is a clear indication that the wider the unspecified aspects, the more likely the chances for 
opportunism and ultimately dissatisfaction.  
 
The general observation from this study is that both the structural and relational 
dimensions have an important contribution to contractual satisfaction. Understanding the 
drivers that influence contractual satisfaction is important because it shifts the attention 
from how inter-firm contractual governance can be organized to how best it can 
maximize parties’ normative intentions (expectations). The endogenous choice 
concerning the contractual optimality does not trade off the relational dynamics that 
surround a transaction. Further, the development of collaborative relations depends to a 
large extent on adaptation (Axelsson & Easton, 1992).  
Adaptations that partner will undergo in the relationship are normally specified in the 
contracts (Jonsson & Zineldin, 2003). Adaptation whether formally specified or 
informally, provides a signal of the willingness to cooperate (Ganesan, 1994). Adaptation 
can also influence the willingness to customize (Doney & Cannon, 1997). As markets 
become more formal, contractual dimensions have mixed effects on the existing channel 
relations. High ex ante contractual efforts are prevalent in more formalized market 
economies (Dwyer et al., 1987).  
Studies from consumer (Cardozo, 1965, Churchill and Surprenant, 1982; Oliver, 1977, 
1980; Tse & Wilton, 1988; Westbrook, 1981; Yi, 1991), and channels or business 
relations (Anderson & Narus, 1990; Andaleeb, 1996; Genesan, 1994; Geyskens & 
Steenkamp, 2000; Ruekert and Churchill, 1984) tend to use the aggregate level of 
satisfaction, but contractual satisfaction is a transaction-specific and post-evaluation of 
the experience with the partner in a contractual relationship. The study has contributed in 
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terms of introducing a conceptual model for contractual satisfaction as well as providing 
an empirical assessment of its key drivers. The literature in the area of culture suggests 
that culture has a significant influence when it comes to making decisions (Schneider and 
De Meyer, 1991; Hofstede, 1980) such as contracts. Our findings suggest that in less 
advanced emerging markets this is even more important. 
The discussion on high versus low context culture can be useful in explaining the 
differences in the interaction effects between the two countries. In a high-context culture, 
an explicit meaning is very important in the message, while in low-context culture, terms 
are specified in much detail (Larsen et al., 2002). In a low context culture (such as 
Poland) ex-post specifications give a good combination with trust because the partner 
will feel more secure with an increased level of details. On the other hand, in a high 
context culture (such as Tanzania), ex-post specifications do not make a good 
combination with trust because the increased level of details in handling the anticipated 
outcomes can symbolize a lack of trust.  
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9.1 Future Research 
There are potential future research areas that need to be addressed concerning the topics 
that have been covered in this study. These areas are both theoretical and methodological 
by nature. Literature suggests that completeness is one of the contributing aspects 
towards complexity (Furlotti, 2007); the reason being that it is not the level of 
specifications that lead to complexity but the number of the clauses. Future research can 
explore the separation between the simple, complete and complex contracts. This 
separation is important because Crocker & Reynolds (1993) suggested that the optimal 
contractual level is a function of completeness and the costs for doing so.  
General question is whether there are optimal complete and optimal complex contracts. 
The challenge around research in contractual governance is that most concepts emerge 
from the operationalization and factor analysis. In future scholars can focus on reaching 
consensus on most of these concepts (contractual dimensions) through strong theoretical 
and empirical support.  
The nomological issues were not a big challenge in most of classical economic papers on 
contractual completeness because there was a general consensus on most of the 
assumptions. This is different from most of research work in the area of management.  
The closely similar problem is that various dimensions within the contracts have not been 
well reconciled (Furlotti, 2007). One way to reconcile these dimensions is to conduct 
further research that will bring more validity and reliability. Coordination has been 
pointed out to be important components in the contracts (Brousseau, 1995). Future 
studies need to examine the condition by which coordination procedures are important 
aspects of contracts (Furlotti, 2007). Ex-ante efforts are part of the coordination 
procedures that take place before the commencement of contracts. Future studies can 
examine in detail these ex-ante procedures and their influence on contracts.  
 
How contracts influence partners’ behavior, satisfaction and performance (Schepker et 
al., 2014) are also a potential area for future research. Fairness’s has an important role in 
sustaining inter-firm relationships (Das & Teng, 1998; Ring & Van de Ven, 1994). Poppo 
and Zhou (2013) found that exchange performance is higher when contracts and fairness 
exist and thus maximizing fairness involves appropriate levels of monitoring or 
socializing. Future studies can explore critical areas that have more weight on contractual 
satisfaction and their outcomes (in terms of performance). 
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Further research can leverage on the role of content and contexts aspects in improving the 
reliability and validity of results. This can include an investigation of whether the nature / 
type of firms (manufacturing versus non-manufacturing) has influence on contractual 
completeness. Institutional context is another broad area that can bring a rich 
understanding on the subject. At a managerial level, most of the decisions that are 
undertaken are to a large extent a by-product of cultural values (Schneider and De Meyer, 
1991; Hofstede, 1980). The contextual surrounding or the institutional environment can 
encourage or discourage inter-firm relations (North, 1990). It could be more interesting to 
investigate in more detail the role of institutions in contracts. The institution is a broad 
concept; the concepts can be broken down in some specific variables when investigating 
such a role. Though it is clear that contracting is determined by the nature of the 
transaction (transaction dimensions) and corresponding institutional environment (Luo, 
2005; Oxley, 1999), much is still to be done in integrating the dynamics of institutions in 
the contractual literature.   
Future research can look at whether there are distinctive clauses across different countries 
or institutions. When two partners come from different cultural backgrounds, their 
cultural difference (Shenkar and Zeira, 1992) can likely challenge the interpretations of 
contractual terms (Cavusgil et al., 2004). 
Methodology is another important area for improvement in future research. The level of 
analysis should be taken into account in future research. For example, the national level 
analysis can be performed when there is a large sample of countries involved. The use of 
panel data can improve some of the explanations that cannot be captured by cross-
sectional data. We suggest future studies to also utilize different forms of data (panel and 
cross-sectional). Operationalization of constructs is also an important area for 
improvement in future studies. Measures for the concept of contractual satisfaction can 
be improved in future studies. The clear distinction between general relationship 
satisfaction and contractual satisfaction can be developed. Future research can also 
examine the empirical differences of these concepts.  
 
The current study has used few theoretical frameworks, but future studies can extend to a 
number of other theories such as resource dependence, social exchange and resource 
based view. Application of these other theories can expand into interactive relations.  We 
also suggest a different approach to studying these dimensions such as critical incidence 
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that involve analysis of critical historical points of a relationship. The comparison of 
different satisfaction levels can provide a broad theoretical insight.   
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9.2 Limitation 
This study is limited in terms of the following aspects: First, it has used only two 
countries from emerging markets for comparison. This limits the generalizability of the 
findings to other emerging markets. Furthermore, the study used manufacturing firms and 
thus the findings might not apply to non-manufacturing firms. Reliance on responses 
drawn from the buying side of the relationship brings another limitation; however, there 
are ongoing discussions in the literature concerning the relevance of using data from both 
sides of the dyadic relation.  
Using the questionnaire is another limitation of the study. An alternative mechanism 
would be to assess the real contractual documents. This method was not opted due to 
availability of such data. Reliance on empirical analysis is also a limitation in this study. 
We are aware of the potential benefits of using case studies or other methods such as 
critical incidents.  
This study is limited by investigating only inter-firm contractual relations and no other 
forms of contracts (such as between firms and individuals). Further, the study is limited 
on how it involved the institutional context. The institutional element has not been broken 
down into specific variable (sub-components). This makes it difficult to attribute the 
observed effects with some particular institutional variable. Data that has been used are 
cross-sectional. This makes it difficult to provide sufficient treatment of concepts like 
history and its influence on contractual governance.    
An extensive literature on contracts has emerged from economics. The assumptions and 
models that are employed in such literature tend to differ with the approach used in 
management studies. This study is limited by focusing on the approach that is used in 
management though the concepts applied in the economic models have been 
acknowledged.  
Time and financial constraints are other limitations of this work. This project had only a 
limited amount of funds and a time allocation of three years. Within this limited time 
framework a candidate is required to do theoretical classes for about one year and the 
remaining two years are for doing the research. The field works normally takes a lot of 
time to prepare and execute. The budget and time limitations minimized a number of 
options that could be used.    
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9.3 Conclusion  
Whether it is completeness or satisfaction perspective of contracts, extending the 
relevance and scope of any theory is within the wishes of any researcher. The use of both 
local and international contexts provides stronger predictive power, especially in the 
social sciences. We have managed to contribute to the literature of contracts by showing 
how institutional context can influence the contractual structures. We understand that the 
study has not addressed all aspects, but has provided a strong base on which future 
studies can build upon.  
Contractual governance is an important part of the transaction. It is of little relevance to 
understand the dimensions of contracts without the knowledge of how these dimensions 
are driven. Studying contracts at the level of two dimensions is important for obtaining 
insights on what drives the degree of any given contractual relationship. Relational 
dimensions have critical influence in emerging markets, but they are not merely 
substitutes for contracts. Their role is factor and context dependent. Further, the cost 
component can significantly contribute to changes in the contractual structures across 
different economies. Though the literature has moved towards assessing the complexity 
of contracts, we still understand that there is a gap that needs to be addressed within the 
completeness reasoning. The degree of asset specificity and its interaction with 
environmental uncertainty (volume uncertainty in particular) are the key distinctive 
drivers that differentiate term specificity and contingent adaptability.  
 
The asymmetrical influence of these factors call for critical decision on which side to 
base attention on (term specification versus contingent adaptability). In situations such as 
increased asset specificity (that has a positive influence on contingent adaptability), the 
establishment of strong informal/social enforcement mechanism is essential. The 
situation is similar when there is a combination of specific asset and volume uncertainty. 
This situation leads to a positive effect on contingent adaptability.   
 
Contingent adaptability has to be opted in such a situation due to difficulties in specifying 
terms. The two dimensional aspects of contracts are not opposing sides of contracts, but 
complements that provide practical guidance (on which aspect require strong emphasis 
and under what conditions).   
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Managers need to ensure that their contractual relations with existing partners are well 
secured because failure can lead to dissatisfaction in other contractual relations.  Being 
able to design contractual terms is as relevant as adjusting to uncertainties. 
Dissatisfaction that leads to termination of the contractual relationship is largely a 
function of failure to adapt rather than the specification of terms. Behavioral 
interventions that can lead to a reduced level of perceived opportunism are also relevant 
in ensuring that partners are not dissatisfied by factors that are not core to contractual 
performance.   
 
Contractual satisfaction has practical significance for managers because it is a specific 
level of assessing contractual relations. Exchange features (such as how contracts are 
specified) and the relational dimensions are significant in influencing contractual 
satisfaction. In designing contracts, the role of term specificity and of adaptability should 
receive proper attention so as to facilitate contractual satisfaction. When choosing 
partners, ex-ante aspects such as reputation can be used as assessment criteria because 
they contribute towards contractual satisfaction.   
 
Understanding contractual satisfaction drivers is of relevance in setting up proper 
governance that will ensure that both specific assets and fragile relational dimensions are 
safeguarded. Perceived contractual satisfaction is not assumed to be the same across 
markets. This is due to specific institutional arrangements relating to where a particular 
market stands in the transformation process. While most firms focus on safeguarding, 
firms that focus on both safeguards and relational aspects will have a satisfying 
contractual exchange. In relatively less advanced emerging economies, it seems that one 
can rely on relations and ex-post specifications, especially in situations when behavioral 
uncertainty is considered higher.    
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APPENDIX A                                                                   
COUNTRY PROFILES
13
 
 
Poland 
 
Location 
Poland is located in Central Europe with geographical coordinates of 52 00 north and 20 
00 east. Bordering countries are Belarus, Czech Republic, Germany, Lithuania, Russia, 
Slovakia and Ukraine 
 
Capital city 
Poland capital city is Warsaw 
 
Area 
Poland has the total area of 312,685 sq km and is ranked at 70
th
 position in comparison to 
the world.  
 
GDP-Per capita (ppp) 
Poland GDP per capita is 20, 100 (according to 2011 estimates). In comparison to the 
world, the country ranks at 63
rd
 position.  
 
GDP growth rate 
Poland GDP growth rate is estimated to be around 3.8% (according to 2011 
estimates).The country is ranked at 105
th
 position in comparison to the world.  
 
Population 
Poland population is about 38,415,284 (according to July 2012 estimates). 
 
GDP composition by sector 
Poland’s GDP is supported by mainly agriculture, industry and services at a proportion of 
3.4%, 33.6% and 63% respectively.   
                                                          
13
 Information concerning country profile, otherwise stated, it was retrieved from Factbook, 2012. 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/pl.html, accessed on 18
th
 April, 2012 
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Institutions 
In Institutional performance, Poland is ranked 54
th
 position out of 139 countries with a 
score of 4.18. It is also ranked at 39
th
 position out of 83 in EU27 (Klaus & World Bank, 
2010). 
 
General economic history 
Poland disintegrated from communist system (Prazmowska, 2010) with a solidarity 
government that entered in to power in 1989 and marked a successful path toward market 
liberalization.  Joining EOCD since 2004, Poland has experienced significant economic 
growth (EOCD, 2006) and was ranked among key emerging markets of Europe (S&P, 
2010, Dow Jone, 2011).  
 
Poland is considered to be in transition from efficiency driven to innovation driven 
(Klaus &World Bank, 2010). The country’s GDP has been rising at the reasonable pace 
since late 1990’s (EOCD, 2006) and the pick was reached in 2007 with annual growth 
rate of 6.8%, which was interfered by global economic down turn and dropped to a 
current rate (2010-2011) of 3.9% (World Bank, 2012). Current growth rate is considered 
to be best in comparison to other European countries, the fact that made Poland the only 
European country that did not experience recession (Pleitgen, CNN, Davies, 2010; 
Brogger & Lovasz, 2009).  
 
Tanzania 
 
Location 
Tanzania is a country in the eastern part of Africa with a latitude and longitude reading of 
6° 00' South and 35° 00' east. Tanzania's commercial capital (Dar es Salaam) sits in 
between 6° 48' South latitude and 39° 17' East longitude. 
 
Capital  
Dodoma is the official capital city of Tanzania, but Dar es salaam is the commercial city.  
 
Area 
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Tanzania has a total area of 947,300sq km, where 885,800 sq km is land and 61,500sq km 
is water 
 
GDP per Capita  
Tanzania has a GDP per Capital of $1,500 (according to 2011 estimates) 
 
GDP growth rate 
Tanzania GDP growth rate is about 6.1% (according to 2011 estimates). The country is 
ranked at 42
nd
 position in comparison to the world.  
 
Composition by Sector 
Agriculture contributes about 27.8% of country’s GDP while industry and service 
contributes 24.2% and 48% respectively. 
 
Population  
Tanzania population is about 43,601,796 (according to July 2012 estimates). The country 
ranks at 30
th
 position in comparison to the world.  
 
Institutions 
According to institutional performance ranking of 2010-2011, Tanzania is ranked 83
rd
 out 
of 139 countries with a score of 3.74 in 7-points scale (Klaus & World Bank, 2010).    
 
General economic history 
Tanzania is considered to have undergone significant political and macroeconomic 
reforms since 1995 (Havnevik & Isinika 2010) though there was structural adjustments 
reforms in mid-1980 that followed the economic crisis on 1970’s. In its early years of 
independent, Tanzania adopted African socialism policies also known as ujamaa 
(familyhood) that lead to the establishment of collective villages, the program which 
ended up with massive failure and was later abandoned around 1975 (Lofchie, 1978).   
Tanzania being one of the fastest growing economies in Africa (Economist, 2011) is 
considered to be a factor driven economy (Klaus, 2010). In 2007, Tanzania’s annual GDP 
was 7.1%, the rate which was sustained by around 7% in between 2010-2011 (World 
Bank, 2012) in spite of global economic downturn. Future forecasts indicate Tanzania to 
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maintain the position of top ten fastest growing economies with estimated annual growth 
of around 7.2% between years 2011-2015 (Economist, 2011).   
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APPENDIX B                                                         
QUESTIONNAIRE 
 
 
  
A SURVEY ON SUPPLIER-BUYER CONTRACTUAL RELATIONS 2011 
 
    This is survey which focus on understanding the buyer-supplier contractual relationship. 
To be able to answer this questionnaire please choose one of your largest (first, second 
or third) domestic or international supplier i.e. the one you purchase highest volume of 
your supplies from. 
   If you have any document that is viewed as contractual forms with this supplier, please 
have them readily available, just in case you will need to refer to them in course of 
answering these questions. The questions are not technical in jurisdictional terms and 
there is no right and wrong answer but if you have such documents it make it easy.  
   The anonymity in this study will be highly ensured. All the information obtained will be 
treated with confidence. Your company name will not be mentioned anywhere in our 
reports. Data obtained from this study will be used for academic and no further usage. 
Expected time for answering this questionnaire is between 10-15 minutes. 
We really appreciate for your time in answering this questionnaire. 
SECTON A 
1. Business name (optional) 
________________________________________ 
2. Year of establishment 
____________________ 
3. How many employees do your firm has? 
__________ 
4. What was approximated last year sales turnover for your firm? (TZS) 
__________ 
5. How long have you worked with this company (years)? 
____________________ 
6. What is your position in this company? 
_________________________________________ 
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7. The supplier you have chosen in answering the rest of questions is: 
  Domestic subsidiary of international company 
  Joint venture with international partner 
  Domestic company owned by local citizen 
  Foreign company 
8. If the supplier is foreign company, please mention its country of origin 
__________________________________________________ 
9. Please indicate the country which arbitration will take place when there are conflicts 
(incase of international supplier) 
__________________________________________________ 
10. Approximately how many years has this relationship with supplier lasted? 
__________________________________________________ 
11. 1How many times do you receive supplies from this supplier? (Choose either monthly or 
annually) 
  Monthly __________ 
  Annually __________ 
SECTION B 
For the rest of questions, please provide your opionion by ticking your choice 
12. To which extent does statements below give description of supplier dependence to your 
firm. Please rank them to the extent they give accurate description    (1=completely 
inaccurate, 2=inaccurate, 3=uncertain, 4=accurate, 5=completely accurate) 
 1 2 3 4 5 
If we stopped buying from this 
supplier, he would easily 
replace our volume with 
another buyer 
          
it is relatively easy for this 
supplier to find another buyer 
for his products 
     
Finding another buyer would 
not affect the price this 
     
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 1 2 3 4 5 
supplier charge 
If the relationship is 
terminated, it will not hurt this 
supplier 
     
13. Statements below give a description on investment made by your firm in this relationship 
with supplier. Please rank them to extent they give accurate description (1=completely 
inaccurate, 2= inaccurate, 3= neutral, 4= accurate, 5=completely accurate) 
 1 2 3 4 5 
We have made significant 
investment in equipment 
dedicated to our relationship 
with this supplier 
      
We have adjusted ourselves 
in order to deal with this 
supplier 
      
Training our people to deal 
with this supplier has involved 
substantial commitments of 
time and money 
     
We have rescheduled our 
time and operations in 
dealing with this supplier  
       
We have significantly 
invested money and time in 
establishing the market for 
the product(s) we purchase 
from this supplier 
 
      
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14. Statements below give a description on investment made by the supplier in relationship 
with your firm. Please rank them to the extent they give accurate description 
(1=completely inaccurate, 2=inaccurate, 3=uncertain, 4=accurate, 5=completely 
accurate) 
 1 2 3 4 5 
Supplier have trained their 
employees to deal with our 
firm 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Supplier has made 
substantial commitment of 
time and money to meet our 
demands 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Supplier production system 
has been tailored to produce 
for our firm 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Supplier has customized the 
product we purchase from 
him to meet our specific 
needs. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Supplier has customized the 
distribution services to meet 
our demands 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
15. Following statements relates to how your firm views the supplier firm. Please give a rank 
to an extent which you think they give an accurate description (1=completely 
inaccurate,2=inaccurate, 3=uncertain, 4=accurate, 5= completely accurate) 
 1 2 3 4 5 
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 1 2 3 4 5 
On occation, this supplier do 
not provide the complete truth 
for the sake of protecting his 
interests 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
On occasion, this supplier 
promises to do things without 
actually doing them later 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This supplier rarely act in 
accordance with our contract 
(s) 
     
This supplier sometimes tries 
to breach informal 
agreements we have made to 
maximize his benefit 
     
This supplier sometimes uses 
unexpected events for his 
advantage 
     
This supplier rarely act in 
accordance with our 
expectations 
     
 
 
 
     
16. Following statements below give description on your knowledge about the supplier. 
Please rank the accuracy of these statements (1=completely inaccurate, 2=inaccurate, 
3=uncertain, 4=accurate, 5=completely accurate) 
 1 2 3 4 5 
We are uncertain about how 
our supplier organizes 
     
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 1 2 3 4 5 
purchases used for producing 
the product (s) we buy from 
him 
Our knowledge about our 
supplier's production process 
is limited 
     
We have little knowledge 
about the terms of trade the 
supplier offers to other buyers 
      
It is difficult to interpret how 
supplier perceives the 
present relationship with our 
firm 
      
We are uncertain about our 
supplier's future plans 
     
17. Following statements relate to how you view supplier performance. Please rank them to 
the extent on which you agree or disagree with them (1=completely disagree, 2= 
disagree, 3= uncertain, 4=agree, 5-completely agree) 
 1 2 3 4 5 
It is inadequate to evaluate 
this supplier based on item 
(s) price 
     
It is difficult to verify whether 
this supplier is performing all 
of its contractual obligations 
under this agreement 
     
Evaluating the supplier's 
performance is a complex 
process 
      
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 1 2 3 4 5 
It is expensive to monitor this 
supplier 
          
We do not have clear 
standards to assess the 
performance of this supplier 
       
18. Statements below relate to how terms in the contract are specified between your firm and 
the supplier. Rank the statements to the extent on which you agree or disagree with them 
(1=completely disagree, 2=disagree, 3=uncertain, 4=agree, 5=completely agree) 
 1 2 3 4 5 
Agreements stipulate all 
aspects concerning exchange 
of information about price and 
market condition between our 
firms 
     
Written contracts stiputate all 
aspects regarding quality 
control of products we 
purchase from this supplier 
     
Written contracts stipulate all 
aspects regarding the 
selection of sub-suppliers for 
the product we order from this 
supplier 
      
Detailness in our contractual 
relationship with our supplier 
is given a key priority 
      
Written agreements stipulate 
how to handle problems 
     
Written agreement stipulate        
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 1 2 3 4 5 
the role of parties in the 
relationship 
Written agreement stipulate 
all aspects regarding delivery  
     
      
19. Statements below relate to things that were done to ensure terms were well specified 
between your firm and the supplier. Rank the statements to the extent on which you 
agree or disagree with them (1=completely disagree,2=disagree, 3=uncertain, 4=agree, 
5=completely agree) 
 1 2 3 4 5 
We consulted lawyers and 
consultants in drafting 
contractual terms with this 
supplier 
     
We gave great care and time 
in establishing contractual 
terms with this supplier 
       
We ensured each terms 
related to this contract with 
the supplier were well 
specified 
     
We ensured that the contract 
is enforceable 
       
We ensured the contract 
covers all the dimensions of 
the relationship with this 
supplier 
     
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20. Following statements relate to items that a contract or agreement covers. Please rank 
them to the extent on which you agree or disagree with them (1=completely disagree, 
2=disagree, 3=uncertain, 4=agree, 5=completely agree) 
 1 2 3 4 5 
Planned price/volume is well 
specified 
       
Payment terms are well 
specified 
     
Expected/targeted 
performance level to be 
reached is well specified 
     
Arbitration procedures are 
well specified in our contract 
     
Re-negotiation periods were 
planned before the relation 
began 
     
Contract has specified major 
principles or guidelines for 
handling unanticipated 
contingencies as they arises 
     
Duration of contract is well 
specified 
      
Parties liability are well 
specified 
     
Responsibility of parties are 
well specified 
     
Termination rights are well 
specified 
      
Information flow is well      
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 1 2 3 4 5 
specified 
Confidentiality of information 
exchange is well specified 
      
Subcontracting options are 
well specified 
     
Exclusive rights of parties are 
well specified 
      
21. Statements below relate to how you perceive the reputation of the supplier. Rank these 
statements to the extent on which you agree or disagree with them (1=completely 
disagree, 2=disagree, 3=uncertain, 4=agree, 5=completely agree) 
 1 2 3 4 5 
Quality of supplier's 
management is high 
     
Quality of product and 
services of this supplier is 
high 
     
This supplier is performing 
good financially  
      
This supplier has ability to 
attract, develop, and keep 
talented people 
     
This supplier is social and 
environmental responsible 
     
This supplier has ethical 
behavior and reliable 
     
This supplier is well 
respected in society 
     
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22. Statements below relate to relational between your firm and the supplier. Rank the 
statements to the extent on which you agree or disagree with them (1=completely 
disagree, 2=disagree, 3=uncertain, 4=agree, 5=completely agree) 
 1 2 3 4 5 
We solve together the 
problems that arise in this 
relationship 
     
The parties are committed to 
mutual benefits 
     
We share jointly the 
responsibility for making this 
relationship work well  
     
There is flexibility in response 
to changes in this relationship  
     
We expect to adjust 
ourselves to cope with 
changing circumstances 
     
When some unexpected 
situation arises, we work out 
a new deal together 
     
Parties are can changes the 
terms together whenever 
necessary 
     
It is expected that any 
information that might help 
the other part will be provided 
to them 
     
Exchange of information in 
this relationship takes place 
frequently and informally 
     
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 1 2 3 4 5 
It is expected that the parties 
will provide strategic 
information if it can help the 
other part 
      
It is expected that we keep 
each other informed about 
events or changes that may 
affect the other part 
      
23. Statements below relate to linkage you had with the supplier. Rank the statements to the 
extent on which you agree or disagree with them (1=completely disagree,2=disagree, 
3=uncertain, 4=agree, 5=completely agree) 
 1 2 3 4 5 
Our firm worked intensively 
with one or more partners of 
this supplier 
     
Our firm had a close 
relationship with one or more 
partners of this supplier 
     
Our firm had a collaborative 
relationship with one or more 
partners of this supplier like a 
real team 
     
Our firm's relationship with 
the partner of this supplier did 
not involve many formal 
procedures 
        
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24. Below statements relate to perceived risk in the relationship with the supplier. Rank the 
statements to the extent on which you agree or disagree with them (1=completely 
disagree, 2=disagree, 3=uncertain, 4=agree, 5=completely agree) 
 1 2 3 4 5 
We are confident that the 
supplier will deliver according 
to the agreements 
     
We are confident that the 
relationship will not break 
       
We are confident that we will 
not loose our assets in this 
relationship 
     
We are confident that supplier 
will adapt even when 
circumstances change 
     
We have confidence that the 
supplier will meet the 
standards for our customers 
      
 
 
 
     
 
25. Following statements relate to flexibility in your relationship with supplier. Please rank 
them to the extent on which you agree or disagree with them (1=completely disagree, 
2=disagree, 3=uncertain, 4=agree, 5=completely agree) 
 1 2 3 4 5 
Terms are flexible for issues 
that are valnerable to 
uncertain enviornment or 
resource availability 
     
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 1 2 3 4 5 
Contract has specified 
alternative solutions in 
responding to various 
contingecies that are likely to 
arise 
     
Contract has specified major 
guidelines on how to handle 
unanticipated contingencies 
      
Contract has specified the 
roles of parties in dealing with 
contingencies 
      
26. Following statements relate to informal relations with your supplier. Please rank them to 
the extent on which you agree or disagree with them (1=completely disagree,2=disagree, 
3=uncertain, 4=agree, 5=completely agree) 
 1 2 3 4 5 
Most of our transactions with 
this supplier do not base on 
formal agreements 
     
We use more words than 
written terms in our 
transactions with this supplier 
     
Our relation with this supplier 
is more of friendness in 
nature  
     
Both our firm and the supplier 
have easy access to each 
other without formal barriers 
     
When problem arise we solve 
them ourselves without 
     
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 1 2 3 4 5 
involving external agencies 
like courts 
Our business agreements 
with this supplier are 
concluded with simple 
arragements.  
     
We view this supplier as part 
of our firm 
      
      
27. Following statements relate to experience or history with your supplier. Please rank them 
to the extent on which you agree or disagree with them (1=completely 
disagree,2=disagree, 3=uncertain, 4=agree, 5=completely agree) 
 1 2 3 4 5 
We have known this supplier 
for long time 
     
We have enough 
understanding of this supplier 
     
We have a rich history with 
this supplier  
     
We have strong connections 
with this supplier which 
started long time ago  
     
Given our experience with 
this supplier, we consider him 
as part of our firm  
      
Given a long history of with 
this supplier, our relationship 
can hardly end up easily  
     
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28. Following statements relate to events experienced in this relationship with your supplier. 
Please rank them to the extent on which you agree or disagree with them (1=completely 
disagree,2=disagree, 3=uncertain, 4=agree, 5=completely agree) 
 1 2 3 4 5 
We have not had significant 
problems in the relationship 
     
Supplier has fulfilled all of our 
agreements 
     
We do not wish to change 
this supplier because so far 
he has been good 
     
We do not wish to put more 
monitoring on this supplier 
because he meet our 
expectations 
     
 
29. Below statements relate to trust between your firm and the supplier. Rank the statements 
to the extent on which you agree or disagree with them (1=completely 
disagree,2=disagree, 3=uncertain, 4=agree, 5=completely agree) 
 1 2 3 4 5 
The parties expectations are 
beyond what was specified in 
our formal agreements 
     
The parties expected that 
conflicts would be resolved 
fairly, even if no guidelines 
were given by our formal 
agreements 
     
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 1 2 3 4 5 
When an unexpected 
situation arise, the parties 
had a mutual understanding 
that a win-win solution would 
be found, even if it 
contradicted our formal 
agreements 
     
Both parties share helpful 
information informally 
     
The parties held mutual 
expectations that each would 
be flexible and responsive to 
requests by the other, even if 
not obliged by our formal 
agreements 
     
Both parties understood each 
other when problems arise 
     
Both parties understood that 
each would adjust to 
changing circumstances, 
even if not bound to change 
by formal agreements 
     
30. Following statements relate to how you are satisfied with the contractual relation with the 
supplier. Please rank them to the extent on which you agree or disagree with them (1-
completely disagree, 2=disagree, 3=uncertain, 4=agree, 5=completely agree) 
 1 2 3 4 5 
We feel this contract satisfies 
all dimensions of the 
relationship 
     
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 1 2 3 4 5 
We feel this contract provides 
direction needed for this 
relationship 
     
We feel this contract can be 
enforced when problems 
arise 
     
We feel this contract do not 
provide room for cheating 
     
We feel this contract do not 
need to be changed 
     
We feel this contract is 
optimal for the best of our 
knowledge 
     
31. Statements below measure the environmental variations (uncertainty). Please rank these 
statements at the extent which you agree or disagree with them (1=completely disagree, 
2=disagree, 3=uncertain, 4=agree, 5=completely agree) 
 1 2 3 4 5 
Demand for this product 
varies continually 
     
The demand conditions for 
our supplier's product (s) are  
irregular 
     
Our most important 
competitors are regularly 
carrying out product 
adjustment 
     
Technology used in this 
product change fast 
     
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 1 2 3 4 5 
It is difficult to predict where 
the technology used in this 
product will be in 2 to 3 years 
     
The technology used in 
manufacturing this product is 
complex 
     
There is much R&D involved 
in the development of this 
product 
  (   
Business policies related to 
this product change fast 
      
Difficult to predict how 
economic crisis affect this 
product 
     
Difficult to predict how 
political changes will affect 
this product 
     
Difficult to predict how 
international policies will 
affect this product 
     
It is difficult for us to predict 
our volume requirement for 
this product (s) from this 
supplier in short term bases 
     
32. If you have anything to add that we did not mention above, please provide it here 
________________________________________ 
________________________________________ 
________________________________________ 
________________________________________ 
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________________________________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
THANK YOU VERY MUCH FOR TAKING YOUR PRECIOUS TIME TO ANSWER OUR 
QUESTIONNAIRE! 
 
 
 
 
N:B For information regarding this questionnaire, please contact: 
E.J. Chao, +47 40582977, email: emmanuel.j.chao@uia.no 
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APPENDIX C 
DEFINITION OF KEY CONSTRUCTS 
 
Table below provides a brief overview of key terms that are used in this study. The table 
provides the meaning and the sources that they were extracted. The control variables are 
not covered in this table but they can be found in specific papers where they appear.  
 
Table 21: Definition of key concepts 
Concept Meaning  Sources 
Contractual completeness Ratio between specific 
rights and residual rights 
where specific rights refer 
to detailed specification of 
decision action in the ex-
ante period and residual 
rights refer to the planning 
of decision procedures 
which enable decision 
making about specific 
actions in the ex post period 
Hendrikse and Windsperger 
(2010:4).   
Brown, Potoski, & Van 
Slyke, 2007; Saussier, 2000 
 
Contractual satisfaction Contractual satisfaction is a 
specific transaction-level 
post-evaluation of the 
experience with the partner 
in a contractual relationship.  
Anderson,  & Sullivan, 
1993; Spreng et al., 1996 
Institutions  ‘‘regulative, normative, and 
cognitive structures and 
activities that provide 
stability and meaning to 
social behavior’’  
Scott, 1995: 33 
Ex-ante efforts (costs) Efforts or costs incurred by 
partners in establishing 
Hennart, 1993; North, 1990; 
Williamson, 1985 
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contractual relationship. 
These include searching and 
contractual drafting which 
take the form of 
consultation in an attempt to 
resolve the information 
asymmetry problem   
Trust Trust is defined as a state of 
mind,  belief or perception 
of the other party’s 
capability, goodwill and 
self-reference in future 
situations involving risk and 
vulnerability 
Blomqvist, 2002, Morgan& 
Hunt, 1994; Rousseau, 
Sitkin, Burt, & Camerer, 
1998; Zucker, 1986 
Networks Networks refer to relational 
connections that involve 
two or more organizations  
Thorelli, 1986: 37 
Relational norms Relational norm are 
expectations about attitudes 
and behaviors of parties 
when working cooperatively 
together to achieve mutual 
and individual goals  
Cannon, Achrol, & 
Gundlach, 2000, p. 183. 
Reputation  ‘‘a perceptual 
representation of a 
company’s past actions and 
future prospects that 
describe the firm’s appeal to 
all of its key constituents’  
Fombrun 1996: 165 
Buyer/supplier asset 
specificity 
These are durable 
investments that are 
undertaken in support of 
particular transactions, the 
Williamson 1985:5 
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opportunity cost of which 
investments is much lower 
in best alternative uses or by 
alternative users should the 
original transaction be 
prematurely terminated  
Ongoing/ex-ante/contractual 
term specificity* 
Concerns with how specific 
and detailed the terms are 
specified in the contractual 
arrangement   
Luo, 2002 (p. 905) 
Contingency 
adaptability/specifications 
(ex post contractual 
specifications)* 
Contingency adaptability 
deals with how to 
contractually respond to 
future problems, conflicts, 
and contingencies  
Luo, 2002 (p. 905) 
Foreigness of supply firm Defined by whether they 
dyadic relation is composed 
of partner from similar or 
dissimilar countries.  
 
Environmental uncertainty Unanticipated changes in 
circumstances surrounding 
an exchange 
Noordewier, 1990 (p. 82). 
Technological uncertainty Technological uncertainty is 
the inability to predict with 
precision the technical 
requirements of a 
relationship  
Walker & Weber, 1984 
Volume uncertainty Volume uncertainty is the 
inability to predict with 
precision the volume 
requirements in a 
relationship  
Walker & Weber, 1984 
Opportunism Self-interest seeking Williamson, 1975 
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behavior (cheat, lie or do 
other similar activities) for 
the sake of serving ones’ 
own interests at the expense 
of the other partner in the 
relationship 
Behavioral uncertainty Can be viewed in terms of 
difficulties in monitoring 
the contractual performance 
of an exchange partner.   
Williamson, 1991 
*some constructs have been used with their synonyms so as to be understood by readers 
from different disciplines/perspectives. Further the papers were sent to different journals 
and some terms appear to fit well for those outlets.  
The definition for the control variables can be obtained from the texts where they appear.  
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
375 
 
APPENDIX D: SNAPSHOTS OF PUBLISHED PAPERS 
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